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ABSTRACT

SITUATIONAL HERMENEUTICS IN THE NEW TESTAMENT’S USE OF THE OLD
William H. Boyd, Liberty University Baptist Theological Seminary, 2018
Advisor: Dr. Leo Percer
The New Testament’s use of the Old Testament presents some unique hermeneutical
challenges. New Testament authors utilize Old Testament texts in ways that do not seem to
strictly adhere to modern interpretive methods, and they seem to exhibit multiple hermeneutical
methods in their usage of scripture. This study seeks to explore the relationship between these
various ways of interpreting scripture, and to propose a consistent way of evaluating the
hermeneutical validity of varying usages which can apply to the New Testament’s use of the Old
as well as to modern interpretation of the Bible.
It begins by discussing the problem under consideration and laying out a methodology
which involves comparing two instances of New Testament usage which utilize the same Old
Testament text in differing ways. This study then explores two such texts, Romans 9:7 and
Hebrews 11:18, which both use the same Old Testament text, Genesis 21:12. It proposes speech
act theory as a framework for furnishing a method of consistently evaluating the usage of
scripture in multiple situational contexts. This study discusses speech acts as they appear in
Romans 9:7, Hebrews 11:18, and Genesis 21:12. Using these texts as examples, it then
demonstrates how speech act theory can effectively account for situational factors which render
varying interpretations hermeneutically valid within their respective situational contexts. Finally,
this study proposes the concept of a situational hermeneutic as a way to broadly account for the
variety of ways in which the New Testament uses the Old, and it examines how a situational
hermeneutic might be applied to modern usage of scripture.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

Introduction
Even among those who can agree upon the centrality of Scripture to the lives of followers
of Christ, upon its inerrancy, authority, and its status as the very word of God, there remain
nuances of understanding with regard to how Scripture is to be interpreted. The whole field of
hermeneutics is devoted to this question. However, simply asserting that the Bible is inerrant or
that one holds to a literal interpretation is rarely sufficient to account for one’s interpretation of
the wide range of biblical materials. The Bible is a complex document, and interpreting it
correctly demands a deep level of engagement and no small amount of careful effort, particularly
for those who seek to understand it thousands of years after its books were written, and who must
therefore struggle against cultural, linguistic, and historical barriers to understanding.
Much has been done to establish modern techniques and traditions of biblical
interpretation. Historical-grammatical interpretation has benefited greatly from historical and
linguistic scholarship even within the last century. Historical-grammatical interpretation, which
locates the source of meaning in authorial intent, provides a reliable basis for a rational and
objective approach. However, the study of hermeneutics has a difficulty with which it must
contend under this historical-grammatical rubric: the New Testament’s own hermeneutical
approach to the Old Testament. The hermeneutics evident within the New Testament’s use of the
Old have the distinction of being part of inspired Scripture. Either those hermeneutics practiced
by the New Testament are themselves inspired and inerrant, or else they raise a serious question
concerning how an inerrant text could exhibit an erroneous hermeneutic. Yet, the manner in
which the New Testament uses the Old in practice does not seem to adhere completely to
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historical-grammatical methods alone. For those who hold that Scripture is inspired and inerrant
(leaving room for at least some nuance of understanding with regard to what those concepts
mean in practice), the New Testament’s use of the Old Testament connects hermeneutical
method to the absolute truthfulness of the very text biblical interpreters seek to understand.
Indeed, hermeneutical approaches of any stripe must deal with this question: how ought the New
Testament’s use of the Old Testament be characterized hermeneutically and what does that mean
for modern methods of interpretation?
Many scholars have sought to answer this question with regard to a variety of passages.
Indeed, those who maintain that the New Testament’s use of the Old does not represent an
invalid or an erroneous hermeneutic can find answers which support their approach, even in the
case of particularly problematic passages. These answers are often complex, delving deeply into
the intricacies of both Old and New Testament contexts on a case-by-case basis. In Handbook on
the New Testament use of the Old Testament, G. K. Beale seeks to set forth a methodology for
navigating the intricate interpretive landscape which appears when the New Testament authors
quote or allude to the Old. In the final stage of his methodology, Beale counsels his readers to
take into account the rhetorical intent of a New Testament authors when they quote or allude to
Old Testament texts. Although Beale does not say much about this methodologically, he
highlights the necessity of understanding these rhetorical factors.1
These factors, however, can be as varied as the individual texts in question. It is not
unreasonable to argue that the New Testament’s use of the Old, though varied and creative, is
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G. K. Beale, Handbook on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament: Exegesis and Interpretation
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012), 49.
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valid. Although such an argument can be made on the basis of the myriad of varied answers to
particular hermeneutical problems throughout the New Testament in its use of the Old, an
important question remains: is there a unifying characterization which can be applied to the New
Testament’s many uses of the Old in terms of their hermeneutical validity? This question
becomes even more important in light of another question: how can modern readers replicate the
interpretive moves of the New Testament authors and use Scripture in the same way they did? If
the New Testament’s use of the Old is held to be valid on the basis of the sum of individual
arguments regarding individual passages, then it stands to reason that modern readers can
replicate that valid hermeneutic. However, without a unifying characterization of the New
Testament’s use of the Old, modern readers are left without criteria for evaluating their own
usage alongside that of the New Testament authors.
The aim of this study is to put forward a unifying characterization of the New
Testament’s use of the Old with particular focus on hermeneutical validity. The study will
attempt to provide a criterion for hermeneutical validity which, while it can account for the
validity of individual instances of New Testament usage of the Old, transcends them in such a
way that it can apply to any such usage, including usage of Scripture by modern readers. Such a
unifying criterion requires a unifying characterization of the New Testament’s usage of
Scripture. This study will argue that such a characterization must take into account the variety
with which the New Testament uses the Old, and it will put forward the concept of a situational
hermeneutic. It will be argued that speech act theory provides a criterion to evaluate usage of
Scripture situationally with regard to hermeneutical validity. Moreover, this characterization and
this criterion can be applied to modern usages of Scripture just as they can be applied to the New
3

Testament’s use of the Old. The concept of a situational hermeneutic can account for both the
creativity and the validity with the New Testament uses the Old, and that an understanding of the
speech acts being performed by the New Testament authors in using the Old provides a unifying
way to account for hermeneutical validity under this view.
The Problem
Many readers simply conclude that the New Testament’s hermeneutic is no different
from their own. Those who hold to historical-grammatical interpretation can claim that the New
Testament itself also employs historical-grammatical interpretation.2 With regard to some cases,
however, there is at least room to question whether this approach tells the whole story. Any
sufficiently thorough attempt to address this problem will grow quite nuanced very quickly, as
there are examples that seem to throw a wrench into the idea that New Testament use of the Old
always reflects straightforwardly historical-grammatical exegesis. Much can be written about the
hermeneutics of any particular specimen of the New Testament’s use of the Old. Historicalgrammatical interpretation itself is by no means monolithic to begin with, and it will be argued
here that the same holds true of the New Testament hermeneutic.
Canonical reading, on the other hand, raises its own set of questions. When New
Testament authors interpret the Old Testament in light of the whole canon, are they in fact
paying due respect to the internal meaning of individual texts? Canonical reading is in some
sense a type of creative interpretation, at least from the perspective of a hermeneutic that values
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For example, Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., “Single Meaning, Unified Referents: Accurate and Authoritative
Citations of the Old Testament by the New Testament,” Three Views on the New Testament Use of the Old
Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 46-47.
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authorial intent. How can the New Testament’s use of the Old be characterized hermeneutically
in light of these various ways of using Scripture?
The assertion that there is a single characterization which can be applied to the totality of
the New Testament’s use of the Old hermeneutically seems difficult to maintain, with some
particular passages being notoriously problematic to categorize. Questions about the
hermeneutical methods used by the New Testament authors inevitably become nuanced, and in
need of repeated qualification with regard to texts that seem to be outliers. This is not to say that
the hermeneutical methods which appear in the New Testament are always inconsistent, nor is it
to say that they defy classification. Rather, it is simply to suggest that perhaps this complexity
should draw attention also to another question which may be in some ways more pertinent.
Rather than just asking what the hermeneutical methods of the New Testament authors are,
perhaps the better question is this: allowing that the New Testament does not display a
monolithic hermeneutic, what determines and informs the interpretive methods that do appear?
This, of course, opens the door to another problem raised by the New Testament’s use of
the Old, one of perhaps greater practical importance. Ought modern readers to imitate the
interpretive practices of the New Testament authors? The answer to this question hinges to some
degree upon whether modern readers should consider the interpretive methods displayed in the
New Testament as valid. Should one conclude that they are not valid, questions arise as to
whether modern readers are given license to use Scriptures loosely or are otherwise obligated to
hold themselves to a standard that differs from that of the New Testament authors. This study
will not concern itself overmuch with the problems which arise if the methods exhibited in the
New Testament are invalid. It will choose instead to argue that those methods are in fact valid,
5

and to put forward an approach which will perhaps provide additional reason to see them as
valid. However, if one concludes as this study does that the interpretive methods exemplified in
the New Testament are valid, there are problematic cases in which it is not immediately clear
how such methods might be replicated by modern readers consistently.
Others have already concluded that there is a valid way to replicate such methods today,
even in the case of difficult passages that don’t seem to directly mirror modern exegetical
methods. This conclusion seems to flow directly from the premises that (1) the interpretive
techniques displayed in the New Testament are valid, that (2) they can be replicated by modern
readers, and that (3) these difficult, non-straightforwardly exegetical passages exist.3 However,
the justifications for replicating the methods displayed in the New Testament have not always
been satisfying from a hermeneutical perspective. It has been suggested for example, that
modern readers may repeat the interpretive moves of the New Testament authors precisely,
sticking to the particular passages or theological moves directly evidenced in the New Testament
itself. However, this approach smacks of an unsatisfying justification as to the validity of the
interpretive methods of the New Testament authors. Modern readers are left to repeat the New
Testament authors’ statements, but not their methods. Why would this be so if those methods are
in fact valid? If Divine inspiration is required in order to legitimize such interpretive moves, this
seems to imply that those moves are not justifiable on their own. If, however, the interpretive
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methods displayed in New Testament are repeatable, then what hermeneutical limitations do they
follow that can be replicated by modern readers in order to avoid an interpretive slippery slope?
Thus, it seems that there is a need to understand more clearly the hermeneutical limitations
which guided the New Testament authors. Perhaps doing so will provide better insight into how
their methods might be replicated more fully in a way which does not lead to mishandling of the
text. Such a thing must be possible, if indeed the methods of the New Testament authors are to
be seen as valid in themselves.
The New Testament uses the Old Testament in a variety of ways. Those who seek a
single hermeneutic consistently applied across all instances of the New Testament’s use of the
Old may find themselves disappointed. However, it will not be argued here that the New
Testament authors interpret the Scriptures without restraint. Saying that they employ more than
one hermeneutic does not imply that they employ any and all. Rather, the argument that will be
made here is that the New Testament’s use of the Old Testament is situational, but within the
bounds of a particular bibliology, bounds determined by what that theological understanding of
the Bible allows. Importantly, it will be argued that this approach provides for an accounting of
replication of the New Testament author’s varied but appropriately restricted methods by modern
readers.
Even to say that more than one hermeneutic could possibly be compatible with a
particular bibliology might seem surprising, but it will be argued here that it is the situational
nature of the New Testament’s use of the Old that makes this possible. It is important to note that
while all the writings of the New Testament serve the purpose of being Divine Scripture, they
also served the purpose of doing ministry in their own time and place. As such, they are written
7

in unique situations, with specific and unique goals in mind. These situations allow for and even
call for differing hermeneutical emphases and methods within the bounds of a particular
bibliology. This bibliology posits a high view of Scripture in accordance with that professed
within the New Testament itself. It also encompasses a particular salvation-historical theology
which informs Old Testament usage, but in a way which consistently respects the Old
Testament’s contextual meaning.4
Another facet of this problem concerns the nature of meaning as it relates to scriptural
texts, particularly in scenarios that involve intertextuality. The creativity of the New Testament’s
use of the Old has led some to define meaning in ways which are more accommodating toward
usages that ostensibly do not respect the intent of the original author. This study will argue that
the New Testament’s approach to the Old does in fact respect the Old Testament’s meaning in
that stricter sense. This may seem to be a difficult task in light of the fact that this study allows
that the New Testament does not practice a single, monolithic hermeneutic. However, this study
will characterize the New Testament’s use of the Old as involving a situational hermeneutic. It
will further argue that this situational hermeneutic is ultimately respectful of the Old Testament’s
meaning within its own context.
The problem which this study seeks to answer may be summed up thusly: the New
Testament exhibits variety in its methods of using and interpreting the Old Testament. Yet, if
modern readers are to be able to replicate the New Testament’s interpretive methods on the basis
of their hermeneutical validity, they are faced with a very complicated task. In fact, it is not
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enough to simply say to modern readers, “Use the same method that the New Testament authors
do,” because what the New Testament authors do is to use Scripture in a wide variety of creative
ways which are both hermeneutically valid and effectual specifically within the context of
particular situations. How, then, can modern readers characterize the New Testament’s use of
Scripture in a unified way which can inform and allow or limit modern usage?
This study will argue that a characterization of the New Testament’s hermeneutic as
situational in nature can account for both hermeneutical validity in light of the creativity with
which the New Testament uses Scripture as well as the ability of modern readers to replicate that
situational way of using Scripture. The way to accomplish this is to devise a hermeneutical
criterion that can evaluate hermeneutical validity in the context of situational usage, a criterion
which can apply to both the New Testament’s usage of Scripture as well as usage my modern
readers. This study will use speech act theory to develop such a criterion, arguing that this
approach adequately accounts for the phenomenon of New Testament usage as well as being
applicable to the guidance and limitation of similar usage today.
Significance
The significance of properly understanding the hermeneutical relationship between the
New Testament and the Old is threefold. First, it can help modern readers to better and more
accurately answer questions about what the New Testament’s use of the Old says about
hermeneutics. The New Testament’s use of the Old represents an inspired hermeneutic, which
raises questions when the New Testament does not seem to maintain a historical-grammatical
method acceptable by modern standards. This can go so far as to raise questions about inerrancy
on the one hand (is an incorrect reading of some Old Testament text an error?), and the validity
9

of historical-grammatical hermeneutics on the other (is a New Testament Christological reading,
as opposed to a purely historical-grammatical one, prescribed for modern readers?).
Alternatively, it can be claimed that there is harmony between historical-grammatical
interpretation and the way the New Testament uses the Old. There have been multiple
approaches to arguing for this harmony. Part of the argument of this study is that an
understanding of the situational nature of New Testament usage of the Old can help provide
some support for this harmony, or at least augment some of the answers that have already been
given.
Secondly, a proper recognition of the importance of situation in the New Testament’s use
of the Old has importance with regard to proper biblical interpretation. When the situational
nature of the New Testament’s use of the Old is misunderstood or given too little attention, one
can face a temptation to shoehorn one’s characterization of the New Testament’s hermeneutic
into an incorrect set of hermeneutical constraints. This approach may cause one to miss out on
some nuances of the meaning of a New Testament text. In some cases, the sophistication of the
New Testament’s use of the Old might deserve more credit than it is given under such an
approach. On the other hand, the same temptation could lead one to draw otherwise unwarranted
conclusions about the meaning of an Old Testament text in order to escape some self-imposed
interpretive difficulty. If the New Testament employs a situational hermeneutic, then
acknowledging that fact is sure to lead to more accurate interpretation. Accurately understanding
the New Testament’s use of the Old Testament in all its nuance is part and parcel of New
Testament exegesis.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly in the context of this study, a more complete
understanding of how the New Testament uses the Old Testament situationally can provide a
better understanding of situational hermeneutics as they may be practiced today. Some ways of
using Scripture may be exonerated, so to speak, if they are in line with a New Testament
bibliology in their particular situational context. In other instances, an understanding of how
bibliology guides New Testament use of the Old even when taking situational factors into
account may weigh in favor of greater restraint with regard to a particular modern situation.
What this improved understanding will not do is provide license for eisegesis or “playing fast
and loose” with the text. Modern interpretation, in some scenarios, may well already be
situational in a way that is similar to New Testament usage, and a better understanding of the
New Testament patterns can serve to refine techniques under that rubric, even if it is unlikely to
radically change them. An understanding of the situational nature of the New Testament’s use of
Scripture allows modern readers to take their own situations into account in evaluating their own
usage of Scripture, and it does this in a way which allows them to lay that evaluation alongside
the New Testament’s situational usage of Scripture.
Clarifications
The claims that have been made here so far are certainly in need of a great deal of
clarification, and it is best to provide this before proceeding any further. First, what is meant here
by the “situational” use of the Old Testament should be clarified. Second, the role of speech act
theory in the context of this study will be introduced. Finally, some clarity should be established
around what exactly is meant when referring to the relationship between bibliology and
hermeneutic.
11

Situation / Situational
Central to the argument of this study is the idea that the New Testament applies multiple
varied hermeneutics situationally. It is important to be clear about what exactly is meant by
situational use of the Old Testament. In the context of this study, situational use of the Old
Testament refers to the relationship between the New Testament’s use of the old and the varied
contexts of individual instances of that use. The “situation” surrounding a particular quotation of
the Old Testament consists of a variety of things. For example, it includes the literary and
theological context of the author’s use of the Old Testament within the text itself, as well as the
historical, cultural, rhetorical, and even pastoral or ministerial contexts and authorial intentions
associated with that particular text. Part of the argument that will be made here is that the New
Testament’s use of the Old does not represent a single, monolithic hermeneutic, but rather a
variety tied together by a central bibliology. The validity of any of these hermeneutics with
regard to that central bibliology (and perhaps even with regard to modern notions about
hermeneutical validity) is situation-dependent. That is, it interacts with the particular situations
surrounding particular instances. To put it differently, certain ways of using the Old Testament
may be valid in certain situations even though they may not be valid in others.
The upshot of this is that differing situations may contain mitigating factors which lend
themselves to or even open the door of validity to certain ways of using Scripture. As such, these
situational factors form an integral part of New Testament hermeneutical methods when it comes
to their validity, and they should not be ignored. Is a particular New Testament passage referring
to the Old Testament as a source of theological authority? To make a statement about prophetic
fulfillment (and if so, in what sense)? For illustrative or rhetorical purposes? Some complex
12

combination of these? Such questions are really questions about textual situation as it is
understood for the purposes of this study.
This understanding of situation shares much in common with the idea of context, but the
term situation was chosen for two reasons. First, it is not quite synonymous with context, which
is often taken to refer in a general way to surrounding factors. Much has already been said on the
importance of context with regard to interpretation. Context as a term is loaded, and not quite in
the right way. It seems probable that to rely too much on this term here is likely to create
confusion. Secondly, situation invites a focus on response. Situations are things that people react
to, and they form a backdrop against which observers view those actions. In the case of the New
Testament writers, they react to their situation, including even situations they have created for
themselves in the preceding context of their work, by choosing to perform particular speech acts
with regard to the Old Testament which are useful and justified given that situation. This places a
desirable emphasis on the relationship between speech acts and the factors which render those
speech acts hermeneutically valid.
The identification of speech acts which involve action toward the Old Testament text
itself has already been put forward as a way of understanding how the New Testament writers
interpret the Old Testament text, a distinction which is useful here as well. Characterizing such
speech acts serves as a way to build some clarity around the relationship between situation and
hermeneutical validity. More will be said further on about how this fits with a high bibliology
and what it means for modern readers of the Bible.

13

Speech Act Theory and a Situational Hermeneutic
It is important to clarify here what role speech act theory plays in the discussion of a
situational hermeneutic in the New Testament. It is related to hermeneutical justification, which
concerns the question of whether or not the New Testament authors are justified in using the Old
Testament texts the way they do. If they do not misuse the text, then they are hermeneutically
justified. It will be argued that speech act theory presents an approach to hermeneutical
justification that can help navigate a situational hermeneutic in a consistent and objective
manner. Importantly, this objectivity enables modern usage of Scripture to be evaluated in a way
that is consistent with the evaluation of New Testament usage by using this same approach for
both. It will not be argued that speech act theory furnishes answers to questions of hermeneutical
justification where none have yet been found. The study of the New Testament’s use of the Old
has already addressed even the most problematic passages, and others have already offered
arguments against seeing the New Testament as misusing the Old even in these difficult cases.
The goal of applying speech act theory here is to provide a consistent approach which can
evaluate hermeneutical justification in the context of a situational hermeneutic. If the New
Testament authors indeed use a variety of hermeneutical methods, some of which may only be
justifiable situationally, then there is a need for a way to consistently and objectively evaluate the
validity of hermeneutical methods that takes situational factors into account. This is of particular
importance if modern readers wish to utilize a situational hermeneutic themselves. Such an
approach should be able to evaluate modern usages in light of their situations just as it can do
within the context of the New Testament. It will be argued that speech act theory is able to
provide such an approach, since the relationship between situational factors and use or misuse of
14

a text is effectively a relationship between situation and a performative speech act. This
argument will be made primarily in the fourth chapter of this study.
With this in mind, it is important to note that there will not be an attempt to show that this
approach based upon speech act theory is superior to any traditional approach in terms of its
ability to justify any particular New Testament use of the Old. It will not be argued that such an
approach can justify particular passages where other approaches cannot. This approach which
involves speech act theory will be discussed in terms of its relationship to already-established
approaches. The purpose of the use of speech act theory here is to provide a unifying bridge
which can weigh hermeneutical justification in cases which involve differing hermeneutical
methods and differing situational contexts, thus providing a consistent way to evaluate
situational usage within the New Testament as well as by modern readers.
Bibliology vis-à-vis Hermeneutic
Part of the argument being made here is that it is bibliology rather than hermeneutic
which unifies the New Testament’s use of the Old. It may seem obvious that bibliology informs
hermeneutic, but it is not always clear what role bibliology plays in how questions about New
Testament use of the Old have been addressed in the past. G. K. Beale, for example, in
Handbook on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament focuses on discussing the theological
and hermeneutical presuppositions of the New Testament authors in terms of how they guided
their interpretation of the Old. He identifies five such presuppositions that are evident in New
Testament use of the Old overall.5 This study will focus specifically on what the presuppositions
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of the New Testament authors (such as those suggested by Beale) say concerning their beliefs
about Scripture (their bibliology) and on how that interacts with their interpretive practices in a
situational way. This focus will help identify those interactions between bibliology and situation
in a way that is instructive for better understanding the New Testament’s use of the Old. Going
directly to questions about how the New Testament authors interpret the Bible may miss this
point. It is important to ask first what the New Testament authors believe about the Bible and
how that informs their use of it. Their hermeneutics, after all, did not arise in a theological
vacuum. While interpretive guidelines existed in the New Testament era, these had theological
foundations, and this relationship is even more pronounced in the New Testament authors
themselves. Their bibliology served to guide and limit their hermeneutical techniques.
This bibliology, it will be argued, is closely related to a New Testament, Christological
understanding of salvation history. This means that the New Testament authors’ understanding
of Scripture involves a particular understanding of the nature of Scripture and of its relationship
to salvation history in light of Christ. This particular relationship between Scripture and salvation
history informs the New Testament’s view of Scripture itself. The belief that the Old Testament
is historically continuous with the same salvation history characteristic of the New Testament era
is, in some sense, a bibliological belief. Asking questions about what the New Testament authors
considered appropriate hermeneutical approaches without considering how their understanding
of Scripture and its relationship to salvation history affected and informed their hermeneutics
misses a salient point. As such, when hermeneutics are discussed here vis-à-vis bibliology, the
focus will be on how the New Testament authors’ beliefs about the Bible inform and guide the
ways in which they use the Old Testament in different situations.
16

Perhaps a good analogy for the distinction made here between bibliology and
hermeneutic as drivers of methods of using the Old Testament is the distinction between biblical
and systematic theology. While both ways of doing theology can be valid in a way which
acknowledges the theological authority of Scripture, the difference is one of focus, and this
difference in focus becomes a source of useful insight. It is possible to translate the conclusions
of biblical theology into systematic terms, but biblical theology arguably finds its strength in
uncovering the theological concerns of the biblical authors themselves. Perhaps, in a similar way,
looking at what the New Testament authors believed about Scripture, rather than looking only at
their hermeneutical methods, will make it easier to understand their use of the New Testament.
This distinction is not, at its core, qualitative. It is a difference of focus. Nevertheless, it will be
argued here that there are advantages to approaching the question of what guided and limited the
New Testament’s hermeneutical methods from the standpoint of their beliefs about Scripture
rather than only from the standpoint of hermeneutics. It is better suited toward gaining a fuller
understanding of their interpretive methods in a way that is more holistic and suffers less from
stumbling over outlying examples.
Methodology
In order to argue for the relevance of speech acts as a way of reconciling a variety of
hermeneutical methods with a high view of New Testament hermeneutics, it is best to focus on
concrete examples from the Scriptures themselves. As such, the methodology used in this study
will focus on dealing with particular examples of New Testament texts, and will make its
argument within the context of an examination of some specific texts. It will seek to apply this
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argument to those specific texts at every interval so that it is clear how the argument functions in
a concrete setting.
An important component of the argument of this study is that the New Testament does
not display a monolithic hermeneutic in its use of the Old Testament. The answer to the question
of how the New Testament authors interpret the Old Testament is “it depends.” Of course, this is
not necessarily agreed upon, and therefore it will be necessary to provide some argument in favor
of this view. One way to both establish this understanding of New Testament hermeneutics and
provide some insight into the different ways in which texts are interpreted in different instances
is to focus on a single Old Testament text that is used more than once in the New Testament.
Even more useful in this regard are Old Testament texts that seem to be used by different New
Testament texts in different ways. This provides a way to compare and contrast varying New
Testament hermeneutics with regard to a single Old Testament text, thus significantly
simplifying the task of this study. In this way, the additional complexity involved in comparing
two different Old Testament texts (and their respective contexts) is removed. So, the first part of
the methodology that will be used here will be to locate and examine an Old Testament text that
is used by more than one New Testament text, preferably ones which do not seem to use that Old
Testament text in question in the same way.
The texts which will be used for the purposes of this study are Genesis 21:12, “… for in
Isaac shall thy seed be called,” and Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 which quote it. The authors
of Romans and Hebrews both quote the same text, but they seem to use it in different ways to
make somewhat different points. As such, these texts present a good case study in which to apply
the method set forth here.
18

The next step in this methodology begins in a way that is fairly classic when it comes to
understanding New Testament texts which use the Old Testament. It will be important to
examine the Old and New Testament texts in question in order to establish their meaning within
their own respective contexts. This will serve as a basis for characterizing the hermeneutical
methods present in the respective New Testament texts and for comparing them to one another.
Of greatest importance will be the hermeneutical differences revealed through this exercise, as
these will serve not only to establish the argument against a monolithic New Testament
hermeneutic but also to point out the relevant questions about situation which might explain the
presence of multiple hermeneutics.
This study will then seek to define the speech acts reflected in each New Testament text
in a way that is tied to their respective contexts. It will attempt to answer the question: what is
the New Testament author saying, and what are the speech acts being performed in the New
Testament context? Any speech acts which are performed with regard to the Old Testament text
itself will be of particular importance. This step is crucial and will function as a source of
nuance, so it will be important to define these speech acts in as complete and accurate a way as
possible, and to tie them to the questions about hermeneutical methods already discussed.
Finally, having closely examined the contexts of the texts involved and defined the
speech acts evidenced within them, it will be possible to show how an understanding of the
speech acts present in each respective New Testament text vis a vis the Old Testament text serve
to account for the validity of the varying hermeneutical methods used in the New Testament
texts. Use or misuse of Scripture will be framed as an instance of illocutionary speech act, and it
will be argued that this framing serves to provide a way to consistently evaluate hermeneutical
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validity in light of a variety of situational contexts and hermeneutical methods. This will involve
a discussion of hermeneutical justification and the formation of a criterion for hermeneutical
justification rooted in this framing of use and misuse as illocutionary speech acts. An argument
will be made that this criterion is satisfied with regard both New Testament texts, but that
differing situational factors in each text play a role in satisfying it. This will serve as the basis for
discussion of a situational hermeneutic. Following this, it will be possible to sum up the overall
argument and draw some tentative conclusions about bibliology as a source of boundaries within
the context of multiple, situational hermeneutics and about the efficacy of identifying speech acts
with regard to justifying those hermeneutics within such boundaries.
Limitations of This Study
In the interest of avoiding over ambitiousness with regard to the scope of this study, it is
necessary to put certain limitations in place. The hermeneutics of the New Testament’s use of the
Old Testament is an area of study which lends itself easily and quickly to a high degree of
complexity. In the interest of maintaining focus and providing a realistic scope, certain issues
will not be addressed here.
One such issue, or rather perhaps an entire category of issues, which will not be
addressed at length is skeptical criticism of the New Testament’s use of the Old. There are many
who have answered the questions raised by New Testament use of the Old by arguing that the
New Testament authors appropriate Old Testament texts as they wish, with little or no regard for
the original context of those texts. While it is certainly worthwhile to respond to and interact
with these views, this study will not attempt an in-depth defense of New Testament
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hermeneutics. Rather, it will assume a high view of the respect which the New Testament shows
the Old.
Of course, it is acknowledged that there is much room for nuance even within that rubric,
and this study argues that some uses of the Old Testament are looser than others, but the
argument being made here is that such looseness appears only when it is situationally allowed in
light of the speech acts being performed by the New Testament author. As such, while the
argument of this study might provide for some elasticity in terms of how the New Testament’s
interpretive methods can be understood, it is the situational limitations which this study proposes
which serve to differentiate it from a skeptical understanding. As such, although this study will
differentiate itself from such a skeptical understanding it is beyond the scope of this study to
rebut a skeptical understanding of the New Testament’s use of the Old Testament as a whole. A
high view of the New Testament’s use of the Old Testament will be assumed, and the focus of
this work will be to show how the ways in which the New Testament uses the Old can be seen as
consistent with that high view, in spite of the presence of a multifaceted and non-monolithic
hermeneutic.
Another limitation concerns the number of relevant texts that can be examined. Ideally,
the argument of this study would be established via a thorough canvassing of all available data,
that is, all instances of the New Testament’s use of the Old. It should come as no surprise,
however, that this is well beyond the scope of this work. As such, the intention of this study is
merely to establish the potential usefulness of its proposed way of looking at the New
Testament’s use of the Old. Only one group of interrelated texts will be examined in detail, but it
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is to be hoped that this will be enough to at least contribute to the discussion and perhaps open
the door for a closer examination involving a greater number of texts.
This limitation in the number of texts that can be realistically covered in turn imposes an
additional limitation. Since a study of this scope cannot examine a large number of examples in
detail, it will also be unable to provide an exhaustive look at all of the varying ways in which the
New Testament uses the Old. A deep dive into the relevant example texts for every type of usage
is simply too large an undertaking for this work. Therefore, the concern here will be more
focused on discussing the relationship between hermeneutical methods, situation, and bibliology
with regard to a single set of texts, but in a way that could serve as a framework for examination
of additional examples of New Testament interpretive methods in the future.
Survey of Literature
G. K. Beale
An author that cannot be ignored in discussing practically any topic related to New
Testament use of the Old is G. K. Beale. In addition to works examining in detail the use of the
Old Testament in particular New Testament books, he co-edited Commentary on the New
Testament Use of the Old Testament,6 which attempts to comment upon nearly every instance of
New Testament use of the Old. There is also The Right Doctrine from the Wrong Texts,7 which
he edited, and which contains relevant works by a variety of authors representing a variety of
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viewpoints on the relationship between the Old Testament and the New. In one of his
contributions to this collection, Beale argues in favor of the validity and reproducibility of New
Testament hermeneutics. He sees in the New Testament’s use of typology a sort of
hermeneutical and theological unity with the Old Testament context which is not admitted to by
those who point to highly problematic ancient Jewish interpretive methods and argue that those
form part of a cultural milieu which directly influences how the New Testament authors interpret
the Old.8 Furthermore, he sees the reproducibility of New Testament exegesis by modern readers
as essential in understanding modern interpretation to have basis in apostolic authority.9
Also worth mentioning here is A New Testament Biblical Theology: The Unfolding of the
Old Testament in the New. In this work, Beale seeks to unpack the New Testament from a
biblical Theology perspective, focusing heavily on the New Testament as it stands in light of
biblical-theological themes rooted in the Old Testament. As such, he spends a great deal of time
examining the Old Testament theological backgrounds of New Testament biblical theology.10
Insofar as biblical-theological connections become of great importance when looking at New
Testament use of the Old, particularly when typology is involved, this kind of work is quite
relevant to the study of the New Testament use of the Old.
Beale’s own view on issues surrounding New Testament use of the Old comes forth most
prominently, perhaps, in Handbook on the New Testament use of the Old Testament, wherein
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Beale characterizes the problems surrounding New Testament use of the Old and offers a
methodology for interpreting New Testament passages which exhibit such usage. This
methodology is not meant to simply resolve problems raised by use of the Old Testament and
proceed onward to New Testament interpretation, but to directly engage the issue of how the
New Testament is using the Old and to take that into account as part of the interpretive process.
Beale argues that New Testament authors display varying degrees of “contextuality” in their
usage of the Old Testament. He makes the interesting observation that “awareness of context
must be presupposed in making such interpretation of OT texts,” which would seem to indicate
that ignorance or inattention to Old Testament contexts is unlikely in any case. Beale points to
“ironic or polemical intention” as drivers of less-contextual uses of the Old Testament, which
hints at the idea which forms the basis of this study, though he does not examine this in detail.11
This work also includes a very useful summary of the various ways in which the New Testament
uses the Old.12 Acknowledgement of hermeneutical variety present in the New Testament’s use
of the Old is essential to the argument of this study, which will focus on the situational aspect of
those types of usage and its hermeneutical significance.
Walter Kaiser
Another author that ought to be mentioned here is Walter C. Kaiser, Jr. Kaiser’s views on
the New Testament use of the Old overall represent a strict adherence to what he calls “the single
intent of Scripture.”13 This view insists that the meaning of an Old Testament text is unified
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across its human and Divine authors as well as New Testament authors who use or interpret it.
As such, if the New Testament authors claim fulfillment in some particular event, Kaiser will
argue that that is also what the Old Testament authors had in mind in a very real sense.
According to him, any amount of leniency here, any admission of a Divine intent or dual
fulfillment that augments the original Old Testament author’s intended meaning, undermines the
intelligibility of Scripture and opens the door any sort of interpretation by modern readers.14
In The Uses of the Old Testament in the New, Kaiser lists a variety of uses of the Old
Testament in the new. He argues that these types of usage imply and necessitate a strong and
unified hermeneutic, founded firmly in the Old Testament’s own context and meaning.15 His
work on this point is very relevant to this study, which acknowledges a variety of uses with a
restrained (but still existent) variety of hermeneutical rules. On this view, the New Testament’s
use of the Old cannot be situational, or at least situation cannot have any effect on the type of
hermeneutic that it employs, since it must always be one which adheres totally to the intent of the
Old Testament author.
This is, of course, somewhat counter to the hypothesis being put forward here: that Kaiser
may be right, but only some of the time, with different situations allowing for looser or stricter
ways of using the Old Testament. More importantly, as this study seeks to establish this
proposed relationship between situation and usage, it ought to answer Kaiser’s objections about
scriptural intelligibility and the hermeneutical slippery slope. It will be argued that taking into
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account situational factors can provide for consistency in asserting the possibility of objective
scriptural interpretation while allowing for a less rigid understanding than Kaiser’s of how the
New Testament uses the Old.
Richard B. Hays
Another important contributor to the study of New Testament use of the Old is Richard
B. Hays. In two of his works, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul16 and Echoes of
Scripture in the Gospels,17 he examines the use of the Old Testament in the Pauline Epistles and
the Gospels, respectively. He discusses not only direct quotations but allusions and theological
connections between the two testaments. In Reading Backwards, Hays examines the concept of
figural interpretation, which is related to typology but more hermeneutically-focused. Hays
argues that this figural hermeneutic is taught within the Scriptures themselves (including both the
Old and New Testaments), and therefore is not vector for the introduction of misreading.18
Another important work of Hays’ is The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as
Interpreter of Israel’s Scripture, wherein Hays seeks to examine Paul’s own interpretation of
Scripture in a fresh way. He argues that Paul’s methods are instructive for the church today, and
that if they are emulated the result will be a “conversion of the imagination,” a new way of
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seeing “both Scripture and the world in a radically new way.”19 Central to Hays’ understanding
of both Paul’s interpretive methods and those which Hays would prescribe to the church is an
interpretive stance which Hays refers to as a “hermeneutic of trust,” as opposed to a hermeneutic
of skepticism which he views as characteristic of modern critical interpretation, both liberal and
conservative.20
Hays’ conclusions on this point draw near to some of the arguments made in this study,
namely that interpretive boundaries within the New Testament are driven primarily by
bibliological rather than directly hermeneutical concerns. Hays argues that Paul’s interpretation
of the Old Testament is driven by an adherence to trust in the Scriptures in such a way that when
the lived experience of the church raises questions about scriptural promises Paul is driven not to
weaken his commitment to Scripture but to understand both Scripture and experience in new
ways. Hays’ insights on this point will prove invaluable in examining the relationship between
Paul’s bibliology and how he interprets Scripture in different situational contexts.
N. T. Wright: Thinking in a New Way
N. T. Wright’s Thinking in a New Way presents a view somewhat similar to that of Hays.
Wright argues that Paul constructed Christian theology in response to questions raised by the
salvation-historical reality of the rejection of the Messiah on the part of Israel.21 He sees Paul as
wrestling with those questions and interpreting the Old Testament in ways which represent an
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attempt to provide answers.22 Ideas like these point out the necessity for reconciliation between
the Old Testament’s theological focus and that of the New Testament. This study will attempt to
show how such creative usages can be compatible with the Old Testament’s internal meaning.
As such, approaches like those of Wright and hays are quite relevant.
J. Ross Wagner
J. Ross Wagner has contributed some works that deal with Paul’s use of the Old
Testament and which focus upon Romans 9-11 specifically. His approach should be taken into
account particularly when dealing with the Romans 9 text in this study. In Heralds of the Good
News, Wagner primarily focuses on Paul’s use of Isaiah in Romans 9-11. However, he offers a
detailed examination of Paul’s use of the Abraham narrative in Romans 9 as part of that larger
argument. In addition, he places some special attention on the concept of seed as it is relevant to
Romans 9.23 Wagner has also written an essay entitled “Mercy to the Nations in Romans 9-11,”
in which he discusses the theme of God’s inclusion of the gentiles in Romans 9-11. This work is
also highly relevant to the passage in Romans 9 that is part of the focus of this study.24
Todd D. Still: God and Israel
A larger work to which Wagner has also contributed is Todd D. Still’s God and Israel.
This work is a collection of essays by several authors focusing on Romans 9-11. Multiple essays
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within this volume are relevant to this study’s characterization of Romans 9:7. Michael Wolter’s
“It is not as Though the Word of God Has Failed” offers a deep analysis of the theodicy which
forms the context of Romans 9:7.25 Simon Gathercole’s contribution to this volume, “Locating
Christ and Israel in Romans 9-11,” speaks to the Christological underpinnings of the passage.26
The final relevant article in Still’s collection is Jonathan A. Linebaugh’s “Not the End: The
History and Hope of the Unfailing Word in Romans 9-11.” Linebaugh discusses the apparent
juxtaposition in Romans 9-11 between the uniqueness of Israel in God’s plan for history and his
acceptance of Jews and gentiles into one body with “no distinction.” As part of this discussion,
Linebaugh addresses at length the context and message of Romans 9-11 in a way which may
prove instructive toward this study’s examination of Romans 9:7.27
Ben Witherington, III: Paul’s Narrative Thought World
A work that is highly relevant with regard to understanding Paul’s thought as it relates
both to his writing in general and to his use of the Old Testament is Ben Witherington’s Paul’s
Narrative Thought World. Witherington argues for a developed and unified Pauline
understanding prior to the writing of any of Paul’s letters which he describes as a type of
narrative. This narrative is ultimately the cosmic drama of redemption that runs throughout the
Bible, and Witherington argues that Paul’s writings are situational in-context expressions of that
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unifying background narrative.28 Witherington’s work is relevant to this study insofar as it offers
insight into the manner in which Paul’s thought guides his interpretation. If bibliology
determines interpretive limits, then perhaps Paul’s thought, in a manner similar to that in which
Witherington conceives it, plays a role in determining the shape of Pauline interpretation within
those limits.
Dennis L. Stamps: “The Use of the Old Testament in the New Testament as Rhetorical
Device”
Hearing the Old Testament in the New, edited by Stanley Porter, is a collection of essays
which is useful overall in studying the topic of the New Testament’s use of the Old. However,
one particular essay in that collection is especially relevant: Dennis L. Stamps’ “The Use of the
Old Testament in the New Testament as Rhetorical Device.” Stamps sees persuasiveness within
the Jewish/Hellenistic multicultural context as the driver for interpretive method.29 This study, of
course, will disagree, seeing that driver as bibliological, i.e. belief in Scripture as Divine
revelation on the part of New Testament authors. However, this study will nevertheless see a
rhetorical aspect to New Testament interpretation of the Old, one which rises to greater or lesser
prominence in different situational contexts. Regardless, Stamps’ insight into the relevance of
rhetorical factors with regard to the New Testament’s use of the Old is valuable in the context of
this study.
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David S. Dockery: Biblical Interpretation Then and Now
When it comes to study of hermeneutics in the first century and their relationship to
intertestamental Jewish interpretations, as well as their relationship to modern hermeneutics,
David Dockery’s book Biblical Interpretation Then and Now: Contemporary Hermeneutics in
Light of the Early Church is indispensable. Dockery discusses the history and development of
biblical hermeneutics all the way from the first century to today.30 His work on First Century
interpretation is especially relevant. This study may not agree with Dockery’s assessment on all
points, but his work nevertheless serves as a valuable resource, offering a detailed examination
of the interpretive and theological background of New Testament interpretation of the Old.31
This is particularly relevant when it comes to clarifying and understanding just what is meant by
the bibliology-driven hermeneutic which this study posits. If indeed the bibliology of the early
church drives New Testament interpretive practices, then Dockery offers some valuable insight
into that early bibliology.
Darrel L. Bock
Another author who has contributed works relevant to this study is Darrel L. Bock. Bock
provides some important insights into the hermeneutical presuppositions of the New Testament
authors as well as a thorough examination of the importance of typology in understanding Jewish
and early Christian interpretation. In Interpreting the New Testament Text: Introduction to the
Art and Science of Exegesis, Bock contributes a chapter entitled “Scripture Citing Scripture,” in
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which he discusses the interpretive issues associated with Old Testament citations in the New.32
One important contribution of this essay is a discussion of the theological presuppositions which
underlie New Testament interpretation. Bock examines these both where they converge and
diverge from first-century Jewish presuppositions. Bock also provides an analysis of the variety
of ways in which The New Testament uses the old. These center primarily around the
relationship between the usage of the Old Testament and prophetic fulfillment, and around the
concept of typology in particular. Of special importance is Bock’s examination of the multiple
and nuanced ways in which typology is employed, with typological and direct fulfillment not
being mutually exclusive, but rather existing on a spectrum.33
An earlier work by Bock, Proclamation from Prophecy and Pattern: Lucan Old
Testament Christology, lays some of the groundwork for Bock’s understanding of typological
fulfillment. Bock closely examines Luke’s use of the Old Testament in this work and seeks to
understand Luke’s primary goal in using the Old Testament.34 Bock concludes that this goal is
proclamational in nature rather than apologetic, as some have claimed, and that Luke employs
prophetic pattern as a way to proclaim Jesus.35 This work provides some important foundational
insights into the relationship between prophecy and New Testament interpretation. Specifically,
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it examines in detail how the ways in which the New Testament views the Old as fulfilled can be
nuanced in terms of the role of typology. This insight will be important to take into account as
this study discusses the varying ways in which the New Testament uses the Old.
Abner Chou: The Hermeneutics of the Biblical Writers
In The Hermeneutics of the Biblical Writers, Abner Chou offers another perspective on
the hermeneutic methods exhibited in the New Testament. He proposes what he calls a prophetic
hermeneutic, which stems from the intertextuality found within the Old Testament itself. He sees
the New Testament authors as standing in concert with this prophetic hermeneutic.36 He views
the Old Testament prophets as writing in a sophisticated way which anticipates, not fully but to
some degree, the way in which the New Testament uses their texts.37 This approach to the
relationship between the Old Testament and the New is quite relevant to the questions that are at
the center of this study.
Bateman, Bock, and Johnston: Jesus the Messiah
Bock has also contributed to another important work, along with Herbert W. Bateman, IV
and Gordon H. Johnston. In Jesus the Messiah: Tracing the Promises, Expectations, and Coming
of Israel’s King, these authors examine Messianic promise throughout the Old-, New-, and
Intertestamental eras. This work provides some valuable scholarship on the trajectory of
Messianic thought within the Old Testament on its own and its development into a New
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Testament understanding of Jesus as the Messiah.38 This is of particular relevance to this study
due to the interrelatedness of New Testament Christology as it is rooted in the proclamation of
Jesus as the Messiah of the Old Testament. The theological underpinnings of New Testament
interpretation and of the New Testament’s interpretive conclusions are heavily tied to the Old
Testament Messianic aspect of Jesus’ identity. In short, understanding the development of
Messianic thought and how the New Testament authors viewed and portrayed Jesus as the
Messiah of the Old Testament is critical in correctly understanding the theological backgrounds
of their hermeneutical methods. As such, this work provides some important and relevant insight
with regard to this study.
Phillips, van Rensburg, and van Rooy: “Developing an integrated approach to interpret
New Testament use of the Old Testament”
“Developing an integrated approach to interpret New Testament use of the Old
Testament” by Phillips, et al. contains some insights relevant to this study. It summarizes many
of the issues surrounding New Testament use of the Old, but what is most relevant to this study
is its conclusions on the issue of sensus plenior. The authors argue that while arguments a-la
Kaiser that the Old Testament writers understood fully the truths espoused by the New
Testament authors through the use of their texts fail to stand up to historical-grammatical
scrutiny applied to those Old Testament texts, the New Testament authors generally respect the
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Old Testament contexts and only rarely seem to depart from it fully.39 This study will attempt to
explore fully how this can be, arguing that this position becomes even more justifiable when
situational factors are taken into account.
J. L. Austin
No discussion involving speech act theory would be complete without addressing the
work of J. L. Austin. Although he certainly built upon the work of others, he seems to be the
closest thing to the father of speech act theory in its modern form. His series of lectures entitled
Sense and Sensibilia40 originates most of the ideas that make up speech act theory. The theory
itself is put forward more clearly and more completely in How to do Things With Words.41 These
seminal works discuss the details of speech act theory in a way that remains relevant even today.
Both of these works will serve here to introduce speech act theory and discuss how it applies to
the argument of this study.
Other Works on Speech Act Theory
In addition to Austin’s works on speech act theory, a few others need to be discussed.
First, there is the work of John R. Searle, whose works Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy
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of Language42 and Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind43 serve to develop speech
act theory from the foundation set forth by Austin. In addition, several authors have discussed
speech act theory as it applies to biblical interpretation. In Divine Discourse: Philosophical
Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks, Nicholas Wolterstorff uses speech act theory as part
of his larger theory of Divine revelation.44 Anthony C. Thiselton applies speech act theory
directly to scriptural interpretation, making use of it in his commentary The First Epistle to the
Corinthians.45 He also discusses speech act theory as an interpretive tool in “Speech-Act Theory
as One Tool Among Many.”46 Brevard Childs offers a critique of Wolterstorff and contrasts his
approach with that of Thiselton in “Speech-Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation,” a work
which will prove useful here as well.47 Finally, Richard Briggs’ volume Words in Action: Speech
Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation should be discussed, as it examines the relationship
between speech theory and interpretation in detail.48
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Graham Allen: Intertextuality
Another work that should be mentioned here is Graham Allen’s Intertextuality. Allen
discusses the topic of intertextuality in general and its background.49 This study will take a
particular approach to intertextuality and therefore will need to discuss intertextuality in order to
clarify that approach. To that end, Allen’s work will prove valuable in providing some
background with regard to intertextuality in general.
Structure
Having introduced the problems and questions to be addressed in this study and
suggested a useful method for examining them, the trail has been marked out down which this
work may proceed. In the second chapter, this study will examine Genesis 21:12 and the two
New Testament passages which use it: Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18. This chapter will focus
on discussing the contexts of these respective passages and the interactions between them, with a
view to making some preliminary observations about the hermeneutical features displayed in the
use of Genesis 21:12 on the part of these two New Testament texts, especially where the
hermeneutics of the two seem to diverge.
The third chapter will begin by discussing speech act theory in general, offering a
definition of it and briefly summarizing the history of its development. It will then focus on
identifying and characterizing the speech acts being performed in these three texts by their
respective authors. The speech acts present in the Genesis text will be discussed first, followed
by an examination of the speech acts in Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 and how they interact
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with the speech acts in Genesis. In the case of each text, it will be important to discuss several
possibilities for how the relevant speech acts can be understood, but some attempt will be made
to come to a working conclusion in this regard. Again, special attention will be placed on
outlining the differences between the speech acts present in Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18, as
these differences, it will be argued, serve to justify the differences in hermeneutical method
between the two texts in a way that is reconcilable with a high view of the New Testament’s use
of the Old Testament.
The fourth chapter will focus on making the argument for which chapter three will lay the
foundation. It will discuss the issues raised by the hermeneutical methods displayed in Romans
9:7 and Hebrews 11:18, especially in light of the differences in hermeneutical method between
the two despite the fact they both interpret the same text. It will then proceed to show how these
differing hermeneutical methods are variously justified in light of the differing speech acts being
performed in the respective New Testament texts given the relationship between those speech
acts and the ones performed in Genesis 21:12.
The fifth and final chapter will synthesize the previous arguments, discussing how the
differences in hermeneutic vis a vis the differences in speech acts represented in Romans 9:7 and
Hebrews 11:18 can be characterized as evidence for a situational hermeneutic. This chapter will
also seek to answer the question of how a situational hermeneutic can be limited, since it cannot
point to a single hermeneutical method as a source of interpretive boundaries. It will suggest that
such a limiting factor can be found in the New Testament authors’ view of Scripture (their
bibliology), and it will seek to show how the speech acts and interpretive methods evidenced in
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Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 adhere to such a bibliology, even though there are differences
between their interpretive methods.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the New Testament’s use of the Old Testament is a deep and complex subject
of study. It is unlikely that the questions and issues raised by the interpretive methods evidenced
in the New Testament and what those issues mean with regard to hermeneutics will be answered
easily. It has already been recognized by many scholars that the answer to the question of how
the New Testament authors interpreted the Old is not a simple one. This study hopes to
contribute some small insight which may help bring some additional clarity to some of these
issues. It is hoped that by focusing on the relationship between the interpretive speech acts being
performed by New Testament authors when they use the Old Testament, and by analyzing those
speech acts in light of their situational context, an additional avenue may be opened whereby the
use of the Old Testament in creative ways by the New Testament may be better understood, but
without compromising a high view of Scripture (and of Scripture’s use of Scripture), and without
the need to adhere to awkward justifications with regard to more difficult passages. By looking
closely at the example of Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 in their use of Genesis 21:12, this
study hopes to show that such a high view is compatible with an understanding of the New
Testament’s use of the Old which allows not only for creative ways of using the Old Testament
but for a multiplicity of ways of using the Old Testament. Perhaps this can offer some benefit to
the discussion of the New Testament’s use of the Old and what that means for modern
interpreters, both in terms of how they understand the message of the New Testament and how
the interpretive moves of the New Testament may be emulated.
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CHAPTER TWO:
CONTEXT AND HERMENEUTICAL ISSUES IN
GENESIS 21:12 / ROMANS 9:7 AND HEBREWS 11:18

Introduction
As the approach of this study is to apply the proposed method to a particular set of
biblical texts, the first step is to examine those texts themselves. This chapter will begin by
taking a somewhat classical approach to the study of New Testament use of the Old. That is, it
will begin with a contextual study of the Old and New Testament texts with a view to uncovering
the contextual and hermeneutical issues involved with them. Particular focus will be placed upon
the hermeneutical questions which arise in light of the interactions between the Old and New
Testament texts. Having laid out the contextual and hermeneutical landscape surrounding the
texts involved, this chapter will attempt to identify hermeneutical differences between the use of
Genesis 21:12 in Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18. The purpose of this exercise will be to outline
these differences in hermeneutical terms so that the approach put forward by this study can, in
subsequent chapters, be evaluated in light of its ability to answer the questions raised.
This study will begin in a fairly straightforward manner by examining each of the three
texts in their own contexts. This will be done with a view toward understanding the message of
each passage and the various hermeneutical issues surrounding it. Focus will be placed on
discussing the hermeneutics involved in the use of Genesis 21:12 in both New Testament
passages. This will be followed by a discussion of the hermeneutical differences between
Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 in their use of the Genesis passage. The chapter will conclude
by setting forth some hermeneutical questions which arise from the different ways in which the
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two New Testament passages use Genesis 21:12. These questions will serve as a foundation for
later chapters.
Genesis 21:12
It is best to begin this examination of the relationship between Genesis 21:12 and the two
New Testament passages that quote it by addressing the context and message of Genesis 21:12
itself. It is important here to focus on the Genesis passage in its own context in a way that is
influenced as little as possible by its usage in later Scripture. This is of particular necessity in
order to best uncover the hermeneutical issues which will arise from how Genesis 21:12 is used,
as these issues will stem from questions about how Paul and Hebrews employ the Genesis
message and what hermeneutical moves they make in doing so. In order to avoid getting lost in
an overly detailed analysis of the themes and theology of Genesis overall, special focus will be
placed on contextual items most relevant to Genesis 21:12.
Background of Genesis 21:12 – The Righteous Seed
This examination of Genesis 21:12 will begin with a discussion of some important
background of the text. Perhaps the largest overarching theme in Genesis which is closely related
to Genesis 21:12 is that of ( ָֽז ַרעoffspring or seed). This term is used frequently in the book, but
before discussing its thematic role in Genesis it is necessary to briefly consider a few lexical
issues surrounding the term. Waltke notes that the term is used to refer to the seeds of plants,
particularly in the creation account, as well as to the offspring of human beings. He further states
that it is at times singular, referring to a particular son of an individual, and at other times it is
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collective, referring to all of one’s descendants.1 T. D. Alexander offers a similar analysis,
pointing out that the term denotes the singular individual of Ishmael in Genesis 21:13 while
referring collectively to the descendants of Jacob in 28:14.2
Alexander argues that the focus on genealogies and the frequent use of  ָֽז ַרעform the
unifying background of the book (cf. Geneses 3:15, 4:25, 9:9, 12:7, 13:15-16, 15:5, 15:13, 22:1718, 48:4).3 James McKeown agrees, seeing the major themes of the book as “Offspring,
Blessing, and Land,” and argues that these themes form the lines along which the narrative of the
book develops.4 Genesis, from the very beginning, is closely concerned with the idea of lineage,
starting with the lineages of Cain and Seth. Genesis seems to concern itself especially with the
idea of diverging lineages, with one lineage having some especial relationship or connection to
God which other lineages do not. This concept seems frequently to take the form of divergence
between brothers, who in turn become patriarchs of their respective diverging lineages. The
purpose of this focus seems to be to express the idea of a particular, righteous lineage chosen by
God, one which may play some sort of redemptive role (though it is important at this stage to be
careful not to think of that redemption in New Testament terms). This theme begins with God’s
judgment upon the serpent in Genesis 3:15, where God mentions the seed of the woman
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specifically. It is continued in the narrative concerning Cain and Seth, with Seth representing a
seed to replace Abel, whom Cain killed in Genesis 4:25. The seed theme is carried forward to
Noah’s sons with the Genealogy in Genesis 5, and reiterated to them when God establishes a
covenant with Noah and his seed in Genesis 9:9. Then there are Abraham’s sons Ishmael and
Isaac (directly salient, of course, with regard to the verse under discussion). God repeatedly
speaks to Abraham about his seed with regard to the Abrahamic promises, for example in
Genesis 12:7, 13:15-16, and 15:5-18. Genesis 21:12, of course, speaks of Isaac being the chosen
seed, and verse 13 calls Ishmael Abraham’s seed as well.5 The righteous seed theme proceeds
beyond those two brothers, though, to be expressed again in Jacob and Esau when God’s land
promise to Isaac’s seed is reiterated to Isaac in Genesis 24:7. There may be something of a nod
to it yet again with the focus placed upon the concept of seed in the Judah and Tamar narrative in
Genesis 38:8-9. Finally, the seed promise is again reiterated by Jacob to Joseph in Genesis 48:4,
11.6 Ishmael and Isaac seem to fit snugly into this pattern, and so this theme of a chosen,
righteous lineage or seed forms the larger backdrop of Genesis 21:12 within the book of Genesis
as a whole.
Genesis 21:12 is also somewhat integral to its nearer context within the story of
Abraham. R. R. Reno argues that the focus on Abraham beginning in Genesis 12 represents a
major shift in the tone of the book. The earlier chapters are, in his estimation, primordial and
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universal in their character and tone, but Abraham represents a transition from these universal
themes to ones dealing with particularism centered on Abraham and his descendants.7 With
Abraham, the focus of Genesis is no longer universal but on a particular family. God’s promises
to Abraham are closely tied to the overall theme of righteous seed, since the promises deal
mainly with either God’s provision of an heir for Abraham or with his promises concerning the
resulting future lineage. God’s promises to Abraham, in short, are seed-dependent. Abraham is to
become a father of a great nation which will inhabit the land through which Abraham sojourns,
but all of these blessings concern the lineage which will descend from Abraham’s promised son.
However, Abraham has not one but two sons: one by Hagar, the handmaid, and one by his wife,
Sarah. So, the immediate context of Genesis 21:12 involves these Divine promises which depend
on and will be fulfilled in Abraham’s son, or seed, in light of the current situation in which
Abraham has two sons.
God has already promised Abraham that it would be a son born of his wife Sarah,
specifically, which would represent the fulfillment of the Divine promise of a son, a statement
which God reiterated in spite of Abraham’s objection “Oh that Ishmael might live before You!”
(Genesis 17:18). Thus, at least initially, there remained some question in Abraham’s mind as to
whether Ishmael represented the promised seed. Nevertheless, in fulfillment of the promise of
God, Sarah has given birth to a son. Following this, there is a second conflict between Sarah and
Hagar, and Sarah tells Abraham to send Hagar and Ishmael away. Sarah’s concern seems to be
one of inheritance. She does not want Isaac to be a joint-heir with Ishmael, a situation in which
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Isaac would presumably not only share the inheritance, but in which Ishmael would in fact be the
firstborn.
The Message of Genesis 21:12
This sets the stage for the narrative which contains Genesis 21:12. The question of
inheritance requires a solution, both with regard to the immediate issue of whether Ishmael will
share in the inheritance and be the firstborn, and with regard to the carrying out of the Divine
promise concerning nation and land. In this context, God speaks to Abraham in Genesis 21:12,
telling him to comply with Sarah’s wishes and send Hagar and Ishmael away “for through Isaac
your descendants shall be named.” It is precisely because Isaac is the promised seed that
Abraham is counseled to send Ishmael away. In the context of questions about inheritance, the
emphasis seems to be on Ishmael being disinherited, or at least on his disinheritance being
solidified, in favor of Isaac. This, however, is in line with the Divine plan, as Isaac is the
promised seed and inheritor of the Divine promises which concern Abraham’s lineage. It is Isaac
who will be the ancestor of the great nation which will inhabit the land of Canaan. In verse 22,
Abraham is told that Ishmael will become a great nation “also,” because he is also a son of
Abraham. However, this “also” seems to indicate that Ishmael’s blessing is extraneous. It is not a
fulfillment of the original Divine promise but stands in addition to it. As such, the focus is on
Isaac. It is Isaac who is the torch-bearer of the promises made to Abraham and of the righteous
lineage which forms a major theme within the book of Genesis.
The message of Genesis 21:12 seems to be that Abraham is told by God to send Ishmael
away because Isaac is the inheritor of the Divine promise that is already the focus of Abraham’s
story, and Ishmael is not. Isaac will become the ancestor of the great nation which will inhabit
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the land of Canaan, Ishmael will not. Isaac presumably represent the continuation of the theme of
the righteous lineage which permeates the book of Genesis, Ishmael does not. In short, Isaac is
chosen by God to be the bearer of these promises, and Ishmael is not. Victor P. Hamilton
characterizes this in terms of inheritance, which is to be withheld from the Ishmael even though
he might have been expected to receive it. Ishmael will not share in the inheritance of the
promise given to Isaac.8 As such, Ishmael is to be sent away and disinherited, for although he
himself has his own promise from God, there is to be no question as to whether he will have any
part in the original promises given to Abraham.9 It is worth noting at this point, though, that
Ishmael’s own promise is received by him precisely because he is a son of Abraham (Genesis
21:13, “because he is your seed”), even though Ishmael is not the promised seed. It seems that
God’s blessing over Abraham’s life extends to Ishmael even if he is not the one to carry forward
the Divine plan concerning the redemptive, righteous seed.
This message fits into and carries forward the overall theme of lineage in Genesis,
contributing to the concept of diverging lineages with a focus on a particular, righteous seed.10
Ultimately, this lineage forms the background of the future nation of Israel, which is itself the
audience of the book, and thus it ties into the greater Old Testament theme of the drama between
Israel and God. It now remains to examine the New Testament authors with a view to
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understanding what they do with these ideas concerning God’s chosen lineage as that pertains to
the people of Israel.
Romans 9:7
Having discussed the context and message of Genesis 21:12 on its own, it is now possible
to proceed to an examination of the New Testament texts which quote it. This study will begin
by addressing the context and message of Romans 9:7. Like Genesis 21:12, Romans 9:7 will
require some discussion of its background. This will be followed by some observations
concerning the message of Romans 9:7 in its own context, as well as some comments about the
usage of Genesis 21:12 and how that usage serves that larger contextual message.
The Background of Romans 9:7
An attempt to understand the use of Genesis 21:12 in Romans 9:7 would be incomplete
without first speaking to the background and context of Romans 9:7. Any understanding of how
it uses the verse from Genesis must make sense within the context of Paul’s overall message in
Romans. Romans 9 as a whole is a somewhat controversial passage from a theological
perspective, dealing as it does with themes of election and the relationship between Christians
and unbelieving Jews. Many theological views concerning dispensationalism, Divine election,
and various ways of understanding the current status and final destiny of national Israel seek to
find support in this passage. It is certainly well outside the scope of this study to unpack fully all
of these theological issues. However, it is unnecessary to do so in order to understand the
message of Romans 9:7 in a way that is sufficient for the purposes of speaking about the
hermeneutical methods exemplified in its use of Genesis 21:12. As such, some of the ideas
relevant to these theological issues will be touched upon insofar as they are important with
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regard to understanding Paul’s message and use of Genesis 21:12, but this study will not attempt
to argue for or against any particular theological system which draws from this verse.
In the interest of being fair to those whose views on the theological message of Romans 9
may differ from those of this author, it is worth stating that this author understands Romans 9 to
be concerned mainly with the relationship between Jewish and Gentile believers as a collective
group and unbelieving Jews as another collective group. Its relevance with regard to individual
election is secondary to this, contra the interpretation of this passage which appears frequently
within the reformed tradition. However, it is hoped that any difference of understanding on this
point will not undermine the usefulness of this study with regard to its main focus, which does
not necessarily hinge upon that particular theological issue.
A good place to begin discussing the background of Romans 9:7 seems to be the book of
Romans as a whole. This book is concerned primarily with the concept of the gospel as an
interaction between the justice/righteousness of God and his offer of salvation by grace through
faith in Jesus. There is a tension between these two truths, and in Romans Paul deals with that
tension in various ways. In the early chapters, Paul is concerned with the tension between God’s
justice and salvation by grace. He famously paints the picture of sinful humanity, unworthy on
their own merits to occupy any relationship with God other than one of enmity, resulting in
judgment. It is precisely within this context that the tension between God’s justice and salvation
by grace appears, because if God is just then it would appear that he must judge man
accordingly. Paul’s point in these early chapters seems to be that not only does God in fact offer
salvation by grace in spite of his justice, but in fact this salvation in no way compromises his
justice.
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J. R. Daniel Kirk, in Unlocking Romans, argues that Protestant readers of Romans,
perhaps too greatly influenced by the West’s roots in Greek philosophy, have tended to
understand it in terms of “timeless maxims,” when it should be viewed more in light of “Paul’s
apostolate and unbelieving Israel.”11 As such, he argues that the letter is a theodicy focused on
solving problems and answering questions related to this real-world situation, and that the most
instructive way to read the letter is with this in mind. Specifically, he states that resurrection
plays a central role in these theodicies.12 The tension between God’s justice and the gospel forms
a pattern in Paul’s letter to the Romans which remains relevant in Romans 9. The pattern is one
of theodicy, in which Paul defends the character of God in spite of apparent contradictions. He
does this through a series of rhetorical questions expressing some apparent theological
incongruity, each followed by the phrase μὴ γένοιτο (cf. Romans 3:4, 3:6, 3:31, 6:2, 6:15, 7:7,
7:13, 9:14, 11:1 and 11:11). In his commentary on Romans, Ben Witherington offers a review of
several approaches to the rhetorical structure of the letter, but his own outline of that structure
follows the arguments made in the μὴ γένοιτο passages.13
Paul’s statement in Romans 3:25-26 expresses the tension which he seeks to address:
“whom God displayed publicly as a propitiation in His blood through faith. This was to
demonstrate His righteousness, because in the forbearance of God He passed over the sins
previously committed; for the demonstration, I say, of His righteousness at the present time, so
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that He would be just and the justifier of the one who has faith in Jesus” (Romans 3:25-26,
NASB). The aforementioned tension between God’s justice and his justification of sinners is
exemplified in the words “both just and justifier.” Paul’s answer to the issue raised by this
tension is, of course, that it is resolved through the shedding of the blood of Christ. The
atonement is what allows God to remain just while declaring sinners as righteous.
Paul’s discussion of the law versus faith beginning in Romans 3:31 continues this pattern
of theodicy, dealing with questions about what justification by faith means with regard to the
law, particularly since the law is God’s own past declaration. Does God’s giving of the law to
Israel represent a sort of self-contradiction in light of his provision of justification by faith in the
present time? Paul’s answer, of course, is that it does not, and he points to Abraham as an
example in whose life the principle of justification by faith operated prior to the giving of the
law.14 Paul’s point here seems to be that this justification by faith is not some new development
to supersede the law. Rather, it existed before the law, and therefore it must be in harmony with
the law. As such, the law is not nullified as a result of God’s offer of salvation by grace through
faith.
Beginning in chapter 6, Paul focuses on the relationship between justification and sin.
Tom Holland argues in his commentary on Romans that the thrust of Romans 6 is corporate
rather than individual, a continuation of the corporate bent of Romans 5.15 Membership in the
corporate body of the bride of Christ necessitates that believers cannot continue in a sinful
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lifestyle.16 Other commentators such as Arland J. Hultgren disagree with this fully corporate
view of Romans 6, seeing it as departing from Romans 5 with a greater focus on individual
behavior.17 Both of these views seem to agree, however, that Paul seeks to offer a theodicy
against the objection that justification by faith allows, or even encourages, a sinful life. He
objects that in fact those who are saved by grace through faith have become dead to sin and truly
free from it. The law warned of sin, but it was unable to free people from sin effectually, either in
terms of their standing before God or in terms of their actual behavior. Paul contends that
justification does not in fact open the door to sin, rather it opens the door to righteousness in a
way that the law could not.
Chapter 8 seems to conclude the first part of Paul’s letter, bringing his affirmation of the
gospel of salvation by grace through faith to a sort of climax. This climax focuses on life in
Spirit, and the implications of the gospel for the spiritual life of the believer. Colin G. Kruse
argues that this life in the Spirit is characterized by Paul in juxtaposition to “bondage to sin under
the law.”18 Having defended the concept of faith as opposed to adherence to the law as the
salvific criterion, Paul speaks to the greatness and wonder of this truth and what it means with
regard to the believer’s position before God. Once he has established the nature of salvation in
spite of the tension between grace and God’s justice, Paul moves on to a different but related
matter in chapter 9: the problem of unbelieving Jews. This is specifically a problem in light of
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the fact that a great many Jews remain who have not become believers in Jesus, and yet the
Jewish people are the recipients of the Old Testament promises and covenants. The fact that such
a large portion of the nation of Israel remains outside community of faith raises questions about
the faithfulness of God toward his chosen people. Romans 9:6 introduces another of Paul’s
theodicies, stating in spite of the situation: “But it is not as though the word of God has failed.”
Romans 9:14, with its μὴ γένοιτο, ties this argument in with the rest of Paul’s statements
concerning theodicy. As such, the background of Romans 9:7 can be summed up as such: Paul is
defending the justice of God in light of his offer of salvation by grace through faith in Jesus
Christ against various objections which may arise as a result of the tension between God’s justice
and his grace.19 Romans 9 specifically defends against objections which may be raised
concerning God’s faithfulness toward Israel, seeing as so many of Israel’s people do not exhibit
faith in Christ and therefore fall outside the God’s new covenant and the fulfillment of many
Divine promises. This forms the backdrop against which the message of Romans 9:7 can be
evaluated, and in turn its use of Genesis 21:12.
The Message of Romans 9:7
The message of Romans 9:7 and its immediate context, then, can be examined against
this larger theodicy defending God’s faithfulness to Israel in light of the practical exclusivity of
the Gospel. It is well worth noting that Romans 9:7 is only one in a series of verses quoting
Genesis concerning the same topic. Paul points to a dichotomy between Isaac and Ishmael in
Romans 9:7, but in verses 12-13 he points to a parallel dichotomy between Jacob and Esau. As
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such, a correct understanding of the message of Romans 9:7 must also make sense in light of
those verses. Whatever message is understood to exist in Romans 9:7 must be more or less
applicable to the Jacob/Esau comparison in in 12-13.
In the context of the numerous narrative parallels between the two sets of brothers, Paul
takes special care to point out one in particular. In each case, Paul provides not one but two
quotes. In verse 9, Paul speaks of “the word of promise,” which specifies that Sarah would give
birth. With regard to Jacob and Esau, Paul relates God’s words to Rebekah and then quotes
Malachi 1:3: “Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.” These four quotations all share an important trait:
they are all Divine declarations. The first three are promises made by God to people in Genesis,
the fourth being prophetic in nature. Paul’s reason for doing this seems to be clarified in Romans
9:11. Paul is focusing on God’s choice. All four quotations are statements that expose the Divine
will, and thus part of Paul’s focus seems to be that the election of Isaac and of Jacob for their
respective roles in the context of the Genesis story is a matter of Divine choice alone. Paul’s
quotation of God’s words to Moses in verse 15 seems to further solidify this point. So, a crucial
element of the message of Romans 9:7 seems to be the concept of Divine will in choosing Isaac
and Jacob, but not their brothers, for purposes related to the Divine promise made to Abraham.20
A word should be said at this point about Paul’s use of Malachi 1:3. Paul’s hermeneutical
methods in his use of Genesis 21:12, of course, will be addressed later on in this chapter, and this
discussion will include some examination of his methods in using other texts in Romans 9.
However, his use of Malachi 1:3 forms part of the context of Romans 9:7, and for that reason
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alone it is important to discuss this particular aspect of Paul’s message here. A reading of the
first verses of Malachi makes it clear that the prophet is speaking about Jacob and Esau as
proxies for Israel and Edom.21 In Malachi, God points to his election of the individual Jacob over
Esau as evidence of his love for national Israel in Malachi’s day, and as evidence of the surety of
his continued judgment against Edom. However, Paul’s use of Malachi 1:3 seems to point
directly at Jacob and Esau themselves in order to support his point about God’s choice of one of
Abraham’s descendants and not another.22
So, what is Paul’s message in Romans 9:7? J. Louis Martyn argues that it deals with the
particularity of God’s election even within the context of Israel. He focuses on the question of
ethnic Israel’s election in Paul’s thought. Martyn sees the particularity of that election with
regard to Ishmael and Esau as a sign that, in Paul’s mind, God’s election of ancient Israel was
never corporate or ethnic in nature. Instead, he argues that what seemed to be a national and
ethnic election throughout the Old Testament era must have been issued repeatedly in each new
generation on the sole basis of God’s faithfulness.23 Martyn’s point seems to be that God was
never under any obligation on the basis of ethnicity, but was always only accountable to nothing
other than his own sovereign will, regardless of whether or not that meant, perhaps even
temporarily, that all members of a particular ethnicity were indeed chosen by God. As such,
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Martyn sees Paul’s focus as being on God’s right to deny such election to a portion of ethnic
Israel in Paul’s day.24 Martyn’s approach has some problems, however. The Genesis text seems
to depict a fairly straightforward promise regarding Abraham’s descendants. If that promised
election actually was as Martyn depicts it, this fact is not something that seems to be
communicated within the Genesis text itself.
Holland sees Paul’s use Isaac and Ishmael (and later Jacob and Esau) simply as an
affirmation that being descended from Abraham does not guarantee participation in the new
covenant.25 Martyn understands God’s election of national Israel in Abraham’s day and of
Christians in Paul’s day to be essentially the same election.26 Holland, on the other hand, views
Paul’s argument as a simple statement about God’s non-election of a portion of ethnic Israel
under the new covenant. This distinction, of course, has implications regarding larger theological
questions about the identity and future of national Israel under the new covenant. A detailed
examination of such issues is beyond the scope of this study, but it is well worth pointing out the
similarities between these two interpretations: both agree that Paul is pointing out that not all
physical descendants of Abraham received the Abrahamic promise, regardless of how that
promise may be defined or what that may mean for ethnic Israel in the church age or in the
future. This idea seems to be at the center of the message of Romans 9:7.
Longenecker makes two important points with regard to Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12.
First, he argues that Jewish theologians in Paul’s day largely saw the Abrahamic promises as
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ethnically-targeted and irrevocable. Longenecker acknowledges that the chosen status of Israel is
clear within the Old Testament (cf. Deuteronomy 7:6, Psalms 135:4, and Isaiah 41:8-9), and he
allows that this creates a certain tension when combined with the idea that not all of Israel would
receive God’s blessings in some sense.27 The second point which Longenecker makes seeks to
resolve this tension with regard to Paul. Longenecker argues that Paul’s argument which
encompasses Romans 9:7 builds upon the Old Testament concept of a remnant. In his words:
“the apostle is here setting out his own version of such a Jewish Christian form of remnant
theology and remnant rhetoric.”28 Longenecker sees Paul’s use of Isaac and Ishmael as in line
with prophetic rhetoric in the Old Testament dealing with the concept of a righteous remnant (cf.
Amos 3:12, 5:15, Joel 2:28-32, Isaiah 8:18). Importantly, such a remnant is not inclusive, rather
it is only portion, and a small portion at that. Only a small portion of God’s supposed people are
true followers of God. Paul, Longenecker argues, is applying this idea to his own situation in
Romans 9, one in which Paul preaches a gospel which the Jewish people have, by and large,
rejected. They have not all rejected it, though, and so those few who believe are a remnant. The
majority are excluded from that group. Paul’s reference to Isaac and Ishmael, then, serves to
support the argument that God in fact has a right to do this. He is under no obligation to include
the unfaithful majority of Israel in his new covenant.29
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Romans 9:7 can be taken in a variety of ways, and there are many questions about the
theological implications of the message of Romans 9 overall, particularly with regard to the
concept of God’s election of individuals as well as the nature and future of national Israel. These
views, however, seem to generally agree regarding an important point concerning the message of
Romans 9:7 specifically: Paul’s assertion that physical descent from Abraham is not sufficient in
order to partake of the Divine promise. There are effectively two groups of people who are
physically descended from Abraham. There are those who receive that promise and those who do
not. Regardless of what that promise is taken to include and how exactly this applies to any
particular person or group, this essential element of Paul’s message seems more or less clear.
The message of Romans 9:7 is related to the exclusivity of God’s promises even among physical
descendants of Abraham.
Use of Genesis 21:12 in Romans 9:7
If Paul is using Genesis 21:12 to speak to Divinely-chosen exclusivity with regard to
God’s promises, even among the physical descendants of Abraham, what remains is to
characterize his use of Genesis 21:12 within that rubric, particularly in terms of hermeneutics.
Perhaps it is best to first point out some hermeneutical issues which are raised by Paul’s use of
Genesis 21:12 in Romans 9:7.
The first issue that should be pointed out is perhaps the most obvious. While Genesis
teaches that Isaac and Jacob would receive the promises whereas Ishmael and Esau would be
excluded, it does not seem to imply in its own context that that promise would, in turn, be
available only to a certain portion of Jacob’s descendants. Rather, it is quite the opposite. Given
the audience of Genesis, its message to Israel seems to be that they are God’s chosen people,
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inheritors of the promise made to Abraham. This, of course, does not amount to a strict and
wide-ranging theological statement anywhere in Genesis, but the general thrust of the book
seems to be that the Divine promise is inherited by Jacob and his seed, meaning all of his twelve
sons. In the Pentateuch, Israel is God’s chosen people, and this Divinely-promised and Divinelybestowed national identity (and land) seems to be depicted as the birthright of ethnic Israel as it
exits from Egypt. The point of the Genesis narrative seems to be that Ishmael and Esau (and their
lineages) are excluded, but Isaac and Jacob (and their lineages) are chosen. It is at least
somewhat odd that Paul then uses this passage to speak of a certain subset of Jacob’s
descendants as being excluded from a Divine promise. This is not to say that Paul somehow
directly contradicts Genesis or the wider message of the Pentateuch. Exclusivity within the seed
is indeed present between Isaac/Ishmael and Jacob/Esau, but it could be argued that while
Genesis specifically speaks to the exclusion of Ishmael and Esau, Genesis itself does not speak
directly to further exclusion within the chosen lineage of Jacob. If Genesis is to be read on its
own terms, it is about the chosen-ness of Jacob’s lineage, not possible exclusivity within it.
Paul’s point is valid, but it is also in some sense alien to the Genesis text, and this raises
hermeneutical questions. Rather, it is simply to suggest that this disparity between the overall
thrust of Genesis (which is not necessarily a fully detailed theology) and Paul’s focus may be
indicative of some related disparity of terms or of contexts.
There is another issue somewhat related to the first: the Divine promises of which Paul
speaks may not be the same as the ones spoken of in Genesis. Paul, of course, focuses on the
blessings of the new covenant, which includes believers in Jesus, both Jew and Gentile. The
inheritance which Isaac was to receive (“for through Isaac your descendants shall be named”)
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speaks of the Abrahamic promise that Abraham’s descendants would be a great nation inhabiting
a promised land. The significance of Genesis 21:12 is that it is Isaac’s lineage, not Ishmael’s,
through which this promise would be fulfilled. Isaac, not Ishmael, would be the ancestor of that
great nation which would inherit that promised land. It may be possible to find some connection
between this promise and the new covenant salvation spoken of by Paul from a wider, canonical
perspective, but can that connection be found within the context of Genesis itself? Genesis
speaks of a national blessing which, while it would not include Ishmael’s or Esau’s descendants,
would include those of Jacob. Once Jacob’s lineage is reached, there doesn’t seem to be any hint
of exclusivity.30 To be clear, the issue is not simply that Genesis fails to speak about exclusivity
within the descendants of Jacob. Rather, a certain level of non-exclusivity seems to be close to
the very heart of its message. Genesis is very concerned with Israel’s national identity, and in the
context of the Pentateuch it is quite difficult to separate the Divine choosing and physical descent
from Jacob with regard to that identity.
Perhaps both of these issues can be summed up like so: Paul says that “they are not all
Israel who are descended from Israel;” and proceeds to offer two examples (Ishmael and Esau),
neither of whom are descendants of Israel (Jacob) physically or in any other sense. It is necessary
for any hermeneutical understanding of how Paul uses Genesis 21:12 in Romans 9:7 to account
for and explain this seeming discrepancy in a way that makes sense within the context of Paul’s
argument in Romans 9.
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Hebrews 11:18
Now that the context and message of Romans 9:7 have been discussed, particularly in
terms of how they relate to the usage of Genesis 21:12, the same treatment ust be given to
Hebrews 11:18. Hebrews 11:18 will be examined in terms of its background and its own
contextual message. This will serve as a basis for the discussion of the usage of Genesis 21:12 in
Hebrews. After examining Hebrews 11:18, this study will have laid the groundwork for a
discussion of the usage of Genesis 21:12 in both New Testament passages and how they may
relate to one another.
Background of Hebrews 11:18 – The Cloud of Witnesses
Hebrews seems to be a particularly controversial book, especially with regard to its
prolegomena. This exacerbated by the general lack of evidential or even traditional attestation
concerning its authorship, date and audience. As an epistle, it lacks the usual salutation, and even
seems to defy genre classification to some degree.31 Any discussion of the prolegomena of
Hebrews depends almost entirely on internal evidence. Fortunately, the content of the letter itself
does seem to provide some foundation for understanding its purpose and message in spite of the
lack of external data.
David Allen characterizes the overall message of Hebrews as sermonic in nature, arguing
that its purpose is to exhort (probably Jewish) Christian believers to persevere in their
commitment to Christ. As such, the book alternates between warning and exhortation, focusing
heavily on exposition of Old Testament passages. This perseverance is presumably to be
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undertaken in the face of adversity. Although there have been numerous theories as to the details
of this audience and whatever difficulty they may have faced, Allen argues that at least this much
can be said based upon the internal evidence.32
Paul Ellingworth also makes a few observations concerning the background of Hebrews
which may be particularly relevant toward understanding its use of the Old Testament. First, he
observes that Hebrews is especially dependent on the Old Testament. He notes the relatively
high density of Old Testament quotation, as well as the fact that the book contains extensive
expositions upon particular texts (such as Psalm 110).33 Ellingworth also discusses the
relationship between Hebrews and Philo. Though some have postulated that the author of
Hebrews was influenced by Philo, Ellingworth concludes that the parallels can be explained
simply by exposure to a shared theological, philosophical, and literary background by both Philo
and the author of Hebrews.34 Another important point that Ellingworth makes concerns the
potential connections between Hebrews and Qumran, particularly in light of 11QMelch, which
like Hebrews discusses Melchizedek. This raises questions about whether the interpretive
methods exhibited in Hebrews should be characterized as pesher-like. Ellingworth notes,
however, that there are important differences with regard to how Hebrews and 11QMelch utilize
the Melchizedek figure. Specifically, Melchizedek as a person is given relatively little attention
in Hebrews. 11QMelch, on the other hand, focuses extensively on the person of Melchizedek
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himself and speculates about him. Hebrews does not seem to imply some special status for him
beyond the fact that the he is an Old Testament example of an extra-Levitical priest and therefore
serves as a sort of precursor or template for Jesus’ extra-Levitical priesthood. He is only
important in terms of what the author of Hebrews wants to say about Jesus.35 Overall, it does not
seem instructive from a hermeneutical standpoint to characterize Hebrews as utilizing pesher.
While there may be interesting similarities, the differences are too great for pesher, by itself, to
function as a sufficient characterization.
Gareth Cockerill sees Hebrews 11:1-12:3 as a contextual unit dealing with the history of
the faithful people of God and the audience’s part in it. Hebrews 11, the famous “hall of faith” in
which 11:18 appears, seeks to “clarify the nature of the faith that the [author] would have his
hearers emulate.”36 In addition, particular focus is placed on the way in which Old Testament
saints maintained their faith when faced with adversity.37 Cockerill sees the statement in
Hebrews 11:1 as a “definition of faith,” which in turn is displayed in the list of the faithful of
history.38 There is some disagreement as to what exactly the author of Hebrews means when he
uses the word πίστις. Some have argued that it should not be understood in the same way as it
can be understood elsewhere in the New Testament (Paul’s writings, for instance).39 However,
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Dennis Lindsay examines some of the other proposed backgrounds for the meaning of the word
(Josephus and Philo) and determines that a comparison of the use of πίστις between Hebrews and
these works “compels us to look elsewhere to Hebrews’ understanding of faith, and, by virtue of
the canonical context, Scripture itself is the most logical place to look.”40
Allen agrees that Hebrews 11:1 is a sort of formal definition of πίστις, but sees the verse
as an assertion that faith gives present substance to unseen, future hope.41 As such, faith is a sort
of present manifestation or witness to an unseen and as yet unfulfilled promise.42 As such, the
“hall of faith” becomes a catalog of this testimony throughout history. The Old Testament
faithful are at once exemplars, but their commitment to unseen future promises also serves to
testify to the reality of those promises. In the more immediate context of Hebrews 11:18, the
author speaks of Abraham as looking for a “city.” Mitchell argues that this is a way of
connecting the experience of Abraham to the experience of the readers of Hebrews. Abraham
was promised a land for his descendants to dwell in, yet he himself lived his life as a nomad. The
land is “reinterpreted” (Mitchell’s word) as a “city prepared for them by God.”43 Abraham’s
willingness to leave his homeland, to remain faithful to God in his nomadic life, not to return to
his homeland even though he could have done so, these all testify to the reality of the promise.
Abraham did all of these things because he knew (had faith) that what God had promised was
real. This faith is, then, a testimony to the audience of Hebrews.
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It is on the basis of this testimony that the call of Hebrews 12 is given. The audience is
called upon to patiently endure the trials and difficulties which they will face, looking to Jesus’
obedient endurance in facing the cross the cross as an example.44 The “cloud of witnesses” in
Hebrews 12:1 is the great host of the faithful men and woman of the past. These people bear
witness to the faithfulness of God through their actions, particularly their sacrifices. F. F. Bruce
even goes so far as to argue that Hebrews 12:1 is an early example of the term μαρτύριον taking
on the connotation of “martyr,” connecting as it does the concepts of witness and personal
sacrifice.45
For the purposes of this study, the contextual background of Hebrews 11:18 can be
summed up like so: The purpose of Hebrews is to encourage believers (likely Jewish Christians)
from turning back from the faith in the face of adversity. It does this by alternatively exhorting
and warning them. Hebrews 11, the more immediate context of the verse in question, sets forth a
litany of Old Testament saints with particular focus given to their belief in as yet unseen future
realities, and the way in which their continued faithfulness and sacrifices testify to those realities
and to the faithfulness of God. The audience is called upon to join this “cloud of witnesses” in
faithful obedience by not giving up or turning back, in spite of the difficulties they face. With
this context in mind, it is possible now to discuss the message of Hebrews 11:18.
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Message of Hebrews 11:18
Hebrews 11:18 falls within the portion of the “hall of faith” that deals directly with
Abraham. Hebrews first focuses on the faith displayed by Abraham in his departure from his
homeland to sojourn in the land of promise, with special focus on the fact that he did this as a
nomad “living in tents” and not seeing for himself the receipt of the land-promise. The verse
under direct examination here, though, falls within a discussion of another act of faith on
Abraham’s part: his willingness to sacrifice Isaac.
Within the larger context of Hebrews 11-12:1, this act on Abraham’s part fits among the
list of acts of faith which testify to the unseen reality of the future promises of a faithful God. By
leaving his homeland to sojourn in the Promised Land, Abraham adds his voice to the “cloud of
witnesses” of Hebrews 12:1. In the same fashion, he further lends his voice to this “cloud” by
offering up Isaac at God’s behest. The author of Hebrews seems to tie this explicitly to the
promises received by Abraham by referring to Abraham as “he that received the promises.” He
seems to be reminding the audience that Abraham was, essentially, offering up those very
promises which he had received, because Isaac was the key to their fulfillment.46
Hebrews offers an interesting additional bit of interpretation here as well: it states that
Abraham, as he offered up Isaac, “considered that God is able to raise people even from the
dead.” Abraham Oh discusses the origin of this idea, pointing out its proposed roots in the Jewish
tradition of Adequah. Adequah represents a Midrashic reading of the binding of Isaac narrative
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which features an atoning function attached to the sacrifice of Isaac.47 Some debate exists as to
whether this influenced the New Testament’s construal of atonement through Jesus as well as the
New Testament’s Christological use of the binding of Isaac narrative (not only in Hebrews 11:18
but also in Romans 4:16-17). However, Oh concludes that while there are similarities between
Isaac and Jesus that the New Testament utilizes, this does not extend to an atoning function on
the part of Isaac such as that put forward by the Adequah interpretation.48
The idea that Abraham trusted God to raise Isaac from the dead is not mentioned in
Genesis. Perhaps there is even an argument to be made that this understanding is a bit of a
stretch. After all, it is clearly not necessary for God to raise Isaac from the dead in order to fulfill
the promise made to Abraham. The narrative itself proves this because God does not in fact do
so. Instead, an angel stays Abraham’s hand before he kills Isaac. That being said, Hebrews is
hardly alone in making this connection between Isaac and resurrection. On the other hand, the
author of Hebrews seems to be reasoning that Abraham, in order to reconcile the Divine
command to sacrifice Isaac with the Divine promise that was to come through Isaac and yet be
willing to go through with the sacrifice, must have believed that the promise could still be
fulfilled even if Isaac was sacrificed. An obvious way of reconciling this is resurrection.49
Hebrews goes so far as to say that Isaac was indeed resurrected “in a figure.”
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What verse 18 adds to all of this is an emphasis on Isaac as the key to the promises made
to Abraham. To sacrifice Isaac was to cut off the promises because God had stated unequivocally
that the promises would be fulfilled through him. Without this, the conclusion stated in Hebrews
that Abraham must have believed Isaac could be resurrected does not make sense. If the author
of Hebrews thought it possible, for example, that the promises could be fulfilled through some
other son, or in some other way that did not involve Isaac, there would be no need to conclude
that Abraham must have believed that Isaac, if killed, would be resurrected. Verse 18 provides
the biblical basis for this, as a clear statement from God that the promises would be fulfilled
specifically through Isaac.
This understanding of verse 18 serves to clear up the interpretive issue raised by
Hebrews’ mention of Isaac as Abraham’s “only begotten son.” Hebrews seems to be
paraphrasing Genesis 22:2 here. Although the Genesis account of Abraham’s sacrificing of Isaac
speaks of Isaac as Abraham’s “only son” in the original Hebrew, Koester notes that the LXX
does not include “only,” let alone “only begotten.”50 The author of Hebrews seems to have
somewhat pointedly opted for the Hebrew text in this instance. Abraham, of course, had another
son: Ishmael. Ishmael, however, was disinherited51 and Isaac was designated by God as the sole
heir of the promises, per Genesis 21:12. The author of Hebrews seems to be drawing special
attention to this fact. Isaac was the Divinely-designated hair of the promises, and so they could
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not be fulfilled without him. Thus, the internal logic of Hebrews 11:17-19 makes sense. Isaac
was the sole key to the promises, therefore Abraham displayed great faith in offering him up,
since he would be sacrificing not only his son but all of the Divine promises that were tied to that
son through Divine decree, and furthermore Abraham must even have reasoned that God was
able to preserve those promises if Abraham obediently offered Isaac up, even if that meant Isaac
would be resurrected. So, in summary, the message of Hebrews 11:18 specifically seems to be
that Isaac was designated by God as the heir of and key to the promises made to Abraham, in
such a way that the promises could not be fulfilled without him.
Use of Genesis 21:12 in Hebrews 11:18
The use of Genesis 21:12 in Hebrews 11:18 is, when taken on its own, somewhat
straightforward. The message of Genesis 21:12 centers on the Divine decree that Isaac would be
the sole heir and vehicle of the fulfillment of the promises made to Abraham. Hebrews more or
less parrots this idea. The contexts, though, are not identical. The focus of Genesis 21:12 seems
to be upon the sending away of Ishmael. Abraham is counseled by God not to hesitate in sending
Ishmael away because a) Isaac is the sole heir of the promises and b) Ishmael will receive his
own separate blessing. Thus, while Genesis 21:12 speaks to the Divine revelation that Isaac
alone will be the heir of the promise, its focus is on the exclusivity of that inheritance within the
context of the Isaac / Ishmael drama. Hebrews, on the other hand, simply focuses on the fact of
Isaac’s centrality to the fulfillment of the Divine promise. Hebrews goes beyond the direct
statements of Genesis by reasoning about Abraham’s mindset when he offered Isaac. Genesis 22,
in its narrative of the sacrifice, does not directly reference the promises tied to Isaac.
Nevertheless, Genesis 21 is in contextual view of Genesis 22, and the reference to Isaac as
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Abraham’s “only son” in Genesis 22:12 may have 21:12 in view. After all, in what sense,
contextually, is Isaac Abraham’s only son in Genesis 22? The answer seems to be that Isaac is
the sole heir of the promise, per 21:12.
As such, Hebrews seems to do little to depart from the meaning of Genesis 21:12 in its
use of that verse. Even its application of that verse to the Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac in Genesis
22 is fairly close contextually to the message of Genesis itself. The biggest leap which Hebrews
makes is, perhaps, its conclusions about Abraham’s faith in God’s ability to resurrect as an
explanation for his willingness to obey God in spite of seeming contradiction between God’s
decree in Genesis 22:12 and the command of 22:2. Nothing in Genesis states that Abraham did
not have such a belief, but there is also no direct contextual evidence in Genesis that Abraham
had resurrection in mind as a solution to the apparent dichotomy. This, however, does not
directly affect how the use of Genesis 21:12 specifically may be understood. Genesis 21:12
identifies Isaac as the sole heir of the Divine promises made to Abraham, and Hebrews quotes it
in a more or less straightforward way to point to that fact, even if Hebrews uses that as part of a
larger argument.
It is important, however, to take note of the fact that Hebrews does use its quotation of
Genesis 21:12 as part of that larger argument. Hebrews 11 uses the experiences and actions of
Old Testament saints to speak to the lives of early Christians. As such, connections are drawn
between the two. The Christian audience of Hebrews looked forward to the fulfillment of Divine
promise in the form the complete fulfillment of their salvation, and Abraham’s faithfulness is
interpreted along these same lines. Thus, Abraham is seen as awaiting a “better country.”
Abraham’s patient expectation of a land and a nation which he would not himself live to see is
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viewed as an indication of an even greater hope. Similarly, Abraham’s willingness to offer Isaac
is seen not only as evidence of his belief that God will somehow “provide for Himself the lamb
for the burnt offering” (Genesis 22:8), but that God can and will even resurrect Isaac from dead,
if need be, in order to preserve the Divine promise. The binding of Isaac narrative is not the
direct and immediate focus of Genesis 21:12. However, Hebrews uses Genesis 21:12 as part of a
larger argument which concerns the binding of Isaac narrative. As such, the usage of Genesis
21:12 in Hebrews also involves and includes this larger usage of the binding of Isaac narrative.
For the purposes of this study, it will all be treated as one unit.
Is the Idea of Resurrection Latent in Genesis?
If the binding of Isaac narrative is to be seen as connected to the use of Genesis 21:12 in
Hebrews, then a relevant question is whether and to what degree Genesis itself contains this idea
of a resurrection. Just how natural is the inference made in Hebrews 11:18 about Abraham’s
thoughts as he sacrificed Isaac? Is it latent within Genesis in some form, or is it purely an
invention on the part of the author of Hebrews? The answer to this question has pertinent
implications regarding the hermeneutical issues surrounding the use of Genesis 21 in Hebrews
11.
Michell L. Chase sees the reasoning provided in Hebrews as something closely tied to
and latent within the Genesis text. It simply flows out of the juxtaposition between the absolute
trustworthiness (specifically in Abraham’s eyes) of the Divine promise concerning Isaac as the
seed and the command that Abraham sacrifice Isaac. The only logical way to reconcile these two
things, in indeed Abraham is to actually go through with the sacrifice, is to assume that God
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would raise Isaac from the dead.52 Chase sees this conclusion as valid partially because the
“seeds” of a resurrection hope are already present throughout Genesis. He provides a cumulative
case for this, and his analysis of the binding of Isaac narrative forms a part of this cumulative
case.53 Furthermore, he bases this enterprise on an argument that the New Testament Scriptures
repeatedly validate the presence of a latent resurrection hope in the Torah.54
In Resurrection and the Restoration of Israel, Jon D. Levenson devotes an entire chapter
to discussion of the concept of resurrection in the Torah. His primary focus is on rabbinic
traditions which saw a concept of resurrection in the text. In his attempt to understand the
motivations of the rabbis, Levenson argues that their commitment to the concept of a
resurrection grew out of a need to adapt scriptural teaching to new contextual realities. He
concludes that these rabbinic attempts “are, in a word, derash, the product of midrashic
interpretation and not historico-grammatical exegesis.”55 On the other hand, he sees the concept
of a resurrection in a latent form within earlier Old Testament texts such as the Torah. Clear Old
Testament statements about resurrection such as that found in Daniel 12:1-3, as well as rabbinic
ideas about resurrection in the Scriptures, are founded in these latent precursors.56
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N. T. Wright sees the concept of resurrection developing in a similar way. Some of its
earlier echoes, he argues, are founded in a vision of a sort of communal immortality focused on
perpetuation of one’s lineage.57 This idea develops into an idea of personal resurrection, but it
does so in a way that in intimately tied to the Old Testament’s vision of God himself. This
theological understanding, present from the very beginning, serves as the basis for thematic
threads which ultimately weave together in order to form a resurrection theology.58
What can be gathered from all of this is that resurrection is not clearly taught in Genesis.
However, it is not entirely alien to Genesis either. Ideas about resurrection and life after death
grow out of seeds already planted in the earlier Scriptures. This, perhaps, explains the New
Testament assertion observed by Chase that a doctrine of resurrection is founded in the Old
Testament Scriptures.59 However, if a doctrine of resurrection was merely latent in books such as
Genesis, what is to be made of the bold claim in Hebrews that Abraham was aware of it? Is this
to be taken as evidence that an understanding of resurrection goes as far back as Abraham
himself? Is the logic applied by the author of Hebrews concerning the binding of Isaac narrative
sufficient to establish Abraham’s trust in a resurrection, despite the fact that Genesis does not
explicitly mention it? These are some of the hermeneutical issues which will have to be
addressed in interacting with the use of Genesis in Hebrews 11:18 (and its immediate context) in
this study.
Hermeneutical Differences Between Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18
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Before diving too deeply into the hermeneutical situations affecting either Hebrews 11:18
or Romans 9:7, it is important to discuss the hermeneutical moves present in these two passages
with a view to how they are different. This will prepare the way for an argument to made that the
hermeneutics exhibited in these verses are affected by situational factors, and that such factors
can play an integral part in the hermeneutics of the New Testament’s use of the Old Testament.
Perhaps the most obvious statement that can be made about the hermeneutical differences
between Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 is that Hebrews uses Genesis 21:12 in a more
straightforward way than Paul does. When the use of Genesis 21:12 in each case is viewed on its
own, Paul’s message seems to divert more widely from that of the original context of Genesis
specifically with regard to the use of Genesis 21:12. Paul’s focus is on exclusivity, and is more
closely tied to the exclusion of Ishmael in favor of Isaac. He makes the point that Ishmael, a
physical descendant of Abraham, was nevertheless excluded from the Divine promise made to
Abraham (despite the fact that Ishmael received a separate promise of his own, making no
mention of the fact that Ishmael received this blessing specifically “because he is [Abraham’s]
descendant” [Genesis 21:13]). The overall contextual message of Genesis seems to focus on the
national identity of Israel as descendants of Jacob and therefore inheritors of the Abrahamic
promise. Indeed, Jacob’s name is changed to Israel, and the whole point is that descent from
Jacob forms part of a national identity that descendants of Ishmael and Esau, for example, do not
have. Paul, however, uses this to speak of exclusion of certain Israelites from the new covenant
of God. Paul’s theology does not contradict the message of Genesis, but it does seem to vary
from it contextually in its focus.
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Hebrews, on the other hand, uses Genesis 21:12 in a more straightforward way. Genesis
21:12 identifies Isaac as the child of the promise. There is no possibility of Ishmael playing a
part in fulfilling the promise, a fact which perhaps serves as the basis for Isaac being identified
three times as Abraham’s “only” son in Genesis 22. This is notwithstanding the LXX which
speaks of Isaac merely as “beloved” on all three occasions, where in this instance Hebrews
seems to prefer a version containing “only.” As such, there is contextual precedent within
Genesis itself for the way in which Hebrews emphasizes the Divine statement in Genesis 21:12:
Isaac is the sole heir. It is this intra-Genesis precedent which Paul’s usage of the verse seems to
lack.
However, the use of Genesis 21:12 in Hebrews 11:18 should not be separated from its
immediate context. This use of Genesis 21:12 forms an integral part of a tightly packed argument
about Abraham’s sacrifice in light of Isaac being the child of promise a la Genesis 21:12. This
argument does contain something of a departure from the contextual message of Genesis in that
the author of Hebrews speculates about Abraham’s belief that if Isaac was killed he would in fact
be resurrected. The author has reasons for such speculation, as has already been discussed, but
this does represent something other than historical-grammatical exegesis. The Genesis account of
Abraham’s life alone does not appear to demand reasoning about resurrection as a solution to the
faith-problem posed by Isaac’s sacrifice. This demand stems from a concern external to Genesis
itself, perhaps the desire of the author of Hebrews to connect Abraham’s experience of awaiting
a promised hope to the similar experience of his readers, whose future hope focuses much more
directly on the promise of eternal life and resurrection. It is necessary to deal with the use of
Genesis 21:12 in Hebrews 11:18 on two levels: first on the granular level of Hebrews 11:18
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alone, and then on the level of Hebrews 11:18 within the context of the statement about
Abraham’s faith exhibited in his willingness to sacrifice Isaac.
When viewed this way, differences between Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12 and that of the
author of Hebrews become even more apparent. Both raise hermeneutical questions, Paul’s
through his departure from the specific message of Genesis 21:12 about Israel’s national/ethnic
identity and Hebrews’ through a more direct usage of Genesis 21:12 within the context of a
larger argument that imports external concerns into that usage. The questions raised by each
respective passage, however, are not the same questions. Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12, while not
immediately contradictory to the meaning of Genesis 21:12, runs in practically the opposite
direction of the contextual message of Genesis regarding Isaac as Abraham’s seed. Nothing
about Isaac being the child of promise and the patriarch of a national identity for Israel indicates
that God’s future new covenant must include all of ethnic Israel, but the Abrahamic promises of
Genesis, in the context of its overall message, are for descendants of Jacob even if Ishmael and
Esau are specifically excluded. Hebrews seems to run with the grain of Genesis, even though it
branches off with regard to concerns that are not part of the Genesis context itself (i.e. hope of
resurrection). Hebrews 11:18 raises questions about whether or not it is hermeneutically
appropriate, for the author of Hebrews or for modern readers, to extrapolate about the thoughts
and beliefs of biblical characters when they are not clearly stated. Romans 9:7 raises perhaps a
more difficult question about whether or not biblical passages can be used in ways which, while
they may not directly contradict, nevertheless run counter to the general thrust of the overall
message of the context of those passages. Both Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 1:18 raise certain
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hermeneutical questions with regard to their use of Genesis 21:12, but they each use the Genesis
passage in different ways, and therefore raise different questions.
Hermeneutical Issues Arising from the Differences in use of Genesis 21:12 between Romans 9:7
and Hebrews 11:18
The fact that Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 use Genesis 21:12 differently raises
questions in and of itself. It is these questions with which this study is primarily concerned. Does
the presence of two inspired New Testament texts which interpret an Old Testament text in
different ways, both of which carry their own difficulties, require as an explanation some sort of
sensus plenior? Perhaps two different usages of a text imply at least two different meanings for
that text. Perhaps each usage presents its own sensus plenior for Genesis 21:12 so that there is
more than one. Presumably, if the Spirit is capable of embedding a hidden meaning in a text he is
capable of embedding more than one hidden meaning in that text. With that in mind, it seems
that sensus plenior would be able to account for these different ways of using the same text.
However, this study will argue that it is not necessary to resort to sensus plenior in order to
explain the phenomenon of multiple, different usages. It will propose a solution which does not
require sensus plenior: the hermeneutical methods exhibited in both New Testament texts are
simultaneously valid in their own right and in a way which does not rely on a fuller sense, even
when the contextual meaning of Genesis 21:12 is taken into account.
There is another issue which is raised by the presence of two differing inspired
interpretations of Genesis 21:12. The question “what is the right way to interpret this text?”
seems to falter at the point where the same passage is interpreted in two different ways within the
New Testament. There can no longer be a single answer to that question, but if the New
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Testament is held to be inspired, then each of these different ways of interpreting must be
somehow valid as well. The particular passages under scrutiny here not only question whether
straightforward historical-grammatical exegesis is the only way to read an Old Testament text,
but they also question whether there even is a single “correct” way. There is a need for
consistency. This study will attempt to show that such consistency is still possible, but it requires
taking into account additional nuance in the form of an acknowledgement of situational factors
which are at play when a particular way of interpreting the Old Testament is put forward. When
these factors are taken into account, there are still “right” and “wrong” ways to use the text, but
the scope of what is right and wrong depends on a variety of situational factors external to the
text itself. Nevertheless, within this context there can still be consistency and a firm interpretive
foundation. It will be argued that speech act theory furnishes an approach which enables this
consistency to be explored across multiple situational contexts.
This question leads to a somewhat related one concerning replication. Should modern
readers replicate the interpretive methods of the New Testament authors in light of multiple,
different ways in which Old Testament passages are used, and if so, how? This study will again
turn to situational factors for an answer. By taking these into account, a foundation can be
established for defining proper and improper interpretation within the context of modern
situational factors. To ask whether an interpretation is right or wrong in a given situation is, of
course, more complex than simply asking whether a particular way of interpreting is right or
wrong, but it will be argued that this is more akin to the actual way in which the New Testament
authors approached Scripture. Furthermore, the approach furnishes by speech act theory provides
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a way to consistently apply the same criteria to both the New Testament’s usage of Scripture and
usage by modern readers.
Conclusion
There are important hermeneutical differences between the use of Genesis 21:12 in
Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18. These differences seem to further complicate the usual slew of
hermeneutical questions which arise from the New Testament’s use of the old. Issues of
hermeneutical validity and replication are muddied when two passages seem to use the same
passage in ways which are differently problematic. This study will suggest that a situational
hermeneutic rooted in theological beliefs about Scripture can help answer some of these
questions, and that identifying the speech acts at work in the relevant passages is a key to
unraveling this. Having examined these three interrelated passages in terms of their individual
messages and contexts, it is now possible to discuss the speech acts being performed in each of
them.
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CHAPTER THREE:
SPEECH ACTS IN GENESIS 21:12 / ROMANS 9:7 AND HEBREWS 11:18

Introduction
Having looked at Genesis 21:12 and its use in Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 in the
more traditional manner, the way is open to begin identifying the speech acts present in each of
these texts. The next chapter will argue that speech act theory provides a way to evaluate the
usage of Scripture in terms of its hermeneutical validity that can be applied consistently across a
variety of situational contexts. This includes the situational contexts involved in the New
Testament’s usage of Scripture, but it also includes those of modern readers. The final chapter
will argue that this, therefore, provides a way to evaluate modern replication of the New
Testament’s methods that better accounts for the New Testament’s situation-bound
hermeneutical variety. In order to make those arguments with respect to Genesis 21:12 and
romans 9:7/Hebrews 11:18, however, it is necessary first to discuss speech acts as they appear in
those respective passages. The current chapter will devote itself to this task. On this foundation,
further arguments about how speech acts interact with situation and hermeneutical validity can
be made in the following chapters. First, a discussion of speech act theory in general will be
offered. This will take the form of an examination of prominent contributors in the field of
speech act theory and its historical development.
In order to maintain relative brevity in discussing the backgrounds of speech act theory,
this study will begin with the work of J. L. Austin. Although the conceptual roots of speech act
theory can be traced back farther, Austin is perhaps the earliest modern philosopher to describe it
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in the form which is best known today.1 This will be followed by some methodological
comments concerning specifically the identification of speech acts in the biblical passages under
scrutiny in this study. Once some methodological parameters have been set, this chapter will be
set to the task of identifying the most relevant speech acts occurring in Genesis 21:12, Romans
9:7, and Hebrews 11:18. Of course, identification of the speech acts present in a particular
biblical passage is by no means a simple task. This will require the identification of multiple
possible accountings of the speech acts present in a passage, followed by an attempt to determine
which ones are most satisfying within the context of each book. The inclusion of Genesis 21:12
in this process is important, as the speech acts performed in the New Testament texts may be
performed on or in light of the ones performed in Genesis. Questions about the relationship
between the authorial intent of the New Testament authors and that of the Genesis author
necessitate an understanding of the speech acts performed in Genesis.
Speech Act Theory
Before embarking on the task of identifying speech acts present in the biblical passages
under scrutiny here, it is perhaps necessary to briefly summarize speech act theory itself so as to
ensure that the argument of this study is properly communicated. Speech act theory is a theory
within philosophy of language which seeks to understand language in terms of actions which go
beyond merely declarative actions. It focuses on the multitude of types of action which are
involved with or performed through speaking. In order to provide an overview of speech act
theory as it relates to this study, the work of some major contributors will be addressed. These
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will include J. L. Austin and John R. Searle, as well as some authors who have applied speech
act theory to biblical interpretation.
J. L. Austin
While speech act theory builds upon the contributions of numerous earlier scholars, its
essential ideas found their genesis in the work of J. L. Austin. Austin’s work on speech act
theory arises as part of his larger contribution to ordinary language philosophy. Austin argued for
an understanding of speech as action that went beyond just the idea of assertion. He was
responding, in part, to a more purely positivist view of language which sought to see language as
comprised of the making of truth claims. Austin saw this as too reductive and argued that it
failed to account for the full range of uses to which language might be put.2 He outlines some of
the shortcomings of these positivistic views in his discussion of sense-data theory as it relates to
language in Sense and Sensibilia. Specifically, he points out that this positivistic view falls short
in its ability to account for the normal, everyday uses of words which allow for or imply some
degree of uncertainty about whether what is experienced is actually the way things are, such as
“perceive.”3 In short, he argues that the way in which words such as “perceive” or “seem” are
used in ordinary language points to flaws in the claim that the best way to understand language is
in terms of fact-assertions which are either true or false. There are significant aspects of
statements containing these words which are neither properly described nor accounted for by the
positivist understanding. Austin instead proposes a much more varied way of understanding the
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actions involved in speaking. Rather than just stating a truth-claim, speakers can “promise,”
“name,” “bequeath,” etc.
In order to account for these kinds of statements in his description of language, Austin
proposes what he calls “performative statements.” Such statements are involved in the
performing of some type of action and do not necessarily have a truth value. Rather than merely
stating a fact (either true or false), they perform some action. Austin offers as examples the
naming of a ship with the statement, “I name this ship…” or marrying a woman: “I take this
woman…” as such performative utterances. He clarifies that such actions properly account for
circumstantial factors which affect whether or not a particular act is being performed, such as the
fact that the one naming the ship is the person with the authority to do so and that the man
marrying the woman is not already married, and that the woman has agreed, and so on. He points
out that these instances of speech can involve actions other than stating a truth-claim and cannot
be said to have a truth value themselves in that simple and direct sense.4 So, Austin sees speech
acts as the actions which are carried out in the utterance of performative statements, and these
acts encompass much more than just the stating of claims with a truth value. Ultimately, these
performative actions are termed speech acts.
Austin argues that any given performative statement involves multiple speech acts, and
places these speech acts in three different categories, although he acknowledges that there are
likely other types of acts involved which could be pointed out. These categories are formed
around the ontological relationship between the speech act and the speech itself. The first of
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these categories, locutionary acts, contains those which involve the physical or modal aspects of
the act of speech such as the making of sounds (which Austin calls phonetic act, a subset of
locutionary act), the act of uttering words conforming to a particular grammar within a particular
understood language (phetic act), and the act of doing the previous two “with a certain more-orless definite sense and reference”5 (rhetic act). Essentially, locutionary acts describe the
functional act of saying something, in all its parts.6
Austin also identifies illocutionary acts, which are acts performed “in saying something
as opposed to performance of an act of saying something.”7 Whereas locutionary acts involve
saying words, or even just making sounds, illocutionary acts involve things like asking a
question or warning someone. Interestingly, Austin points out the importance of context with
regard to illocutionary acts. The same locutionary act could be made in two different situations
(same sounds made), and yet the illocutionary acts involved might differ based upon that
situational context.8 This will be of particular importance in this study, which will seek to point
out the effect which situation has on the speech acts involved in New Testament texts as they use
the Old Testament.
Austin points out a third category of speech act: perlocutionary acts. These acts concern
the consequences or effects produced by speech on the audience, the speaker themselves, or

5

Ibid., 95.

6

Ibid., 98.

7

Ibid, 99-100.

8

Ibid, 100.

83

others, insofar as those effects are intended by the speaker when speaking.9 An example of such
an act might go as follows: if a person is about to be hit by a bus and a bystander shouts “watch
out!” A locutionary act would be the shouting of those words, and an illocutionary act would be
that the bystander warned the person about to be hit. Assuming that the person got out of the way
of the bus in time, a perlocutionary act in this scenario would be that the bystander got the person
to move out of the way. In short, locutionary acts in Austin’s view are acts of speaking,
illocutionary acts are acts performed in speaking, and perlocutionary acts are acts performed by
speaking.
John R. Searle
John R. Searle takes Austin’s work on speech acts and develops it further. He focuses
primarily on illocutionary acts in Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.10 In this
work, Searle seeks to more closely define what is meant by illocutionary force as Austin initially
described it. While Austin pointed out the existence of such a concept, he did not fully explore
how it could be understood. Searle focuses primarily on the speech act of promising as a test case
for his analysis. His method involves asking questions related to what criteria specifically must
be met in order for an illocutionary act such as promising to be successfully carried out. His goal
in doing this is to determine a set of rules which can be used to identify illocutionary force.11
Searle explores more deeply the details of reference and predication as illocutionary speech acts.
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In Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind,12 a later work, Searle explores
speech acts again as part of his larger focus on the philosophy of intent. He sees speech acts as
parallel to states of intent within the context of the philosophy of intent which he seeks to put
forward. As part of this discussion, Searle asserts that illocutionary acts, like intent-states, have
conditions by which they can be satisfied or left unsatisfied. A promise, for example, can be kept
or broken, or a command can be obeyed or disobeyed. He speaks of the concept of “direction of
fit” as an attribute of illocutionary acts which speaks to their intentionality and determines how
their truth value is defined. Typical propositional statements, and others which Searle calls part
of the “assertive class” have a “word-to-world” directional fit. They are true insofar as they
match an external and independently existing world, and false insofar as they do not. Other
speech acts, however, such as promises, requests, or commands, have a “world-to-word”
direction fit, and are kept/fulfilled/obeyed not insofar as they match the world but insofar as the
world matches them, and broken/denied/disobeyed insofar as it does not.13
Within the context of this study, Searle’s contribution is important in that it provides
some starting points for analyzing the nature of the speech acts involved in a text. Perhaps
identification of the satisfying conditions or direction of fit involved in biblical texts can provide
some insight into the numerous speech acts which may be being performed in a particular text.
Searle’s contributions will be discussed further in the context of the methodological section of
this chapter.
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Speech Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation
Following its beginnings in the domain of philosophy of language, speech act theory has
been taken up within the study of hermeneutics, and of biblical hermeneutics specifically. While
this study focuses on speech act theory as it specifically applies to questions about New
Testament use of the Old, it is important to understand the background of how speech act theory
has been applied to biblical hermeneutics in general. The main contributors that will be
addressed here are Nicholas Wolterstorff, Anthony C. Thiselton, and Richard S. Briggs, as well
as some comments by Brevard Childs that seek clarify the differences in approach between
Wolterstorff and Thiselton.
Nicholas Wolterstorff
Perhaps Wolterstorff’s most important contribution to the use of speech act theory in
biblical hermeneutics appears in his book Divine Discourse. Wolterstorff sees in speech act
theory an opportunity to understand in a new way the claim the God speaks. He argues that the
distinction proposed by speech acts theory between locutionary and illocutionary acts opens the
door to the possibility that the idea that God speaks “… should be understood as the attribution
to God of illocutionary actions, leaving it open how God performs those actions.”14 As such,
someone hearing the Bible read aloud and feeling as though the message of Scripture were meant
for them can rightly understand that God is indeed speaking directly to them. Furthermore, this
can be understood without the need for some special revelatory incident, because God’s speaking
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to that person can be seen as an illocutionary act already embedded in, perhaps, the much earlier
locutionary acts involved in the writing of that Scripture. Wolterstorff argues that what people
perceive as God speaking can indeed actually be God speaking, even in the absence of some
additional locutionary act (such as an audible voice or some other special mode of revelation).
To him, Divine speech is in fact Divine appropriation of human speech.15
It is important to note that Wolterstorff’s approach does not insist that the Bible itself is
Divine speech in the inerrantist sense. Indeed, he argues that it is not necessary for the Bible as a
human-authored text to be inerrant in order for the Divine discourse which comes from it by way
of illocution to be perfectly true and loving. He acknowledges that this leads to questions
regarding the authority of Scripture, which he refers to as the “wax nose” anxiety. This is the
concern that one’s interpretation is wrong, either in failing to recognize what God says or
otherwise believing that He says something He does not say. Wolterstorff argues that, on a
practical level, even the inerrantist cannot escape this anxiety. His answer to this problem is that
readers should approach the task of interpretation with a great deal of humility, because the risk
cannot be completely avoided.16
Anthony Thiselton
Anthony C. Thiselton further develops speech act theory within the domain of biblical
hermeneutics. He draws upon the work of Wolterstorff, but does not necessarily mirror his
approach. Whereas Wolterstorff sees speech acts as a primary vehicle for Divine discourse,17
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Thiselton understands speech act theory as an interpretive tool for understanding the text. He
sees speech act theory as “one of the many ways of understanding the language of the New
Testament.”18 In his commentary on 1 Corinthians, Thiselton particularly emphasizes the benefit
of examining scriptural rhetoric in its perlocutionary context. He argues that rhetoric, insofar as it
seeks to produce certain effects in the audience, can be better understood by viewing such effects
as perlocutionary speech acts. Thiselton sees speech acts as important for complete
understanding of biblical texts because performativity is simply a property of the text. In many
cases, biblical authors do not simply say something, they do something in saying and also by
saying. Thus, speech acts are in fact a feature of the text itself. Thiselton does not seem to mean
this in a Wolterstorffian sense (i.e. that the Divine discourse is contained in illocutionary acts
which extend to today), but rather seems to be simply stating that the Bible is the performance of
speech acts, and that failing to recognize this in favor of seeing it only in terms of its truth-claims
is to miss out on a hermeneutically useful dimension of the Scriptures.19 As such, speech act
theory is “one tool among many” for scriptural interpretation.20
Brevard Childs on Wolterstorff and Thiselton
Brevard Childs offers a critique of Wolterstorff’s approach in which he elucidates the
differences in approach between Wolterstorff and Thiselton. He criticizes Woltertorff’s departure
from the traditional understanding of biblical interpretation as seeking to understand the meaning

18

Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 51.
19

Ibid., 50-52.

20

Anthony C. Thiselton, “Speech-Act Theory as One Tool Among Many: ‘Transforming Texts’,” in
Thiselton on Hermeneutics: Collected Works with New Essays (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 71-74.

88

of the text exegetically. He sees Wolterstorff’s approach as failing to address the problem of the
divide between faith and reason which Wolterstorff seeks to address. Instead, it separates the
content of Divine revelation from the original meaning of Scripture itself. Childs contrasts this
approach with that of Thiselton, who he says utilizes speech act theory within the context of
exegesis. Thiselton seeks to understand the text in the more or less typically exegetical way, but
sees speech act theory as a tool which can be used toward that end in certain situations. Childs
cautions modern scholars to take care when addressing the topic of speech act theory in biblical
interpretation, because this is not in fact a unified topic, but rather involves wildly disparate
approaches.21
In agreement with Childs, the approach of this study will be most like that of Thiselton. It
will be argued that speech act theory is a useful interpretive tool, in this case especially when it
comes to answering hermeneutical questions about the New Testament’s use of the Old
Testament. Like Thiselton, this study will emphasize the importance of speech acts. Speech acts
are in fact a feature of the text, whether they are recognized or not, and therefore they are
hermeneutically significant. However, this study will not seek to place the locus of meaning for
the biblical text in speech acts. Speech acts may be part of a text’s context and therefore affect its
meaning, or understanding them may help to clarify that meaning, but speech acts are not
themselves a source of additional meaning that is independent from the text or from the intent of
its human authors.
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Richard S. Briggs
Building on the earlier work of Wolterstorff and Thiselton, Richard S. Briggs contributes
to the topic of speech act theory in biblical hermeneutics in his volume Words in Action: Speech
Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation. Briggs does not see the role of speech act theory as being
relegated only to certain categories of so-called performative utterances, nor does he see it as
totally revolutionizing the way in which language is understood when it comes to hermeneutics.
Rather, he proposes that speech act theory opens up a new hermeneutical category which he
terms a “hermeneutic of self-involvement.” Briggs differentiates this from a reader-response
hermeneutic and does not seem to claim that meaning is derived from one’s subjective response.
Rather, he sees certain theological concepts as best understood in the context of one’s own
involvement in them. Indeed, to separate that self-involvement from one’s understanding is
perhaps to miss something.22 One example which Briggs offers is that of forgiveness. He
discusses the construal of forgiveness as a performative speech act and argues that this construal
has significant advantages over others. Seeing forgiveness, for example, as simply reporting an
inner cognitive state fails to account for the fact that cognitive states can fluctuate. Seeing it as a
“strongly self-involving illocutionary act,” he argues, accounts for forgiveness within the context
of theological beliefs about sin, atonement, etc.23
Briggs seems to see the strong self-involvement in illocutionary acts as central to
interpretation precisely because these acts are a feature of theological concepts dealt with by the
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biblical texts, and because the texts also deal with issues related to that involvement. Like
Thiselton, he sees speech acts as a feature of the text which interpreters ought to take into
account, although he is focused specifically on his hermeneutic of self-involvement whereas
Thiselton is simply concerned with speech acts in the biblical text generally. This study will
follow their example. If speech acts are indeed a feature of the text, then they ought to be
examined as part of the task of exegesis. In the case of New Testament use of the Old, the
argument being made here is that such examination has something to contribute to the discussion
of hermeneutical issues which arise when the New Testament uses Old Testament texts.
John Walton and Brent Sandy
In The Lost World of Scripture,24 John Walton and Brent Sandy discuss ancient ideas
concerning scriptural authority and their basis in oral culture. As part of their larger argument,
they discuss the concept of Divine accommodation of human authors. Speech act theory plays an
important role in their understanding. They employ speech act theory to argue that usage of a
text does not guarantee illocutionary endorsement of all that the appropriated speaker expresses
or believes. Whether or not that endorsement is present with regard to any particular point
depends on additional factors, such as cultural genre conventions.25 With regard to this argument,
Walton and Sandy present some ideas that come close to the argument being presented this
study. Like Walton and Sanders, this study will focus on circumstantial factors which have an
impact on the nature of illocutionary acts being performed. This study will apply a similar idea
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within the context of the New Testament’s use of the Old to form a criterion for hermeneutically
justified usage of a text.
Speech Act Theory and New Testament Use of the Old Testament
The preceding overview of the development of speech act theory and its use in biblical
interpretation has been necessarily brief. A more thorough canvass of all the various
contributions to the topic would be too large for the scope of this study. Having discussed the
development of speech act theory as an interpretive tool, it is now possible to focus on its role
specifically with regard to understanding how New Testament texts use the Old Testament. Here,
the argument will be made that identification of speech acts which take Old Testament texts,
authors, meanings, or assertions as their object provide a way of addressing hermeneutical issues
caused by the New Testament’s use of the Old Testament with some additional clarity.
To state this argument simply, when discussing the hermeneutical issues raised by the
New Testament’s use of the Old, it matters what the New Testament authors do to (and with) the
Old Testament text. It is important, however, to spend some time explaining precisely what this
means. Perhaps it is best to do so with the help of a well-known example. In this way, the
approach presented here may be described as it relates to what are perhaps somewhat familiar
arguments. Matthew’s quotation of Hosea 11:1 in Matthew 2:15 has become something of a
prototypical example of a hermeneutically problematic instance of the New Testament’s use of
the Old. Matthew’s claim that Jesus’ departure from Egypt as a child somehow fulfills Hosea’s
statement raises certain questions. The foremost, perhaps, stems from the fact that Hosea does
not appear to be making any sort of predictive prophecy in the quoted text, but rather seems to
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simply be referring to God’s deliverance of Israel from Egypt during the exodus.26 In what sense
can Jesus fulfill a statement that does not, on its own, appear to be a predictive prophecy? Does
this not seem to indicate that Matthew is quoting Hosea with little respect for the original
meaning of the text, and is in fact simply finding in Hosea some convenient wording which he
can apply to an event in Jesus’ life? Far be it from modern historical-grammatical interpreters to
use the Scriptures this way! And yet, what of the fact that such loose hermeneutical moves are
ostensibly practiced within inspired Scripture? Does that mean that such methods ought to be
replicated today? In short, all of the typical difficult questions about the New Testament’s use of
the Old are raised.
Of course, there have been a variety of answers to these questions, even with regard to
this passage in particular. It is not necessary to catalogue them here, nor to argue for any
particular solution to this problem. It has already been dealt with extensively. Instead, an attempt
will be made to show how this problem and its proposed solutions can be seen in terms of speech
act theory. One author who has addressed the problem of Matthew 2:15 at length is G. K. Beale.
He lists among the problems he sees in this passage Matthew’s apparent reference to Hosea 11:1
as though it were a predictive prophecy to be fulfilled when it is not. Beale’s solution to this
problem is to argue that Matthew is not in fact claiming that Hosea 11:1 is predictive prophecy at
all, at least not in that simplistic, problematic sense. He argues instead that Matthew is
combining a historical-grammatical reading of Hosea 11:1 with a concern for a larger biblical
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theology within Hosea itself which focuses on the exodus as a prototypical pattern for a future
reentering of Israel into Egypt and a subsequent eschatological return. Matthew then sees this as
“fulfilled” in Jesus as a Messianic representative for corporate Israel. For Beale, Matthew’s
usage of Hosea 11:1 is theologically foreshadowed in the larger context of Hosea 11, even if it is
not clearly expressed in Hosea 11:1 specifically. The idea which Matthew keys upon is not alien
to the Hosea text, but it is present in a sophisticated way in the overall biblical theology of the
book.27
A key feature of Beale’s response to the problem of Matthew 2:15 is that it resolves the
problem by envisioning Matthew’s use of the Hosea text in a new way. One way of looking at
both the problem and Beale’s solution is to observe that they concern what Matthew says about
Hosea 11:1. In fact, the problem itself can be seen as a problem of saying about. The
hermeneutical issues raised by Matthew 2:15 arise from the fact that Matthew seems to be saying
about Hosea 11:1 that it is a prophecy awaiting fulfillment when, on its own, it does not appear
to be. In other words, Matthew seems to be saying something about Hosea 11:1 which, according
to historical-grammatical methods, does not appear to be true. And thus, “What of inerrancy?”
etc., etc. Beale’s answer to this problem sees Matthew’s saying about differently. Instead of
seeing Matthew as saying about Hosea 11:1 that it is a straightforward predictive prophecy that
God’s son (in the sense of Jesus) would one day exit Egypt (as He did in Matthew 2), Beale sees
Matthew as saying something much more complex about Hosea, specifically that it is a reference
to the first exodus, but in light of the biblical theology of Hosea that has implications regarding
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an eschatological exodus involving the Messiah.28 It is by viewing differently what Matthew says
about Hosea that Beale is able to resolve the problem posed by Matthew’s use of Hosea 11:1.
Perhaps there is, however, a more precise way of characterizing arguments such as
Beale’s with regard to how they seek to re-envision what the New Testament text says about the
Old Testament text. It is at this point that the relevance of speech act theory can be brought into
focus. When the situation of Matthew 2:15 is viewed in terms of speech act theory, it becomes
apparent that the saying about is an illocutionary act. In the locutionary act of penning the words
of Matthew 2:15, Matthew says about Hosea something or other. Since this act of saying about
Hosea 11:1 is performed in writing the words of Matthew 2:15, it is illocutionary in nature. The
relevance of speech act theory to situations such as the one which Beale addresses can be stated
thus: the problem posed by Matthew 2:15 as well as the solution proposed by Beale hinge upon
the precise way in which Matthew’s illocutionary act of saying about Hosea is understood. The
problematic understanding of Matthew 2:15 sees Matthew performing the illocutionary act of
claiming that Hosea is a simplistically predictive prophecy about an event in the life of the
Messiah. The way Beale characterizes Matthew, however, paints him as performing a different
illocutionary act: referencing a biblical theology already present within Hosea as a whole and
represented in Hosea 11:1 and its immediate context. As such, the problem of Matthew 2:15 can
be framed as a misconstrual of Matthew’s illocutionary act with the text of Hosea 11:1 as its
object, and Beale’s solution to that problem can thus be framed as a correction of that
misconstrual which involves offering a correct envisioning of that illocutionary act.
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It may well be the case that all instances of the New Testament’s use of the Old
Testament can be viewed this way. The hermeneutics employed by New Testament authors using
the Old are, perhaps by definition, properties of their illocutionary acts with regard to the Old
Testament text. The question of what hermeneutical methods they use is a question about the
specifics of what they are doing in quoting or alluding to that text. This study will not seek to
test, however, whether every instance of the New Testament’s use of the Old can be
characterized this way, but it will seek to show that it is a useful approach at least in some cases,
particularly when it comes to understanding the situational aspects of the New Testament’s use
of the Old. It is not necessary to make use of speech act theory to solve hermeneutical problems
raised by the New Testament’s use of the Old. Indeed, Beale’s argument seems to resolve the
problem and does not mention speech act theory. However, the argument of this study is that
speech act theory provides a useful framework of understanding in which to clarify and answer
these problems, particularly in a generalized way that can be applied to other instances of the use
of scripture, including modern usage. Questions about situational rightness or wrongness seem to
be questions that are primarily concerned with the rightness or wrongness of actions. The
hermeneutical methods of the New Testament authors in some sense boil down to hermeneutical
actions performed in the writing of their texts, and speech act theory stands as a ready-made
framework in which these actions which are performed in speaking (or writing) can be
understood and described. In other words, these illocutionary speech acts are simply a feature of
the text. Speech act theory provides a way to properly describe them and discuss them within the
context of questions about the use of scripture as a whole. The prototype of Matthew 2:15 has
been used here as a way to explain with a concrete example how speech act theory fits into
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questions about the New Testament’s use of the Old. The purpose thus far has merely been to set
the stage. The true test of this methodology will be to apply it more fully in the context of
Romans 9:7 and Hebrews11:18.
Multiple Layers of Speech Act in Genesis 21:12
The primary focus of this study will be on the speech acts performed in the two New
Testament passages under scrutiny with Genesis 21:12 as the object of those acts. However, it is
necessary to first briefly discuss the speech acts involved in Genesis 21:12 itself. The purpose of
this is to provide some parity between the discussion of the New Testament passages and how
Genesis 21:12 is understood. Since the use of Genesis 21:12 will be framed in terms of speech
acts, it seems useful to be able to speak of Genesis 21:12 in the same conceptual language.
Genesis, being a narrative, puts forward an additional layer of complexity with regard to
speech acts which may be somewhat (though not totally) unique to narrative text, one which is
indeed exhibited in Genesis 21:12 specifically. Any text involves speech acts being performed by
the author in and by authoring the text. However, the text itself can also contain depictions or
descriptions of speech acts being performed. This is in some ways similar to the complexity
introduced by one text’s use of another insofar as it involves depiction of or reference to some
other instance of speech, but in the context of narrative it is simplest to frame this complexity as
involving two layers of speech and therefore of speech acts: the author’s speech and character
speech within the narrative. Moreover, when God Himself is seen as an author of Genesis 21:12,
there is the somewhat odd situation of authorial speech acts on one level and in-narrative
character speech acts by the same person on another level, acts which although they are
performed by the same person are nonetheless logically distinct. As such, it is necessary to
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explore the speech acts being performed at both of these levels within Genesis 21:12, since the
New Testament passages will likely interact with both in some way.
In addition to the authorial and in-narrative layers of speech and speech act involved in
Genesis 21:12, there is another layering of speech acts which ought to be considered. Speech acts
performed by the human author of the Genesis text may not be identical to those performed by
the Divine author. This may seem to invoke the specter of sensus plenior, and if there is a sensus
plenior there are almost certainly differences of speech act related to differences between Divine
and human authorial intent and meaning. However, setting sensus plenior aside there may still be
at least the potential for a distinction between Divine and human layers of speech act even if
there are not multiple layers of meaning. It will be necessary to discuss this issue in some detail
in order to determine whether, firstly, the Divine-authorial layer of speech acts is indeed distinct
from the human-authorial layer, and secondly whether this can be understood in a way that does
not invoke sensus plenior. It will also be important to interact with Wolterstorff’s theory of
Divine discourse with regard to this point, since he focuses on speech acts which are unique to
the Divine author of Scripture.29
In summary, three potential layers of speech acts in Genesis 21:12 have been identified.
First, there is the in-narrative layer, which involves speech acts which are depicted within the
narrative of the text as characters within that narrative speak (in the case of Genesis 21:12, God).
Then there is the authorial layer, which is further subdivided into the human and Divine authorial
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layers, which involve speech acts performed by the human and Divine authors of the Scripture in
and by authoring that Scripture. Each of these layers will now be examined.
In-Narrative Divine Speech Acts
The in-narrative layer of speech act, in the context of Genesis 21:12, deals with God as a
character speaking within the narrative: “But God said to Abraham…” It seems best to consider
the short statement made by God in verses 12-13 in its entirety:
Do not be distressed because of the lad and your maid; whatever Sarah tells you, listen to
her, for through Isaac your descendants shall be named. And of the son of the maid I will
make a nation also, because he is your descendant.
Perhaps one way to characterize the focal speech acts here would be to say that be that God
comforts and commands Abraham concerning the situation between Sarah and Hagar/Ishmael.
This comforting aspect is tied to God’s “Do not be distressed.” The commanding aspect can be
seen in “whatever Sarah tells you, listen to her.” Abraham is in the midst of a distressing
situation: some serious family drama. God reassures Abraham and provides him with a Divinelycommanded course of action which fits in with an overall Divine plan, which God reveals.30
Abraham can be comforted because this course of action (sending Hagar and Ishmael away) does
not interfere with God’s prior promises. Instead, it furthers those promises, because as God again
promises Abraham (here is another speech act), Abraham’s descendants with regard to the
promise will come through Isaac, not Ishmael. As such, sending Ishmael away does not hinder
those promises.31 Abraham is further comforted concerning Ishmael himself, as God promises
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him that his larger plan also involves making Ishmael into a nation, separately from that core
promise. God’s comforting of Abraham is performed in an illocutionary way as God simply
states “Do not be distressed,” and again in a perlocutionary way as God promises Abraham
concerning his differing plans for both Isaac and Ishmael (that is, God comforts Abraham by
giving him promises). Perhaps there is an even more important speech act at play here, however.
God does not simply inform Abraham about His plans for Isaac; He also commands Abraham to
do as Sarah says, specifically to send Ishmael away and disinherit him. This speech act is of
particular importance because it brings a piece of God’s plan to fruition. God has chosen Isaac as
the recipient of the promise, and in commanding Abraham to send Ishmael away and make Isaac
his sole heir, God in some sense enacts a part of that promise.
There are, of course, other nuanced ways in which these speech acts could be described.
For example, instead of simply promising Abraham that Isaac is the child of promise in Genesis
21:12, perhaps God might also be described as reminding or reiterating, since Isaac’s status as
the child of promise has already been established in the book through God speaking to Abraham
(cf. Genesis 17:19). Exploring the myriad ways in which these speech acts could be
characterized is a rather large task indeed, but it should suffice for the moment to use inform as a
basic working description for the purposes of understanding the relationships between these
speech acts and those performed in the New Testament texts that cite Genesis 21:12.
Authorial Divine Speech Acts
Having discussed the in-narrative layer of speech acts in Genesis 21:12, it is possible now
to examine the authorial layer. This will begin with a focus on the human-authorial layer
followed by a discussion of whether and in what ways the Divine-authorial layer might differ.
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The way in which Genesis 21:12 functions within the larger context of Genesis itself, as
discussed in a little more detail in the previous chapter, involves primarily the seed-promise
made to Abraham by God. The theme which runs throughout Genesis of a chosen, righteous
seed-lineage which had a special place in the plan of God finds its culmination in Abraham’s
family. God promises to make of Abraham a blessed and great nation, and therefore to give him
a child in his old age in order to accomplish this.32 Taking into account the circumstances of the
authorship of this book and of its audience, and its canonical context within the Torah, this is
deeply, thematically tied to the national identity of Israel.33
In terms of speech acts, there is of course the fact that author is claiming in Genesis 21:12
that Isaac is part of a Divine plan to fulfill the seed-promise made to Abraham. This is too
simplistic, though. One of the major contributions of speech act theory is its ability to look
beyond the purely positivistic truth-value-based understanding of what is done when speaking.
The author’s point in claiming this special status for Isaac involves a revelatory aspect. He is,
after all, depicting God as speaking in the text. Perhaps it is useful to see the author as revealing
this truth about Isaac in the sense that he is revealing a Divine plan. Perhaps there is not much
difference between claiming and revealing. Both involve communicating or imparting some
piece of information, but revealing connotes more than that. In this case, the focus is on
revealing a Divine plan, and specifically on revealing that a particular event (Isaac’s birth) has
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some special significance as part of that Divine plan.34 Isaac’s birth is not merely the birth of a
child; it has a special “because.” Isaac exists because God has some special intention connected
to him.35 Taking into account the author’s purpose in revealing this Divine plan, he can also be
seen as grounding the national identity of Israel in Divine promise. The nation of Israel is set
apart as a people (certainly a major theme throughout the entire Old Testament), and the author
of Genesis grounds this identity in a historical event with special significance tied to Divine
purpose. From a perlocutionary perspective, the author in turn might be grounding his audience
(the immediate audience) in their own national identity as Israelites.
Do Authorial Divine Speech Acts Imply Sensus Plenior?
At this point the question can be asked: does the Divine-authorial layer of speech act
differ from the human-authorial layer, or is the same set of speech acts merely performed by both
the human and Divine authors? If the two can indeed differ, questions arise as to whether this
implies sensus plenior. It has already been hinted that a difference between these two in the
realm of speech acts does not necessarily equal sensus plenior, but this begs further
investigation. This question is highly relevant here, as this study will proceed to concern itself
closely with hermeneutical justification, a realm in which sensus plenior must be confronted.
Does a difference between speech acts performed by the Divine author and those
performed by the human author imply sensus plenior? While sensus plenior deals with
differences of meaning and intent (specifically intent with regard to meaning), speech acts deal
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with the actions performed in and by some instance of speech. While the two can certainly
interact, they are logically distinct particularly with regard to illocutionary and perlocutionary
acts. To illustrate this distinction, perhaps it is best to begin by envisioning a construal of the
Divine layer of speech act in Genesis 21:12 which would imply sensus plenior. This construal
can then be juxtaposed with one which does not seem to imply sensus plenior. A fairly
straightforward way to do this might be to conceive of the Divine author as performing an
illocutionary act of revealing a future intra-Israel new-covenant exclusivity. This is merely
translating into the language of speech act a way of seeing Romans 9:7 from a perspective which
involves sensus plenior. This would mean that that God is saying in Genesis 21:12 precisely
what Paul says in Romans 9:7, though in a “fuller sense” than that meant by the human author of
Genesis. God would be performing this illocutionary act off revealing in the locution of Genesis
21:12. Perhaps a construal of Divine speech acts which differ from human ones in authoring a
biblical text, given sensus plenior, could be stated thus: God’s speech acts in authoring an
inspired text differ from those of the human author in that they include those speech acts
associated with the speaking of the text’s “fuller sense.”
However, there is an alternative way to envision this situation involving differing Divine
and human authorial speech acts which does not imply sensus plenior. In the example of Romans
9:7, the locutions associated with God’s speech act of revealing new-covenant exclusivity need
merely be located within the New Testament text rather than in the Old Testament text. If God is
revealing the exclusivity of the gospel within Israel, but He is doing it in authoring Romans 9:7
rather than in authoring Genesis 21:12, then the relationship between the New and Old
Testament texts should not be understood as involving sensus plenior. What matters in this
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regard is not necessarily what God does, but how and when (and in the authoring of what text)
He does it. That is to say that it matters where the locution is located, whether it is located in the
Old Testament text or in the New.
Here again Wolterstorff’s theory of Divine discourse might become relevant.
Wolterstorff argues that the biblical text has ongoing effects, and that these effects are
attributable to actions which can be characterized as illocutionary speech acts that originate with
the authoring of the text and extend into the present day. In his theory, God, in authoring the
biblical text, is aware of how it will be read, used, and interpreted in the future and indeed He
intends for this to occur. Thus, in some very real sense, God not only spoke but continues to
speak in an illocutionary way.36 This view seems somewhat parallel to the way in which speech
acts might be understood given sensus plenior which has been proposed here, insofar as these
illocutionary acts (which do seem to impart something like a “fuller sense”) are in Wolterstorff’s
view rooted in the authoring of the original text rather than in a later instance of speech which
might use or refer to that text. Of course, Wolterstorff’s main focus is on how God might still be
speaking today rather than on intertextual dynamics specifically, and so his theory must enable
God to speak in situations that do not involve the authoring of new, inspired Scripture, which
makes it necessary for him to root his illocutionary acts of Divine discourse in the text as he
does. The upshot of all of this is that, unfortunately, Wolterstorff’s theory does not provide a
satisfactory answer to the question at hand: if sensus plenior is indeed jettisoned, can the Divine

36

Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 13.

104

layer of speech acts still be seen as diverging from the human layer? Perhaps it is necessary to
look again at the fundamental concepts of speech act theory to find an answer.
J. L. Austin’s notion of performative statements may indeed have some relevance here.
At the core of Austin’s insight into the nature of language is the idea that some statements
perform actions which go beyond simply stating something. Austin’s example of the naming of a
ship may be particularly apropos, because he observes that the performative aspect of such a
statement as “I name this ship…” depends not only on the uttering of the words themselves but
upon surrounding circumstances, such as the speaker being such a person as has the right and
authority to name the ship, the ship not having already been named, etc.37 Perhaps most
crucially, in Austin’s example the speaker’s identity deeply impacts what actions are actually
being performed. The speaker’s identity as one having the authority to name the ship makes all
the difference between claiming or pretending to name the ship and actually, performatively,
naming it.38 Here there is, perhaps, a mechanism whereby there can be a layer of Divineauthorial speech act which is distinguishable from the human-authorial layer without invoking
sensus plenior. Might God’s unique identity and authority make His speech as author of
Scripture performative in ways in which the same speech by the human author is not
performative, or differently performative?
Crucially, this understanding of separation between the Divine-authorial and humanauthorial layers of speech act does not open the door to sensus plenior. The distinction lies not in
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the speech itself, nor in its meaning, nor in how it should be interpreted, but only in the identity
of the speaker. The fact that God is speaking does not make the meaning of His words different
than the meaning of the human author’s words or provide a “fuller sense,” rather it changes only
the performative impact of those words. As such, Divine and human authorial speech acts, even
when they differ in some way, do not necessarily imply sensus plenior.
Speech Acts in Genesis 21:12
So, what might be unique about the Divine-authorial layer of speech act present in
Genesis 21:12? The author of the text in general has already been spoken of as grounding
Israel’s national identity. This speech act very much involves communication, and thus it is not
too far from simply stating a truth. This speech act of grounding is perhaps really a specific type
of promising. By grounding the identity of Exodus-era Israel, Genesis connects the Abrahamic
promises to them. The promise that was previously made to Abraham is revealed to carry
forward to a specific group of people contemporary to the authoring of the Genesis account. As
such, Exodus-era Israel is promised anew the promises given to Abraham. Thus, the speech act
of the Divine author in Genesis 21:12 is one of promising which occurs by way of grounding the
identity of the recipients of that promise in a way which ties them to a promise spoken in the past
(to Abraham).
The speech acts performed by the Divine and human authors differ according to their
“direction of fit.”39 The human author’s statement about God’s intentions for Isaac and Israel’s
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national identity obtain if God has in fact made those promises, that is, if Israel’s identity is
indeed what the author says it is. This seems to be a word-to-world direction of fit. The Divine
author, being the promisor in this scenario, speaks with an element of world-to-word direction of
fit, as His statements obtain if indeed the promises to Israel regarding their identity and future are
fulfilled. To put it differently, the human author cannot make promises to Israel on behalf of
God. He can only report or reveal those promises, and comment upon how they impact Israel’s
national identity. When God speaks on those promises, however, He is actually making them.
The crux of all this is that it seems to be the case that the Divine author is doing something which
the human author is not, without invoking sensus plenior. The human author does not stand able
to make such promises and thus can only be seen, from a speech act perspective, as reporting on
what God is doing performatively. God, however, is promising to Exodus-era Israel. Even
though those promises were spoken in the past (to Abraham, for example), God is promising it to
the nation anew by specifically drawing their attention, in a revelatory way, to the past promises
made to Abraham and to the fact that these promises extend to them by virtue of the fact that
descent from Isaac forms part of their national identity.
The authorial speech acts which have been spoken of in Genesis 21:12 thus far have been
illocutionary in nature, but before proceeding it is necessary to say a word about the
perlocutionary acts involved in this passage. It will suffice to briefly suggest a few possibilities
just to give an idea of how perlocution can be understood in this context. As a message to the
early Israelites, Genesis 21:12 speaks of the identity of the nation. By doing so, it may perform
acts such as encouraging, establishing, and revealing to them the truth about their own identity.
These actions center around the effects which the message of Genesis 21:12 might have upon the
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original audience. There is always a little speculation involved in attempting to draw conclusions
about a biblical author’s purpose, but the perlocutionary acts that have been suggested will,
perhaps, be enough to go on for now, until it becomes necessary to look more deeply into how
these speech acts may interact with the New Testament’s use of Genesis 21:12.
To sum up, three distinct layers of speech act have been suggested for Genesis 21:12.
First, God performs speech acts as a character within the narrative, comforting Abraham
concerning the familial strife between Sarah and Hagar and commanding him to send Ishmael
away and promising to fulfill the Divine promises through Isaac specifically. At the humanauthorial layer, the human author reports upon God’s promise to Exodus-era Israel. The human
author is reporting on what is occurring at the Divine-authorial layer of speech act, wherein God
promises to Exodus-era Israel the same promises made originally to Abraham by grounding their
national identity in Isaac, with special focus on the fact that Isaac is the past recipient of that
promise.
Speech Acts in Romans 9:7
Having discussed the multiple layers of speech acts involved in Genesis 21:12 and
investigated the relationship between Divine-authorial speech acts and sensus plenior, it is now
possible to begin examining the speech acts involved in the New Testament texts which quote
Genesis 21:12. Although it may be necessary to speak somewhat of speech acts in general that
are exhibited in these passages, primary focus will be placed upon those speech acts which
involve the New Testament text as their object. In other words, special care will be taken to
identify what the New Testament authors are doing (in a speech act sense) to or with the Old
Testament text.
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As a starting point for Romans 9:7, perhaps it is best to observe that Paul is in the process
of defending the truth of the gospel of salvation “by grace through faith.” Thus, defending can be
seen as a larger speech act which characterizes the context of Romans 9:7, but it may be possible
to find something a little more granular in terms of speech act involved with Romans 9:7
specifically. As was discussed in the previous chapter, Paul offers a series of such defenses, the
one most relevant to Romans 9:7 being a defense against an objection claiming that, under Paul’s
gospel, God is unfaithful to His promises to Israel since most Jews seem to fall outside the
gospel covenant since they do not believe in Jesus.40 Part of this defense is the assertion that
God’s promise to Abraham, and therefore to Israel, was not solely based upon physical descent
from Abraham, as evidenced by the fact that Ishmael did not inherit that promise. Paul seems to
be arguing that the objection is based upon a misrepresentation of the Divine promise, namely
that it automatically extends to all physical descendants of Abraham, or to put it as Paul puts it,
that all physical descendants of Abraham are his children as far as the promise is concerned.41
Paul is not concerned here with what the promise says so much as he is concerned with
what it does not say. Paul turns to Scripture in order to support his correction of this
misrepresentation of the promise to Abraham. Thus, even though the overall thrust of Genesis
focuses on Jacob as the patriarch of national Israel, Genesis 21:12 shows that physical descent
from Abraham is not sufficient to guarantee covenant membership. This is a technicality which
Genesis itself is not contextually concerned with, but it is nonetheless a valid technicality. So,
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what does Paul do with regard to Genesis 21:12? One way to characterize it would be to say that
he appeals to its authority. This, of course, fits into the larger contextual speech act of defending.
Appeal to scriptural authority has been recognized as a way in which the New Testament uses
the Old in many contexts, but the focus here is placed upon that appeal to authority as an
illocutionary act rather than as a description of hermeneutical purpose or method. That is to say
that aside from Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12 potentially fitting into the hermeneutical category of
“appeal to authority,” that appeal is also an illocutionary act carried out by Paul in writing what
he writes in Romans 9:7. The contrast between this act and the speech acts involved in Hebrews
11:18 will serve to provide a window into the situational factors involved in the New
Testament’s use of the Old.
Speech Acts in Hebrews 11:18
As has already been discussed, Hebrews 11:18 uses Genesis 21:12 in different way than
Romans 9:7 does. Thus, it is necessary to discuss the speech acts exhibited in Hebrews 11:18.
The focus of Hebrews 11 is on offering Abraham as one among a “cloud of witnesses” whose
faithfulness in light of God’s promises serve to testify in turn of the faithfulness of God.42 The
author’s purpose in Hebrews 11:18 seems to be centered on exhortation. Thus, a speech act
which is at work here might involve the author of Hebrews exhorting his audience. He does this
in part by tying the experiences of his audience to those of Abraham. The insistence upon the
role of resurrection in Abraham’s actions seems to make this clear, as resurrection plays a central
role in the future hope of the audience of Hebrews. By citing Genesis 21:12, the author of

42

Gareth Lee Cockerill, The Epistle to the Hebrews, The New International Commentary on the New
Testament (Grand Rapid, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 556.

110

Hebrews draws attention to the centrality of Isaac to the promise made to Abraham, underscoring
the complete faith exhibited by Abraham in his willingness to sacrifice Isaac. In his use of
Genesis 21:12 and his treatment of the surrounding context, the author of Hebrews performs a
speech act of testifying to God’s faithfulness by way of relating the testimony implicit in the
actions of Old Testament saints.
Differences Between Speech Acts in Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18
Central to the argument being made here is not only the idea that speech acts are an
important way to look at the relationships between Old and New Testament authors when the
New Testament uses the Old, but that New Testament authors perform different speech acts
which lead them to use the Old Testament differently in different situations. As such, it is
important to look closely at how Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 perform different speech acts
even while using the same Old Testament passage. Paul’s speech acts in Romans involve an
overall act of defending the Gospel message, with a specific act of appealing to authority in his
use of Genesis 21:12. Hebrews 11:18 involves exhorting by way of testifying, taking Abraham’s
actions in Genesis 21-22 as a testimony that can in turn testify to the audience of Hebrews
alongside other, similar testimonies from the Old Testament.
It is important to take note of the differing flavor between these two instances of speech
act. Paul’s speech acts, in this instance, are more logical whereas the ones in Hebrews are more
personal. This is not to say that Paul, here, is totally logical or that Hebrews is totally personal,
but that each has a particular general thrust. Examination of these speech acts provides a clearer
way to frame this point, as this “general thrust” is reflected in the differing objects of these
speech acts. The object of Paul’s defending is the Gospel message itself, whereas the object of
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Hebrews’ exhorting is the text’s audience. The object of Paul’s speech act is a message, and for
the purposes of defense can be characterized as a set of truth-claims. The object of the author of
Hebrews’ speech act is a group of people. This study will argue that these differences provide a
pathway to additional clarity in understanding how these two passages use the same Old
Testament text differently, and in understanding how their differing hermeneutical methods can
both be justified in light of their respective situations.
Conclusion
Much more could be said concerning the speech acts involved in the texts which have
been discussed here. It is likely that there are some variations in terms of how these speech acts
have been characterized here that could be argued for. Nevertheless, the speech acts that have
been identified are, it is to be hoped, sufficient to adequately put forward the argument which
will follow: that the differences in speech act between Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 can serve
to elucidate and define differences in situation which must be taken into account when discussing
whether the varying hermeneutical methods at play in these passages in their use of Genesis
21:12 is justified. It is to be hoped that this approach can provide some additional clarity when
answering questions about how the New Testament authors’ hermeneutical methods can be
replicated.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
SPEECH ACTS AND HERMENEUTICAL JUSTIFICATION
IN ROMANS 9:7 AND HEBREWS 11:18

Introduction
Thus far, the three related texts that have served as an example in this study have been
examined hermeneutically with particular focus on the dynamics of the use of Genesis 21:12 in
the two New Testament texts. Some differences between the usages of Genesis 21:12 in those
respective texts have been noted and some hermeneutical issues associated with the usage of
Genesis 21:12 in these New Testament texts have been discussed. Initial forays have been made
with regard to characterizing the speech acts represented in each of these texts and analyzing the
relationships between them. The focus of this chapter will be to discuss the issue of
hermeneutical justification with regard to how Genesis 21:12 is used in each of these two New
Testament texts. It will be argued that a certain relationship exists between hermeneutical
justification and speech acts in these New Testament texts. The purpose of this is to establish the
relationship between speech acts and hermeneutical justification, particularly in the context of
the New Testament’s use of the Old. This approach, in turn, furnishes a method of evaluating the
usage of Scripture across a variety of situational contexts. The two New Testament texts will be
contrasted in terms of their respective hermeneutical justifications. In light of this contrast, this
study will argue that these differences point away from a monolithic picture of New Testament
hermeneutics while possibly pointing the way toward a more nuanced understanding.
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In order to accomplish this, an approach to hermeneutical justification with regard to
New Testament use of the Old will be laid out. This approach will involve forming a criterion for
hermeneutical justification which is furnished by speech act theory. Each of the two New
Testament texts will be examined in turn with regard to hermeneutical justification according to
this criterion. Various approaches to each text’s hermeneutical justification will be discussed,
and an attempt will be made to understand how the text’s speech acts relate to that justification.
The previous chapter’s discussion of speech acts represented in the passages which are in focus
here will prove useful in applying this approach to those passages. The two texts will be
contrasted with regard to their hermeneutical justification in an attempt to draw out some salient
points for discussion in the final chapter of this study. The final chapter will explore the nuanced
hermeneutic of the New Testament, arguing that it might be productively characterized as a
situational hermeneutic. It will also argue that speech acts offer some clarity concerning the
relationship between the situation of a text and the hermeneutics it employs. Importantly, speech
acts serve to provide a consistent approach to evaluating hermeneutical validity across a variety
of situational contexts, including not only those represented in the New Testament but also those
experienced by modern interpreters of Scripture.
Intertextuality
Before discussing hermeneutical justification directly, something should be said about
intertextuality. This work will make certain underlying assumptions about the nature of
intertextuality in light of which the proceeding arguments should be understood. While a
complete defense of these assumptions is beyond the scope of this study, a brief discussion of
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intertextuality will reveal that they are not unprecedented and will hint at some of the reasons
why they might be valid.
Structuralism and Post-Structuralism
A somewhat reductive way to describe intertextuality might be to say that it refers to the
interrelationships between texts. The term intertextuality, however, should be understood within
the context of the post-structural milieu in which it was born.1 Postmodern theories of
hermeneutics deconstruct the text and the author on the basis of the inherent subjectivity of
reading (in indeed of language itself and of all knowledge). Derrida’s deconstructionism, for
example, argues against the traditional notion of text as a method of transferring meaning
intended by the author to the reader and locates meaning within reading as opposed to writing or
text.2 Ultimately, postmodernism points out the subjectivizing effect which these forces have
upon all “truth,” rendering it, for all practical purposes, merely one’s experiential perception of
truth. Within this framework, it is impossible (so postmodernism says) to locate the concept of
meaning, for hermeneutical purposes, in the intent of the author. While this early postmodernism
focused on these subjectivizing forces in a very general way, intertextuality focuses specifically
on this relationship with regard to other texts. This postmodern concept of meaning is divorced
from the text itself by virtue of the inherent subjectivity of reading, and intertextuality recognizes
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the prominent place of other texts within that subjectivizing backdrop. Meaning resides outside
of the text and floats somewhere among that text and other texts to which it is related.3
The term “intertextuality” has, however, grown fraught with ambiguity in its usage, and
has been employed by different scholars to mean rather different things. Graham Allen groups
these approaches into two broad categories: structuralist and post-structuralist.4 The structuralist
employment of intertextuality is, interestingly enough, somewhat of a reaction to poststructuralist theories, and uses the relationships between texts to assert the opposite of what poststructuralism asserts: that it is possible to say objective things about a text’s meaning.5
One of the most prominent voices in the world of post-structuralist intertextuality has
been Roland Barthes. He argues that the various intertextual threads which ultimately contribute
to meaning only come together in the reader, not the author. As such, he states that “the birth of
the reader must be at the cost of the death of author.”6 In this way, Barthes indicates that
intertextuality itself bolsters the post-structuralist and postmodern approaches to meaning since it
is in the reader that the locus of intertextuality is found. Locating meaning in the author cannot
account for this. However, there appears to be a degree of circularity here. Barthes’ poststructuralist idea of intertextuality is itself founded upon the postmodern approach which he
claims it supports. Is it not possible for an intertextual relationship to be included in an authors’
intent? Is it necessary to adopt a post-structuralist approach in order to properly account for
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intertextuality? While this study will assume a structuralist stance, it is hoped that it will
contribute some support toward the internal consistency of a structuralist approach to
intertextuality.
A proponent of such a structuralist approach can be found in Gerard Genette. In the
course of his study of poetics, he asserts that a structuralist approach to intertextuality is still
valid and valuable. He proposes what he calls transtextuality, which includes the whole variety
of relationships between texts.7 Although Genette describes several different categories of
transtextuality, he does not understand any of them to be purely at the mercy of the reader as a
post-structuralist approach would. Genette sees “the relationship between the text and its reader
as one that is more socialized, more openly contractual, and pertaining to a conscious and
organized pragmatics.”8 In contrast to Barthe, Genette sees intertextual relationships as involving
rules and norms that exist outside of the reader. His approach can perhaps be seen as an evolved
approach to intertextuality. It is not a return to a naïve structuralism but rather a more disciplined
structuralism that acknowledges the complexity of intertextual realities but still maintains a place
for objective meaning.
Riffaterre, though not necessarily a strict structuralist, makes a move that is analogous to
that made by Genette. With regard to poetics, he sees a semiotic layer of meaning underneath the
mimetic (referential) layer which is usually the focus of post-structural intertextuality. While he
acknowledges the presence of mimetic relationships, he argues that these are not sufficient in
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order to understand a text in its totality.9 Instead, texts regularly depart from what can be
understood mimetically, a phenomenon he refers to as ungrammaticality. In other words, texts
are not wholly comprised of references to other texts or signs. They are unique in that they depart
from and subvert these signs, forcing the reader to examine them from a semiotic perspective in
order to fully understand their meaning.10
What the post-structuralist and structuralist approaches to intertextuality have in common
is that they deal with the relationships between texts, and especially with how the meaning of a
text can be understood in light of other texts. A postmodern view of meaning (and therefore of
hermeneutics) is not required in order to speak about intertextuality, though the term arguably
means different, though related, things in a structural and a post-structural context. Absent the
assumptions of postmodernism which locate meaning in the space between texts, the
relationships between texts are still important when it comes to meaning. After all, even authorial
intent must involve other texts of which the author was aware, a point of particular salience here
because that is precisely the situation at play when speaking about instances of New Testament
use of the Old such as the ones under scrutiny in this study.
More recently, McKay has examined the state of this debate as it has taken shape within
the world of biblical interpretation. He notes that, strangely,11 the concept of intertextuality was
initially brought to bear on the reading of the Bible primarily in the form of a structuralist
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approach centered on historical criticism. This approach was concerned with establishing the
historical intertextual context of texts and with a quest for the true historicity behind biblical
texts which often involves intertextual clues. On the other hand, postmodern ideological
interpretation of the Bible has involved the more traditional post-structuralist notion of
intertextuality. McKay laments that these disparate spheres have largely operated in isolation
from one another.12 This study does not take either approach. Instead, it seeks to reconcile a
structuralist approach to intertextuality with creative usage, specifically in light of the
multiplicity of creative ways in which the New Testament uses the Old.
The issue at hand deeply concerns hermeneutical justification. The post-structuralist
approach to intertextuality raises an important question when it comes to the New Testament’s
use of the Old: does that usage itself represent a non-structuralist reading? Are the New
Testament authors appropriating texts in ways which lend support to the post-structuralist view
and cannot be properly justified from a structuralist standpoint? If the New Testament authors
use the Old Testament text in a variety of ways, then it would suggest that, at the very least, they
do more than just parrot the straightforward meaning of the text. This study will argue that New
Testament usage does not lend credence to post-structuralism with regard to biblical
interpretation. Various texts can interact with one another, to be sure, but it is not necessary to
place the locus of meaning outside each individual text or in the intertextual interaction between
them. External texts can contribute, but in a structural way which impacts and comes by way of
internal meaning.
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Structuralism and Hermeneutical Justification vis a vis Intertextuality
As noted previously, there is a deep relationship between structuralism and the concept of
hermeneutical justification when it comes to interactions between texts. It is worth saying a little
more about this, as it will provide some insight into how hermeneutical justification can be
understood specifically. Particularly when it comes to direct quotations, a structuralist approach
to intertextuality introduces the need for hermeneutical justification. That is to say that if, in the
case of an interaction between texts, meaning is located within the texts themselves rather than
suspended somewhere in between them, the later text ought to be justified in its way of
interpreting the older text. A structuralist approach implies that there is a meaning attached to the
text itself in some objective way. An interpretation is justified if it understands the text to have
the meaning which it really does have and not some other meaning. In the context of this study,
this meaning is assumed to be the meaning intended by the text’s author, or authorial intent. This
simply means that the newer text which is interpreting the older text ought not interpret it
incorrectly, claiming that the older text means something that it does not mean, and that the older
text’s author did not intend it to mean. Under a post-structuralist approach, whether or not the
newer text correctly interprets the older text is irrelevant, since the meaning does not reside
within the text itself. Given structuralism, the newer text needs to interpret the older text in a way
that can be shown to be correct or justified.
A Speech Act Approach to Hermeneutical Justification
This study intends to keep its approach to the New Testament’s use of the Old Testament
anchored in a structuralist understanding of meaning while allowing for the creative uses of the
120

Old Testament which the New seems to exhibit. It argues that defining how hermeneutical
justification functions in terms of speech acts can help to provide unifying criteria for evaluating
hermeneutical justification in light of passages which take different hermeneutical approaches in
their usage of other texts. If the hermeneutical methods employed by New Testament authors are
not uniform (and the differing ways of using Genesis 21:12 imply that they are not), then the
criterion for hermeneutical justification must exist outside of hermeneutical method. Yet, the
structuralist approach to meaning implies a need for hermeneutical justification. There has been
plenty of scholarly discussion on the various ways in which the New Testament’s creative usages
of the Old are justified.13 This study attempts to locate a unifying thread, particularly one which
might enable replication of the New Testament authors’ creative methods overall. What is
needed here is a shared criterion which can apply to a variety of ways of using Scripture. Speech
act theory supplies a useful way to talk about this criterion for hermeneutical justification.
A criterion for hermeneutical justification can be used to judge texts as to whether or not
they are warranted in their usage of another text. An example of such a criterion could simply be
whether or not an author interprets an Old Testament text in a straightforward historicalgrammatical manner. On such a criterion, any author would fail the test of hermeneutical
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justification if they did anything more than simply state the correct historical-grammatical
meaning of the Old Testament text, perhaps then applying that meaning in some way.
Ultimately, there would be only one “right” way to interpret a text. Walter Kaiser espouses
something like this view insofar as he argues for a strong identity between what the New
Testament authors assert and what the Old Testament authors intend. In his view, usage of the
Old Testament is on a comparatively short leash.14 Under a strict historical-grammatical rubric,
two texts could not both be justified in interpreting an Old Testament texts in different ways,
since there would be only one “right” answer. This definition does not seem to account very well
for the creativity with which the New Testament seems to use the Old, and of course this study’s
use of two texts which seem to interpret a single Old Testament text in somewhat different ways
would appear to be quite incompatible with such a strict construal of hermeneutical justification.
Darrel Bock provides an approach which treads the middle ground between strict
historical-grammatical interpretation and creative interpretation. He argues for a view of the New
Testament’s use of the Old which understands the New Testament to be using the Old in creative
ways which are nevertheless not divorced from the Old Testament’s meaning. In his view, both
Old and New Testament texts have their own, stable meaning, but that meaning is applied to new
situations, or referents. However, that Old meaning is still active and intact within the context of
that usage, and usage in that new context can give it new depth.15 This study is generally in
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agreement with Bock when it comes to the idea that such ways of using the Old Testament are
justified. They do not violate the Old Testament’s meaning even when they do more than parrot
it. Bock goes on to assert that the methods of the New Testament authors can be replicated,16
which stands to reason if those methods are indeed valid. This study, however, aims to go a little
further. Bock argues that New Testament usage respects Old Testament meaning because Old
Testament meaning remains intact and active in that usage. There is more to be said concerning
how exactly this can be evaluated, particularly in a way which can account for both the
multiplicity of ways in which the New Testament uses the Old and the multiplicity of ways in
which modern readers might hope to use Scripture. Bock argues convincingly that such a
criterion exists, but this study argues that speech act theory can furnish a more detailed
understanding of it, in particular one which can provide more clarity on questions about modern
usage of Scripture.
So, on the one hand there is a post-structural approach to intertextuality which is more
than willing to seek meaning outside the realms of text and of authorial intent and find it instead
in a middle-space which ultimately resides in the mind of the reader. This means that any use of
the Old Testament text is hermeneutically justified even in such a way as to render the very
concept of hermeneutical justification more or less irrelevant. On the other hand, there is a strict,
historical-grammatical idea of hermeneutical justification which uses as its sole criterion whether
or not a text expresses only the single, “correct” meaning of the Old Testament text. It is crucial
to the argument of this study, however, that speech act theory suggests another criterion for
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hermeneutical justification which is simultaneously broader than the strict historical-grammatical
approach and able to account for a variety of interpretive methods while also remaining
grounded in structuralism.
This criterion focuses on hermeneutical justification in terms of the illocutionary acts
involved in the usage of a text. Its purpose is to serve as a unifying criterion which can apply to a
variety of usages of Scripture, including more creative usages and including usages by modern
readers as well as the New Testament authors. This study argues that usages which may be
allowable in certain circumstances may not be allowable in others, and that New Testament
usage exhibits this phenomenon. Chapter five will go into more detail on this, calling it a
situational hermeneutic. In order to build toward that argument, it is important now to establish a
unifying criterion which can apply across these varying usages. This criterion must be able to
answer the question of what is allowable in a way that takes situational factors into account.
Speech act theory is well-suited to supplying such a criterion, because its concept of
illocutionary acts already adequately describes the manner in which situational factors can alter
the nature of a speech act.
In quoting, alluding to, or otherwise using a text, the author may perform an illocutionary
act that consists of the making of a claim about that text. In other words, what the author does to
the older text in using it serves as a focal point for the issue of hermeneutical justification, and
this criterion can be applied within the context of multiple hermeneutical methods while
accounting for situational factors which may excuse or disqualify particular ways of using a text
in that situation. Such a criterion based upon speech act theory could be construed in this way: a
text is hermeneutically justified in its use of an Old Testament text if it does not, when taking
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situational factors into account, perform an illocutionary act of making a claim that the Old
Testament text means something that it does not mean. This criterion maintains structuralism in
its commitment to the meaning of the text being used, but it accounts for how a variety of
creative usages can still respect that meaning structuralistically when situational factors are
considered. Moreover, it can apply equally in a variety of situational context and to a variety of
ways of using Scripture. It is even possible for an author to use a text in a creative way that
diverges from the text’s meaning while being completely aware of that original meaning. This
opens the door to a wide variety of creative uses of the text.
An Illustrative Example: T. S. Eliot’s “The Hippopotamus”
How can a text be used situationally in a way that diverges from its meaning without
being misused? Perhaps it is best to offer an explanatory example here. In the interest of
avoiding a further complication of the discussion of the New Testament’s use of the Old, an
extra-biblical example will be offered. That is to say that in order to illustrate this point about the
Bible’s use of the Bible, the use of the Bible by other literature will be offered in order to show
how this definition of hermeneutical justification can function from a literary perspective. In the
poem “The Hippopotamus,” T. S. Elliot begins with an epigraph quoting Colossians 4:16: “And
when this epistle is read among you, cause that it be read also in the church of the Laodiceans.”17
The poem itself satirizes the worldliness of the church, comparing it to a hippopotamus. The
epigraph, in this context, seems to be an oblique reference to the “lukewarm” Laodicean church

17

T. S. Eliot, “The Hippopotamus,” In Poems (A. A. Knopf: New York, NY, 1920).

125

in Revelation 3:14-22.18 However, nothing in the quoted verse from Colossians, or its context,
deals directly with this lukewarmness as it is construed in Revelation 3. Colossians 4:16 seems
simply to be a rather straightforward request by Paul to have the Colossian letter read there. Eliot
seems to be making a somewhat subtle reference to the lukewarm reputation of Laodicea
stemming from the well-known passage Revelation 3, and he is using Colossians 4:16 to do so
simply because the very mention of Laodicea brings Revelation 3 to the reader’s mind. In short,
Eliot’s intended meaning here has little to do with Colossians 4:16 beyond the mere mention of
Laodicea, and yet his meaning has much to do with the lukewarmness mentioned in Revelation
3, which he does not quote in the poem.
Is Eliot hermeneutically unjustified in his use of Colossians 4:16? Certainly “The
Hippopotamus” is a poetic work, and a large degree of creativity can be allowed when taking the
genre into account, but why precisely does this excuse Eliot from the charge of lack of
hermeneutical justification? What is it about certain contexts and genre-rules that allows authors
like Eliot to “get away with it?” It is being argued here that viewing hermeneutical justification
as a matter involving illocutionary acts provides a satisfying answer to this question. Eliot is not
making a claim that Colossians 4:16 speaks directly to the spiritual state of the Laodicean
church; rather, he is merely trusting in the reader’s familiarity with Laodicea as a stand-in for the
idea of lukewarmness, an association which originates from Revelation 3. This type of
maneuver, making an oblique reference to something that can be expected to have a certain
understood significance in the mind of the reader, does not imply that the author is claiming the
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author of the quoted text to have intended that meaning, nor even that the quoting author is not
aware of the original meaning of the quoted text, even if that original meaning stands quite apart
from how it is used.
Evaluating Hermeneutical Justification
Under this criterion for hermeneutical justification, the claims made by one text about
another’s meaning are central to the question of whether or not a text is hermeneutically justified
in its use the other text. It is not enough simply to point out that a newer text quotes an older text.
The relevant question is: in its own context, what if anything is the newer text claiming about the
meaning of the older, and are those claims true? The answer to this question depends on
contextual and situational factors relating to the newer text. This study argues that these claims
about the older text which become the center point of hermeneutical justification are a type of
illocutionary speech act, performed in the quoting or usage of the Old Testament text, and that a
broader understanding of the functioning of speech acts within the New Testament text provides
a way to understand these claims across multiple genres, situations, and types of usage.
The criterion that has been offered here suggests a certain methodology in determining
whether or not a New Testament text is hermeneutically justified in its use of the Old. This
methodology is focused on answering a simple question: does the New Testament text claim that
the Old Testament text means something that it does not mean? Since such claims are seen as
illocutionary acts, the approach of this study is to seek out the illocutionary acts present in the
New Testament text’s use of the Old, then to identify among those acts which, if any, constitute
claims about the meaning of the Old Testament text. Having done this, evaluating hermeneutical
justification is a relatively straightforward matter of determining whether any of those claims
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diverge from the historical-grammatical meaning of the Old Testament text. If they do not, then
the New Testament text is hermeneutically justified, no matter how creative its usage of the Old
Testament may be.
This study will seek to evaluate Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 with regard to whether
or not they are each hermeneutically justified in their respective uses of Genesis 21:12. The
methodology for this evaluation will be to take what has already been discussed about the speech
acts present in these passages and seek to determine whether they involve the illocutionary
making of any claims about the meaning of Genesis 21:12. Then, any such claims can be
evaluated to determine whether or not they are true with regard to the actual meaning of Genesis
21:12. The nature of this hermeneutical justification will then serve as a basis on which to
develop some larger discussions around the New Testament’s use of the Old and what the
limitations of that usage might be, both for New Testament authors and for modern readers.
Hermeneutical Justification in Romans 9:7
At this point, it is necessary to apply what has been discussed so far regarding
hermeneutical justification to Romans 9:7 and its use of Genesis 21:12. A few different
explanations of the hermeneutics of Romans 9:7 will be discussed in preparation for a
consideration of the relationship between hermeneutical justification and speech act. In order to
examine various approaches to hermeneutical justification here, the hermeneutical issues raised
by Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12 should be summarized briefly. In the second chapter of this study,
some such issues were discussed in more detail. These issues can be seen as potential obstacles
to justification of Paul’s hermeneutics. The first of these issues which was discussed previously
is that there seems to be a certain contextual disparity between Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12 and
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the overall thrust of that passage in the context of Genesis. Genesis is about the special identity
of Israel as descendants of Abraham, and Paul’s focus on non-inclusiveness within that chosen
lineage seems somewhat discordant with the contextual message of Genesis 21:12. While the
first issue deals with the scope of the Divine promise in terms of the contextual message of
Genesis, the second deals with its content. Specifically, Paul uses Genesis 21:12 to speak about a
promise which, though it could be related to the Abrahamic promise of Genesis, is nonetheless
logically distinct. In other words, Genesis does not seem to speak directly, in its own context, to
the New Covenant promise to which Paul speaks. This is not a contradiction, but it does
represent a divergence from the sort of emphasis on the original context upon which historicalgrammatical exegesis or biblical theology might focus. Answers to these questions have already
been discussed in chapter two, so attention will be turned here toward dealing with various
interpretive approaches to Romans 9:7 and what they say about hermeneutical justification. The
aim here is not to repeat earlier discussion showing that Paul is justified in his use of Genesis
21:12, but to more closely examine how he is justified. This will pave the way for some
discussion of how the criterion for hermeneutical justification that has been suggested here can
interact with Romans 9:7.
With a view toward understanding various possible approaches to hermeneutical
justification within Romans 9:7, some interpretations of that passage will be discussed with
regard to how they might interact with these hermeneutical issues. B. J. Oropeza suggests that
“seed” functions as a sort of midrashic catchword in Romans 9. He points to Romans 4:17,
which he sees as connected to Paul’s argument about the inclusion of the Gentiles in Romans 9.
Specifically, the operation of God’s covenant of grace toward Gentiles serves as a fulfillment of
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God’s promise to Abraham that he would be the father of many nations.19 Oropeza seems to see
Paul as expressing continuity with the Abrahamic promise of Genesis. The promise that
Abraham would be the father of many nations is connected to the inclusion of the Gentiles,
meaning that the application of the seed-promise to Jewish and Gentile believers is already latent
in the theological context of Genesis. However, this approach does not necessarily prove out how
that concept can be located within Genesis itself, as that context already shows Abraham
becoming the father of many nations in the sense that his descendants become the various
nations descended from Jacob, Esau, and Ishmael.
G. Kruse provides another approach. He sees Paul’s interpretation as being based upon a
concept of exclusivity that was already extant within Judaism. God exercised His “sovereign
choice” from the very beginning in choosing Isaac over Ishmael, something with which every
Jew was familiar and which therefore would serve as an effective retort against the argument
which Paul seeks to refute.20 How might such an approach answer the hermeneutical issues
which have been identified? Kruse seems to regard the sovereign-electoral exclusivity evidenced
in the choice of Isaac over Ishmael as sufficient to account for Paul’s usage of Genesis 21:12.
Indeed, there is something of a contextual departure between the overall message of Genesis and
the way in which Paul uses the verse. Nevertheless, the exclusivity is present within Genesis
itself in a way that makes Paul’s argument work. Paul is not parroting the overall message of
Genesis, but pointing out something that is nonetheless a truth internal to Genesis itself: God’s
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choice was always preeminent (and exclusive) with regard to receipt of covenantal promises. The
issue of Paul’s use of Genesis’ discussion of Abrahamic promises to talk about a new (though
not entirely unrelated) set of promises might be dealt with by pointing out that the initial
objection does concern the Old Testament Abrahamic promise. The exclusivity which Paul
defends concerns the New Covenant, but the objection is based upon the promise made to
Abraham’s “seed.”
Richard B. Hays’ approach to hermeneutical justification is quite different from that of
Kruse. He sees Paul’s use of the Old Testament as somewhat appropriative. Scriptures, in Hays’
mind, can be interpreted anew in light of the changing needs of the church. While this task of
interpretation carries with it the risk of departure from the historical faith, Hays argues that it is
nevertheless necessary. He characterizes this as a sort of “dialectical engagement” which
characterizes Paul’s use of Scripture and is also prescriptive for modern readers. In Hays’ words:
“the ideal of a perspicuous authoritative text that contains an unchangeable meaning is untenable
because it denies the necessary contribution of the reader and the readers’ community in the act
of interpretation.”21 He applies this to Romans 9:7 specifically by pointing out the parallels
between that passage and Galatians 4:21-31, which deals with the Genesis concept of “seed”
from the pericope which contains Genesis 21:12. He argues that while the audience of Romans
may not have been aware of Galatians 4, modern readers cannot help but read Romans 9 in light
of Galatians 4.22 Hays has a rather different understanding of Paul’s hermeneutic overall than
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what has been offered here so far, and the final chapter this study will deal with Hays’ view more
directly. Here it is sufficient to look simply at his approach to hermeneutical justification, which
seems to be, in essence, to see Paul as appropriating and somewhat reinterpreting Old Testament
Scripture in order to address the needs of his community. In Hays’ view, hermeneutical
justification is a matter of community under the New Covenant. It is a function of “law written
on our hearts” that gives both Paul and modern readers the right (and responsibility) to do
hermeneutics in ways such as those exhibited by Paul in Romans 9:7.
Under the rubric of Hays’ approach to hermeneutical justification, the answer to the
hermeneutical issues raised in Romans 9:7 is fairly straightforward. Paul is justified in
interpreting Genesis 21:12 not strictly in light of its historical-grammatical meaning in its own
context, but in light of the needs of his community. As such, the disjunction between the
contextual focus of Genesis 21:12 and Paul’s focus in using it does not by itself cause any
problems in terms of hermeneutical justification under Hays’ view. The ease with which this
view answers such hermeneutical issues does come at a cost, though. It diminishes the
importance of the meaning of the Old Testament text in its own context, and it allows for a type
of appropriation which undermines structuralist meaning. It will be argued in this study that
speech acts can open the window on a better way of understanding the interpretive freedom
which Paul seems to exhibit, and its limits.
Ben Witherington offers somewhat of a counterpoint to Hays’ understanding of Romans
9:7, particularly in light of its relationship to Galatians 3:15-16. He asserts that Paul’s reference
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to “seed” in Genesis 9:7 is evidence of a rather different understanding on Paul’s part than the
one exemplified in the Galatians passage, a fact which leads Witherington to conclude that Paul
has Genesis 17:6-7 in mind in Galatians as well. Galatians 3, he argues, brings in the concept of
“seed” as a Messianic king by way of the royal-seed promise of Genesis 17:6: “… and kings will
come forth from you.” The upshot of this is that Paul’s understanding of the “seed” as referring
to covenant exclusivity regarding Isaac in Romans 9:7 does not need to be understood differently
in light of the fact that he finds a more Messianic significance in the “seed” concept in Galatians
3. His view on hermeneutical justification, therefore, would seem to lean more toward that of
Kruse: that Paul is calling upon an concept of exclusivity already present in the Genesis text
itself, but not simply parroting the overall contextual and biblical-theological message of Genesis
which involves Israel’s (in some sense) ethnic identity. However, whereas Kruse focuses more
on the exclusivity already present within Genesis 21:12 specifically, Witherington takes a more
canonical approach.23
Hays’ idea of what is required for hermeneutical justification seems to be somewhat
different than that of Kruse or Witherington. The criteria which he offers come from internal
evidence found in Paul’s writings themselves. Specifically, Hays points to faithfulness to God’s
covenant promises and testifying of Christ as Paul’s two main hermeneutical criteria.24 Since
these are drawn from internal evidence within the text itself, it is difficult to see how there could
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ever be any problem of hermeneutical justification in the New Testament’s use of the Old. The
criteria for hermeneutical justification are founded upon the content of the text itself, and
therefore the hermeneutical methods expressed in that content cannot help but be justified. Hays’
approach is not to hold New Testament interpretation accountable to modern historicalgrammatical standards but to take the New Testament “as it is” and simply understand that to be
the standard of hermeneutical justification.
The approach of Kruse and Witherington, by contrast, looks to understand how Paul’s
use of Genesis 21:12 fits with its meaning. They see Paul as making a specific point about
covenant exclusivity contra an opposing view which would see the fact that there are many nonbelieving Jews as problematic for the Gospel message from the standpoint of the Abrahamic
promise specifically. In other words, Kruse and Witherington take an understanding of Romans
9:7 which sees no hermeneutical issue after taking into account the particulars of Genesis 21:12
and Paul’s usage of it. Unlike Hays, they turn to a more traditional way of providing
hermeneutical justification, examining the texts involved and arguing that Paul’s use of the Old
Testament text is justified because it does ultimately adhere to some external standard of
interpretation. Indeed, the message of Genesis 21:12 might even inform how Romans 9:7 can be
understood.
Michael Wolter offers an account of Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12 which is similar to
Kruse and Witherington in terms of his approach to hermeneutical justification. That is to say
that, like them, he sees Paul’s usage as based upon concepts already latent in the Genesis text
itself. However, his understanding of the way in which Paul uses Genesis 21:12 in this instance
differs from theirs and merits interaction here. Wolter argues that the Genesis account of Isaac
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and Ishmael and the later account of Jacob and Esau to which Paul refers in Romans 9:12-13 do
not depict exclusivity within Israel. Instead, they depict actions and declarations by God which
have the effect of making some “Israel” and others “not Israel.” This restriction, to him, exists in
the Genesis account and is picked up by Paul. He sees Paul as picking up on the idea not that the
details of the Genesis text allow for exclusivity within Israel, but that they allow for restriction
on the part of God as to who is Israel and who is not, regardless of descent from Abraham.25
Speech Acts and Hermeneutical Justification in Romans 9:7
Having discussed some varying approaches to hermeneutical justification in Romans 9:7,
it remains to examine how they might interact with speech acts. It will be argued here that as
these approaches to hermeneutical justification are discussed in light of speech acts, a certain
relationship between issues of hermeneutical justification and speech act begins to show itself.
This relationship, in turn, becomes suggestive of the particular way of understanding
hermeneutical justification that has been offered here, and in turn the hermeneutics of the New
Testament as evidenced in Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18.
In the previous chapter, the focal speech act with regard to Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12
was identified as appealing to authority as part of a larger performative act of defending.
Importantly, this appeal to authority, from the perspective of speech act theory, must be seen as
an illocutionary act and not merely as a description of hermeneutical method. This difference
may seem subtle, but it is an important distinction with regard to properly understanding speech
acts as they relate to hermeneutical justification. It is now necessary to examine how this
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understanding of the speech acts displayed in Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12 interact with his
hermeneutical justification in using the Old Testament in the way he does.
In the second chapter of this study, certain hermeneutical issues with regard to Paul’s use
of Genesis 21:12 were identified. These can be seen as potential obstacles to justification of
Paul’s hermeneutics, and by examining how these issues can be answered from a speech act
perspective should provide some clarity with regard to the relationship between speech act and
hermeneutical justification. The first of these issues which was discussed previously is that there
seems to be a certain contextual disparity between Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12 and the overall
thrust of that passage in the context of Genesis. Genesis is about the special identity of Israel as
descendants of Abraham, and Paul’s focus on non-inclusiveness within that chosen lineage
seems somewhat discordant with the contextual message of Genesis 21:12. In the study of the
New Testament’s use of the Old, the use of specific Old Testament passages with their larger
theological (and even canonical) contexts in mind has been widely recognized.26 Paul does not
seem to be doing this in Romans 9:7, however, at least not in a way which focuses on Genesis’
message concerning Israel’s national and ethnic identity. So what exactly is it that Paul’s speech
act of appealing to authority in order to defend his gospel message does? It seems that Paul’s
appeal to authority focuses on specific details of the Old Testament message. The fact that
Ishmael and Esau are excluded from the Abrahamic promise countermands an erroneous notion
concerning Paul’s message: that it must be invalid or incorrect in some way if it does not
effectually include all of ethnic Israel in the New Covenant which Paul preaches.

26

For example, G. K. Beale, “The use of Hosea 11:1 in Matthew 2:15: One More Time,” in Journal of the
Evangelical Theological Society 55, no. 4 (2012): 700.

136

Paul’s appeal to authority involves certain truth-claims about the Old Testament text,
namely that the text indeed says what Paul’s argument depends upon it to say. This is,
specifically, that Ishmael, though son of Abraham, was not included in the covenant promise.
Though Paul builds a larger argument upon this claim, this does not imply that he is claiming
anything more than this of Genesis 21:12 specifically. If this is indeed the case, that Paul’s
illocutionary act of making claims about the meaning of Genesis 21:12 is limited in scope to only
what Genesis 21:12 does indeed mean, then Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12 passes the test of
hermeneutical justification. In order for Paul’s appeal to authority to work, all Paul needs is for it
to be true that the Abrahamic promise was indeed exclusive in some sense among Abraham’s
descendants. The fact that it is exclusive even among Isaac’s descendants only further proves
Paul’s point. It is not necessary for Paul’s statement to completely mirror, in a biblicaltheological way, the overall thrust of the Genesis message in order for Paul to be hermeneutically
justified according to the broad definition offered here. This approach achieves roughly the same
conclusion as those of Kruse and Witherington which were discussed earlier. Both see something
of what Paul says in Romans 9:7 as already being present in Genesis 21:12. However,
understanding hermeneutical justification in terms of illocutionary acts of truth-claiming seems
to provide a criterion that could be consistently applied elsewhere.
This is all well and good, and more or less in line with what has already been discussed
concerning Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12, but there is an important and even more relevant
observation to be made here: Hermeneutical justification is parallel in this example to Paul’s
speech act successfully obtaining. Paul’s speech act obtaining and his being hermeneutically
justified go hand-in-hand. If Paul is not hermeneutically justified, he fails in appealing to the Old
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Testament’s authority, and he also fails in defending his message against the hypothetical
objection which is in focus in Romans 9:7. If Paul is claiming that Genesis 21:12 is saying
something that it does not say, his appeal to its authority is inherently flawed and unsuccessful
insofar as it depends on an understanding of the Old Testament text which is not actual. In order
for Paul’s appeal to authority to succeed, that authority must indeed support what he is saying in
the way that he claims. If Paul’s hermeneutic is not justified, then his illocutionary speech act of
appealing to authority (and then defending) does not obtain. This speech act is broken according
to its word-to-world direction of fit, because Paul’s claim that the Old Testament authority
establishes his particular point does not match the world. If, on the other hand, Paul’s
hermeneutic is justified, the speech act does obtain. Thus, it can be observed that hermeneutical
justification seems to go hand-in-hand with speech act obtainment in this passage. This is,
perhaps, indicative of a close relationship between the two. It will be argued that such a
relationship does exist, and that it forms the basis of speech acts serving to provide special
insight into situational factors which are at play with regard to hermeneutics in the New
Testament.
The second major hermeneutical issue which has been identified in Paul’s use of Genesis
21:12 is the fact that the Genesis text deals with the Abrahamic promise, which is not identical to
the New-Covenantal promise under discussion in Romans 9. These two promises are not
identical, for example, in that Gentile believers under the New Covenant are not promised things
like the land of Canaan. They don’t simply take over the Abrahamic promise from the Jews.
Thus, Paul applies statements about the Abrahamic promise directly to a different promise.
However, although the two covenants are not the same covenant, the New Covenant is
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nevertheless tied to the Abrahamic promise. The Gentile inclusion under the New Covenant can
be seen as flowing out of the promise that Abraham would serve as a blessing to the nations.27
Further, Oropeza argues that Paul also sees the inclusion of the Gentiles as fulfilling the promise
that Abraham would be the father of many nations.28 In light of the connection between these
two covenants, perhaps this issue is not a problematic one. There is another answer to this
question which is perhaps even more effective. Although Genesis 21:12 does not speak directly
to the New Covenant and its presumed exclusivity, the hypothetical objection with which Paul
contends is likewise concerned more or less with the Old Covenant. The hypothetical objection
deals not just with New Covenant exclusivity but specifically with that exclusivity in light of
Abrahamic promises. As such, by answering this objection based upon Abrahamic grounds, Paul
answers the objection to the New Covenant itself. If this is the case, then Paul remains
hermeneutically justified, because it is not necessary to see him as claiming that Genesis speaks
directly to the New Covenant. Rather, Paul can be seen as speaking directly to Abrahamic
promise, albeit in a way that is relevant to the New Covenant.
The relationship here between speech act and hermeneutical justification is similar to that
relationship as it stands in light of the first hermeneutical issue discussed. Paul is
hermeneutically justified because his speech act obtains. He succeeds in performing the
illocutionary act of appealing to authority, which he could not do if he were hermeneutically
unjustified in speaking of the Abrahamic promise in relation to New Covenant exclusivity. This
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close relationship between hermeneutical justification and speech act obtainment will serve to
provide a bridge to the concept of situation, which will help answer questions about speech act
and hermeneutical justification in light of the fact that Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 use
Genesis 21:21 differently and are differently justified.
Hermeneutical Justification in Hebrews 11:18
While Romans 9:7 presents certain hermeneutical issues in its use of Genesis 21:21,
Hebrews 11:18 presents its own set of issues. These will only be briefly restated as they have
already been discussed in greater detail in chapter two. The hermeneutical issues present in
Hebrews 11:18 with regard to its use of Genesis 21:12 mainly center on the larger contextual
argument of the Hebrews passage, which seeks to tie Abraham’s faith and experience to that of
the audience of Hebrews, particularly by way of expectation of resurrection. Hebrews considers
the sacrifice of Isaac pericope contextually, hence the quotation of Genesis 21:12, but adds to
this some reasoning about Abraham’s hope that God could even resurrect Isaac which does not
seem to be in contextual focus within Genesis. So, Hebrews uses Genesis 21:12 to speak about
the “chosen-ness” of Isaac in a fairly straightforward way, but it does so as part of a larger
rhetorical move that may seem to “read into” the story something about Abraham’s thoughts
concerning resurrection at the time, something which does not seem to be in focus within the
Genesis text. As such, it is necessary to speak about hermeneutical justification at two levels: the
granular level of the Genesis 21:12 quotation itself as well as at the level of this larger
resurrection argument.
At the first and more granular level, it appears that hermeneutical justification can be
fairly straightforwardly addressed. The Genesis passage speaks to Isaac’s chosen-ness and
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Hebrews echoes that sentiment in order to emphasize that which Abraham stood to lose in
sacrificing Isaac. Alan Mitchell comments upon Hebrews 11:18 to this effect, stating that the
binding of Isaac put not only Isaac himself but also the Divine promise that was attached to him
in jeopardy. Mitchell also notes that the idea of Abraham’s hope lying in God’s ability to
resurrect Isaac does not come from the Genesis itself.29 His explanation for it is that, in the mind
of the author of Hebrews, this hope in the possibility of a resurrection accounts for Abraham’s
willingness to go through with the sacrifice. More importantly, according to Mitchell, this
account of Abraham’s hope serves to invite the audience of Hebrews to identify with Abraham’s
struggles as their own faith is tested.30 While Mitchell acknowledges that the idea of Abraham
hoping in a resurrection for Isaac as an idea that is external to the content of the Genesis text
itself, he seems to see the conclusion drawn by the author of Hebrews as valid. While Genesis
does not mention Abraham expecting Isaac to be resurrected, such a hope is an adequate and
reasonable account of Abraham’s unwavering trust in God. DeSilva’s comments on this issue are
similar to those of Mitchell,31 as are those of Cockerill. Cockerill, however, explains the logic in
more detail. To him, Hebrews is saying that if Abraham believed Isaac to be the seed of the
promise and also believed that God had commanded him to sacrifice Isaac, then indeed Abraham
must have concluded that God would raise Isaac if the sacrifice were to be completed.32
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All three of these commentators seem to view the conclusion of the author of Hebrews
about Abraham’s trust in a resurrection for Isaac should he be sacrificed as a conclusion drawn
from the data available within Genesis itself, even if the concept is not dealt with directly by the
author of Genesis. Furthermore, the discussion of this issue in chapter two, while it did not find a
theology of resurrection in Genesis, nevertheless found latent threads which feed into such a
theology. They do not, however, seem to deal directly with the hermeneutical implications of
this. The fact remains that the author of Hebrews seems to be making a statement about
Abraham’s beliefs which is not clearly borne out within the context of Genesis itself. This may
be viewed as “reading into” Genesis something about Abraham’s beliefs and attitudes which
characterizes the story in a way other than the way in which Genesis presents it. Of course, the
characterization of Abraham’s beliefs in Hebrews is not directly contradictory to the Genesis
depiction, it simply adds something to it that seems alien to the Genesis text. The manner in
which these commentators deal with this issue leaves something to be desired. A modern reader,
perhaps, ought to feel uncomfortable drawing similar conclusions about the feelings, attitudes,
and beliefs of biblical characters when those are not expressed in the text itself.
To say that there can be a certain amount of discomfort in what the author of Hebrews
does with the Genesis account is not to say that Hebrews is necessarily being hermeneutically
disingenuous. The facts upon which the author Hebrews bases the statement about Abraham’s
belief in the potential for Isaac to be resurrected are true to Genesis, and Genesis itself contains
threads which later develop into a fully-fledged resurrection theology. Abraham believes that
Isaac is the promised seed and yet his trust in God is great enough that he is still willing to go
through with the sacrifice. Particularly from a canonical perspective that takes into account the
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Bible’s overall emphasis on Divine sovereignty over death, the idea of Abraham trusting that
God would resurrect Isaac should he die is not unreasonable. This study is concerned with
understanding in a more detailed way how the usage of Genesis 21:12 in this way is
hermeneutically justified. It now remains to examine how an approach which takes speech acts
into account can provide some clarity on this point.
Speech Acts and Hermeneutical Justification in Hebrews 11:18
At this point it is necessary to apply the speech act-based criterion for hermeneutical
justification to the use of Genesis 21:12 in Hebrews 11:18. The relevant question here is whether
or not Hebrews makes an untrue claim about the meaning of the Genesis text, but any such act of
claiming must be viewed in relation to the larger speech acts in the passage. The focal speech act
here was identified in the previous chapter as one of testifying, by way of Abraham’s faith, about
the faithfulness of God. The hermeneutical difficulty with this particular example arises mainly
from the construal of Abraham’s mindset when sacrificing Isaac which is not discussed directly
in the Genesis text itself. The author of Hebrews is certainly going beyond the contextual
meaning of the Genesis text itself, but does this constitute a hermeneutically unjustified usage of
the text?
The Hebrews text certainly performs illocutionary actions that involve the making of
claims. With regard to the quotation of Genesis 21:12 specifically, Hebrews makes the claim that
the text asserts Isaac’s status as the chosen seed. This act is implied in the quotation of the text
and its usage in the overall argument in Hebrews. Isaac’s seed-status is necessary to the
contextual Scripture-based argument of Hebrews, and therefore its usage constitutes a claim
about its meaning. This particular claim is tied to the larger act of testifying insofar as it forms a
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part of the content of that testimony. Isaac’s seed-status is critical to the characterization of
Abraham’s actions and the testimony about God’s faithfulness which those actions imply. This
claim, however, is not particularly problematic from a hermeneutical perspective. The claim that
Genesis 21:12 means that Isaac is the chosen seed, the one through whom the promises made to
Abraham would be fulfilled, appears to be a true claim in keeping with the contextual meaning
of that verse. If this is indeed the case, then the usage of Genesis 21:12 in Hebrews 11:18 passes
the hermeneutical justification text with regard to this particular claim. This claim, though, is not
what is at the center of the issue with Hebrews’ use of Genesis 21:12.
The statement in Hebrews about Abraham’s trust in God’s ability to resurrect Isaac even
if he were sacrificed is a claim which seems to cause more difficulty. While it is not centered on
the quotation of Genesis 21:12 itself, it is relevant to the way in which that verse is used. In
quoting Genesis 21:12, the author of Hebrews has in mind a wider argument which takes into
account the context of the Genesis passage and makes a claim about Abraham’s mindset within
the context of that overall narrative. Hebrews seems to be positing this belief that Isaac would be
resurrected as Abraham’s reason for being willing to sacrifice him in spite of his status as the
promised seed.33 As such, there does indeed appear to be a claim about Abraham’s reasons for
acting as he does in Genesis. So, there is a claim that can be stated along these lines: Abraham
was willing to sacrifice Isaac at least partially because he believed Isaac would be resurrected if
sacrificed. In much the same way as the earlier claim, this claim supports the larger speech act of
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testifying. Using this claim, the author of Hebrews emphasizes the absoluteness of Abraham’s
trust in God.
What of the meaning of the Genesis text? Does it mean something along the lines of this
claim being made in Hebrews 11? It would seem that it does not, and herein the hermeneutical
difficulty with Hebrews 11:18 manifests itself. As has already been stated, this conclusion about
Abraham’s mindset seems to be alien to the direct message of the text, regardless of its
plausibility. It simply is not expressed in the text itself, its context, nor in the themes of that
context. However, this is not enough to make Hebrews 11:18 fail the test of hermeneutical
justification. Certainly, it makes a claim, and that claim deals with content that is not the result of
mere exegesis of the Genesis text. In order to fail the test, however, that claim must be about the
meaning of the Old Testament text. It seems that it could be said that this claim is about
Abraham’s mindset and not about the meaning of the Genesis text itself. In other words,
Hebrews may be drawing conclusions about Abraham as he stands within the context of the
Genesis narrative, but it is not necessarily claiming that the Genesis text means that conclusion.
This conclusion, of course, can be evaluated on its own merits as an argument, but it does not
violate hermeneutical justification since it does not make a false claim about the meaning of the
Old Testament text.
Under this approach which understands hermeneutical justification in terms of speech
acts, the use of Hebrews 11:18 can be said to be hermeneutically justified. This hermeneutical
justification is related to factors which influence and determine the nature of the speech acts
performed by the author of Hebrews in using Genesis 21:12. The context of the Hebrews passage
and the structure of its argument, along with other factors, form a situation in which the author
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acts, one in which speech acts performed with regard to Genesis text can be understood as
hermeneutically justified. There are differences between Hebrews 11:18 and Romans 9:7 in how
they use Genesis 21:12 and in how their respective hermeneutical justifications function. The
remainder of this chapter will explore those differences and begin to explore how these
situational factors serve to justify different ways of using the Genesis text.

Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 Differently Justified in Situational Context
An examination of the hermeneutical issues stemming from the use of Genesis 21:12 in
both Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 reveals that the two passages use the Genesis verse in
distinct ways. As such, each of these two verses has its own distinct hermeneutical difficulties
which require a certain degree of explanation. It may be intuitively clear to some that the New
Testament uses the Old in a variety of ways, and this study seeks to better understand that variety
and hermeneutical implications. By comparing two different passages which use the same Old
Testament verse, this study is able to avoid much of the complexity which might otherwise arise
in a comparative study of how multiple passages use the Old Testament. After removing the
variables which would be associated with the usage of differing Old Testament passages, this
study is able to focus on only those differences which relate to the New Testament passages and
the manner in which they use the Old.
This study argues that speech act theory provides a useful approach to hermeneutical
justification that can accommodate the differences in hermeneutical method between Romans 9:7
and Hebrews 11:18 in a way that takes situational factors into account. The fact that two New
Testament passages use the same Old Testament verse differently shows that the New Testament
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uses the Old in a variety of ways. Speech act theory provides a way to measure hermeneutical
justification across a variety of ways of using Scripture. More specifically, it helps answer the
question of whether or not a particular way of using Scripture is allowable in a given context,
especially when certain methods may not be allowable in all contexts. Much has already been
said by others about the features of the New Testament’s use of the Old, but this study argues
that speech act theory can provide some insight with regard to hermeneutical limitations within
varying situations.
The manner in which these two passages can be hermeneutically justified in their use of
Genesis 21:12 has been discussed and viewed through the lens of speech act theory, but what
does this contribute to the discussion of hermeneutical variety in the New Testament’s use of the
Old? By examining two passages which use the same Old Testament verse differently, this study
has shown that differences between the Old Testament texts being used cannot wholly account
for this hermeneutical variety. This means that, at least in part, this variety must stem from
something to do with the New Testament texts. If it is to be assumed that the New Testament
authors do not simply misuse the Old Testament text, then something in the context of the New
Testament passages must serve to justify these varying usages. How can that something be
explored? What is it that limits what hermeneutical methods are acceptable within a particular
context, since a single hermeneutical method and the Old Testament text itself are both
insufficient in this regard? This study argues that speech act theory can be of help here. Proper
and improper use of an Old Testament text both involve illocutionary acts performed in the
usage of that text. Under speech act theory, situational context coupled with the rights and
statuses of the speaker have a profound impact on the nature of the acts being performed. This
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holds true for acts which involve use or misuse of a text. Situational factors and the rights and
statuses of the speaker (in this case the New Testament author) could make all the difference
between use and misuse. Different New Testament texts involve different situational factors, and
this can account for the justifiability of different hermeneutical methods, ones which may be
more loose or more strict depending on situational context. Speech act theory may not be the
only way to approach these issues, but it is a theory that is especially well suited to describing
issues concerning the interaction between situation and the nature of an act.
This argument can be applied to the differences between Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18
in terms of how they are hermeneutically justified in their use of Genesis 21:12. Romans 9:7 has
been shown to be somewhat straightforward when it comes to hermeneutical justification. This
study has already examined how the illocutionary claims about the meaning of Genesis 21:12 do
not actually depart from the contextual meaning of the Old Testament text. Paul’s use of Genesis
21:12 is in some ways more straightforward than that found in Hebrews 11:18, as Paul more or
less just references a fact about the Abrahamic promise while Hebrews goes on to make a
comparatively speculative observation about the narrative.
Speech act theory posits that factors surrounding but external to a locutionary instance of
speech itself have a profound impact on the nature of the illocutionary acts performed in that
speech. This study has chosen to refer to these external factors collectively as situation.
Importantly, situation includes other speech (and other speech acts) in the context of the speech
in question. Indeed, when it comes to New Testament texts, there is often little information
available other than the internal evidence of the text itself. The rights and statuses of the speaker
are also important, but this study will focus on situation as it is found within the context of the
148

text itself. While the rights and statuses of the New Testament authors present an intriguing line
of inquiry, so little is known (particularly about the author of Hebrews) that it is doubtful
whether this would be as fruitful as simply focusing on textual context.
The relevant situational factors in Romans 9:7 involve a contextual speech act which has
already been discussed: Paul’s defending of his construal of the gospel against a particular
objection. It is this defense which defines Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12 as the introduction of a
fact which he then uses in a larger argument. This defines the nature of Paul’s act of making a
claim about the Old Testament text and also plays a role in defining what that claim is. Hebrews
11:18, on the other hand, involves an act of testifying. This contextual situation includes a list of
Old Testament saints, and the author of Hebrews makes assurances about the faithfulness of God
on the basis of the actions of these saints. In other words, he is asking the question “what to the
actions of these saints say about God’s faithfulness?” and by extension, “Why did they do what
they did?” This overall argument is sort of an inductive one, including numerous examples from
the Old Testament. All of these statements about the motivations and reasons of the Old
Testament saints are somewhat speculative in the sense that they often go beyond what the
original texts explicitly state. Nevertheless, within this context the statements about Abraham are
justified. The claim made about Abraham’s belief in a resurrection for Isaac is not a claim about
the meaning of the Genesis text, but nevertheless the argument obtains especially in the context
of this larger evidential argument. The varying situations of these two texts play a role in their
hermeneutics by serving as a backdrop for the speech acts being performed with regard to the
Old Testament text. The final chapter of this study will seek to explore this relationship in
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greater detail, and will attempt to understand the nature and limitations of this situational
hermeneutic.
Conclusion
The study of intertextuality has led to a variety of approaches to understanding the
relationship between the New Testament and the Old. This study has chosen to take a
structuralist approach which locates meaning with the texts themselves rather than in a middlespace among the milieu of texts residing in the mind of the reader. With this in mind, an attempt
was made to define an approach to hermeneutical justification which maintains a structuralist
approach to meaning but might allow for the creative usages which the New Testament seems to
exhibit. An approach to this task based upon speech act theory rendered the following as a
criterion for hermeneutical justification: a text is hermeneutically justified in its use of an Old
Testament text if it does not make an illocutionary claim that that text means something which it
does not mean. Both Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 were discussed in terms of how they
interact with this broad-but-structuralist criterion for hermeneutical justification, and both were
found to be justified based upon the claims made about the Old Testament text. However, both
texts do not use Genesis 21:12 in the same way, and so this study has concluded that contextual
differences in the New Testament texts themselves must be taken into account in order to
understand what is hermeneutically acceptable. Speech act theory provides some insight into
this, since use or misuse of a text are both illocutionary acts, and their nature is deeply affected
by external factors such as context. Speech act theory describes the relationship between
use/misuse and the situational factors surrounding a particular usage of Scripture, and it offers a
way to evaluate such usage that takes such factors into account. The final chapter of this study
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will address this in more detail, hoping to arrive at some understanding of the situational nature
of the hermeneutical methods exhibited in the New Testament’s use of the Old, and of what
limits those hermeneutical methods.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
A SITUATIONAL HERMENEUTIC

Introduction
The hermeneutical methods practiced by the New Testament authors when they use the
Old Testament are certainly deep and complex in character. Despite much existing scholarship,
they still present a rich field available for study. It seems clear that the New Testament’s use of
the Old cannot be characterized in a few sweeping generalizations. Indeed, this study has drawn
particular attention to this fact by pointing out the differences between Romans 9:7 and Hebrews
11:18 in their usage of Genesis 21:12. The hermeneutical methods of the New Testament authors
are varied, and they vary according to more than just what is contained within the Old Testament
text itself. These variations cannot, then, be attributed solely to differences in content or genre
between various Old Testament texts. They arise, at least in part, from the New Testament author
and the New Testament text. Furthermore, these New-Testament differences play a part in
making the respective hermeneutical movements performed by the New Testament authors
justifiable. Speech act theory has been posited as an avenue of insight into this relationship,
hinging upon the fact that use or misuse of an Old Testament text are by nature illocutionary
acts. The upshot of all this is that the hermeneutical methods practiced by the New Testament
authors are situational just as the performative impact of any speech act (and indeed any act in
general) is situational. Speech act theory furnishes an approach to consistently evaluating all of
this, particularly in light of the variety of situational factors presented in the New Testament as
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well as in the context of modern interpretation. In this final chapter, this concept of a situational
hermeneutic will be explored in detail.
This chapter will begin by further developing the evidence from the texts themselves that
has been discussed in the previous chapters. This discussion will focus primarily on the
hermeneutical differences between these two texts. The significance of these differences with
regard to hermeneutical justification will be discussed with particular focus on the impact which
this has with regard to the larger argument of this study. A conclusion will be offered that a good
way to reconcile all of this data is with the concept of a situational hermeneutic. This idea will be
defined and developed. It will then be discussed in light of its relationship to the theological
dimension of the New Testament’s usage of the Old. This will culminate in an examination of
whether or not this situational hermeneutic can be reproduced by modern readers, followed by
some final concluding remarks.
Evidence from the Texts
This study argues that the New Testament’ use of the Old exhibits a situational
hermeneutic. The general flow of this argument had already been stated here, but it is necessary
to examine it in greater detail. The approach to this task will begin with the evidence stemming
from the two New Testament passages that are have been in focus thus far. The relationship
between Romans 9:7 and Hebrew 11:18 will serve as a basis for an argument that the concept of
situation has value in understanding the hermeneutical methods of the New Testament writers.
The evidence from the texts will focus on differences in usage of Genesis 21:12 as well as the
differences in hermeneutic implied by those differences in usage.
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Differences in Usage of Genesis 21:12
The first relevant observation concerning Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 is that both
texts use Genesis 21:12 differently. Paul uses Genesis 21:12 as an Old Testament example of
covenant exclusivity in order to defend against a charge that the gospel’s exclusivity violates Old
Testament promises. Hebrews uses it to hold Abraham up as an example of faithful and
determined hope in a promised future for God’s people that involves resurrection. Both of these
passages, in concert with Genesis 21, assert the absolute faithfulness of God and his willingness
and ability to fulfill his covenant promises, but ultimately there are differences in the way they
approach the text hermeneutically.
What requires greater scrutiny at this stage of the argument is the precise nature of the
differences in how these two passages use Genesis 21:12 and the significance of those
differences. Paul’s use of Genesis, for example, is in a sense somewhat straightforward.
Although Paul does use Genesis 21:12 to make a point that is outside the concerns of Genesis
itself, his appeal is nonetheless to the face-value meaning of Genesis 21:12 itself. Isaac’s chosen
status is the contextual point of Genesis 21:12, and Paul appeals directly to it and uses that point
as a premise in his larger argument about Old Testament precedent. Hebrews, on the other hand,
strays further from the contextual message in that it is concerned not with Isaac’s status for its
own sake but for the sake of what Hebrews makes it out to imply regarding Abraham’s thoughts
and intentions as he sacrifices Isaac. Both appeal to the simple fact of Isaac’s chosen status, but
Paul does not comment upon the significance of that fact within the narrative of Genesis. In a
way, the fact that his argument has little to do with the context of Genesis 21:12 makes his usage
of the verse more direct. Hebrews, on the other hand, deals not only with the fact of Isaac’s
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status presented in Genesis 21:12 but also comments upon its significance in the contextual
narrative of the binding of Isaac. Paul touches less of the contextual narrative, but as a
consequence he meddles less with meaning of the Genesis text even though he is not simply
performing exegesis.
Romans and Hebrews both exhibit creative usage of the Genesis text in their own ways.
This creativity, which seems to be characteristic throughout the New Testament, raises certain
hermeneutical questions. These problems are closely related to questions about to what degree
New Testament interpretation represents legitimate exegesis by modern standards and, therefore,
to what degree they can be replicated by modern readers. Are the New Testament authors
wrong? Are modern hermeneutical approaches misguided? Or are the New Testament texts
simply able to take liberties that others cannot, perhaps due to their status as inspired Scripture?
This study hopes to add to the discussion by providing an approach to understanding New
Testament hermeneutics that accounts for the apparent creativity with which the New Testament
authors use the Old while maintaining hermeneutical integrity under a structuralist approach to
intertextual meaning. The next step in this process will be examine the differences in usage
which have been highlighted here in terms of their hermeneutical import.
Differing Hermeneutics in Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18
It has been pointed out that Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 each use Genesis 21:12 in
different ways. This study will now argue that this difference in usage also translates into a
difference in hermeneutical method. This will serve develop the argument of this study around
the concept of a situational hermeneutic, that is, a hermeneutic which allows for a variety of
hermeneutical methods used situationally. In order to proceed to that discussion, though, it is
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necessary first to discuss the concept of variety among New Testament hermeneutical methods
on its own. Of course, Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 can serve here as the test case. Since both
deal with the same Old Testament verse, the task is simplified. It is unnecessary to account for
differences in usage which might arise from differences between multiple Old Testament texts.
The interpretive variances between Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 have already been
analyzed at some length, but thus far the discussion has not focused closely upon hermeneutical
method. It is important to establish that there are indeed real differences in hermeneutical method
between Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 in their usage of Genesis 21:12. The comparative
looseness with which Hebrews uses Genesis 21:12 relative to Romans 9:7 has already been
observed, but how can this be classified hermeneutically?
Hermeneutics in Romans 9:7
Since this study has begun with Romans 9:7 thus far, it seems appropriate to continue that
pattern here. One place to begin is to ask whether typology might be a good way to characterize
Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12. Paul points out an Old Testament pattern involving covenant
exclusivity among Abraham’s descendants and then applies that pattern to a similar salvationhistorical reality in his own day: the fact that a large number of Paul’s countrymen are not
receiving the blessings of the new covenant. Certainly, this interpretive move seems to exhibit
the application of historical patterns to modern realities that characterizes typology. Does
Romans 9:7 show how something in the New Testament fully embodies a pattern expressed in
the Old? Typology often (though not always) involves something that is fulfilled in or by Christ.
Furthermore, Romans 9:7 in context has more of the character of a legal defense than of a
statement about typological fulfillment. The focus is on theodicy, and on appeal to the Old
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Testament as a source of authority. It seems better to take Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12 as being
more or less directly concerned with the technicalities of that passage than with its potential as a
pointer to an historical pattern in the Old Testament. Perhaps Paul could have used it
typologically if he wanted to, but the focus on theodicy in Romans 9 seems to diminish the
potential role of typology and call instead for Paul’s hermeneutic to be a more direct appeal to
the Old Testament text. There exists an analogy between Isaac/Ishmael and
believers/nonbelieving Jews in Paul’s day, but it is not typological in nature. In order for Paul’s
argument to work, he needs legal precedent for the covenant exclusivity which he advocates. The
pattern exists because it is necessary from the perspective of legal precedent, not because Paul
wishes to make the Isaac-Ishmael story out to be typological, at least in this case.
Another important reason for which Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12 might not be best
understood as typological is that typology relies upon historical pattern which relates to the
present, but Paul’s argument does not relate immediately to the present. Rather, his theodicy is in
answer to a question about the Abrahamic promise of the past and the impact of the Gospel upon
it, specifically whether the exclusivity of the gospel violates the Abrahamic covenant itself. In
other words, Paul’s defense is against the charge that his gospel directly contradicts Old
Testament teaching regarding God’s promises to Israel, and he answers that charge on the basis
of the Old Testament evidence. The situation of Paul’s present only comes into logic of his
argument after he has established the precedent for covenant exclusivity among Abraham’s
descendants. In short, the question at hand is one of whether or not Old Testament teaching,
within its own context, has been contradicted. The connection here is direct rather than being
based upon historical pattern.
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With this in mind, Paul’s hermeneutic in his use of Genesis 21:12 can perhaps be
characterized to a useful degree. Paul is concerned with the facts of the Abrahamic promise:
what it does and more importantly does not entail. He appeals to the Old Testament text in for its
theological authority in order to answer the question of theodicy concerning the faithfulness of
God toward Israel. This appeal implies a certain exegetical rigor. If Paul claims the Old
Testament to say something that it does not say, then he fails in answering his detractors.
Moreover, a straightforward reading of the Genesis text reveals Paul’s usage to be in line with
Genesis text’s contextual meaning. As such, Paul’s use of Genesis 21:12, in terms of
hermeneutics, seems to be fairly straightforward. Paul may not be simply parroting the Genesis
passage in terms of its biblical theology, but he does seem to be utilizing its theological content
in a way that is direct with regard to its immediate context.
Hermeneutics in Hebrews 11:18
It remains now to analyze whether Hebrews exhibits a similarly direct hermeneutic in its
use of Genesis 21:12. Certainly, the use of Genesis 21:12 in Hebrews is direct, in a sense. The
quotation itself is, like Paul, concerned with the fact of Isaac’s seed-status. Hebrews, of course,
parleys this into a larger statement about Abraham’s mindset as he sacrifices Isaac. Paul likewise
uses the quotation and the fact of Isaac’s seed-status as part of a larger statement. From this
perspective, it might seem that the hermeneutics exhibited in Hebrews 11:18 can be
characterized in much the same way as Paul’s hermeneutics in Romans 9:7.
There is an important difference, however, between the larger argument to which
Hebrews applies Genesis 21:12 and the larger argument made by Paul. Paul’s larger argument
focuses neither on the Genesis text, it wider narrative, nor its contextual concerns. Paul is
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focused on a theological issue concerning the gospel and external to the Genesis text. He
employs Genesis as part of his argument, but his argument does not comment further upon
Genesis itself. The way in which Hebrews uses Genesis 21:12 as part of a larger argument, on
the other hand, does comment upon the Genesis text. Hebrews uses not only Genesis 21:12, but
the entire contextual pericope of the binding of Isaac. The wider argument, comprised of a
commentary upon Abraham’s mindset as he sacrificed Isaac, is not external to the Genesis text
but rather intimately attached to it. This wider argument, in fact, constitutes continued usage of
the Genesis text. Furthermore, this wider argument comments upon Genesis in a way that does
seem to differ from the more direct usage in Romans 9:7. What Romans 9:7 has to say in terms
of interpretation of Genesis 21:12 is more or less direct, but this is not the case for Hebrews
11:18. The usage in Hebrews is, by comparison, much more creative as it speculated upon
Abraham’s thought and beliefs which are not mentioned within Genesis. Therefore, the
hermeneutic exhibited in Hebrews 11:18 ought not to be characterized in the same way as that
exhibited in Romans 9:7.
The Use of Scripture in Hebrews
In order to proceed further, however, it is necessary to first discuss the issue of Hebrews’
use of Scripture overall. Hebrews 11:18 does not stand alone, after all. Hebrews as a whole
exhibits some interesting features in its use of the Old Testament, and the hermeneutics it
employs in 11:18 function within that larger context. It is crucial to acknowledge in this regard
the sermonic nature of Hebrews. The view that Hebrews is a sermon turned into a letter has
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become common.1 Regardless of whether and to what degree Hebrews should be understood as a
spoken or a written work, the presence of this debate testifies to its oral character.2 Gabriella
Gelardini goes so far as to liken Hebrews to a proto-rabbinic homily, seeing in its use of the Old
Testament a sermonic exposition of two main texts and other supporting texts. This form, she
argues, likens it rabbinic preaching.3
In his article, “The Scriptural World of Hebrews,” Luke Johnson explores the relationship
between the oral nature of Hebrews and its use of the Old Testament. He argues that Hebrews
invites the reader into a conceptual world and that the way in which it employs Scripture plays
an important role in the construction of that world.4 Specifically, he focuses upon the way in
which Hebrews presents scriptural quotations. He notes that Hebrews citation formulae speak
almost exclusively of Scripture as something oral. That is, Hebrews speaks of God speaking
presently to the audience when it quotes the Old Testament rather than simply of Scripture.5
According to Johnson, however, Hebrews goes beyond this in its creative interpretation of
Scripture in light of a contemporary experience. One of the examples which he deals with is
Hebrews’ use of Melchizedek in Hebrews 7:1-10. By drawing a series of connections between
Melchizedek and Jesus, the author of Hebrews applies Genesis 14:18 and Psalm 110:4 to Jesus.6
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Ultimately, he also applies those texts to his audience as he uses them to prove the “superiority
of God’s speech through his son.”7 This speech is part of the scriptural world which the author of
Hebrews builds for his audience to inhabit, and he calls upon them to heed it.
Matthew Easter builds upon this concept further, noting how the author of Hebrews’
claims about the faith of the heroes listed in Hebrews 11 center around not just a generalized
trust in God, but specifically hope in resurrection and life after death.8 Easter sees this theme
involving resurrection running throughout Hebrews, for example in the discussion of Jesus’ faith
in Hebrew 5:7-9.9 He concludes that the motivation for faith in God in the context of Hebrews
always involves trust that he will resurrect. In his words, “this connection between faith in God
and the hope of life after death provides a pastoral word to the hearers of Hebrews.”10
Easter’s work points to the pastoral, hortatory focus of Hebrews in a way that is
intimately linked with the references to Abraham in Hebrews 11 as well as the larger context of
Hebrews and its use of the Old Testament. This seems consistent with Johnson’s conclusions
about the manner in which Hebrews views Scripture as speaking in some sense directly to its
audience, because resurrection is the hope of the Christian audience of Hebrews, a hope to which
he exhorts them to continue to hold fast in faith. Resurrection hope is arguably not the focus of
these Old Testament texts. They have their own contexts apart from the experience of the
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audience of Hebrews. This does not mean that Hebrews misuses these Scriptures, but it does
mean that they are used and applied creatively.
Hermeneutics of Hebrews 11:18 in Contrast to Romans 9:7
How, then, should the hermeneutic exhibited in Hebrews 11:18 be characterized? Since
that verse is part of a larger passage dealing with Abraham, it seems prudent to include at least
the commentary upon the binding of Isaac in that characterization, since the quotation in
Hebrews 11:18 is part of that commentary. Here also the possibility of typology ought to be
discussed, as some features of typology seem to present. The comment in Hebrews upon
Abraham’s hope in a resurrection seems to bear correspondence to the situation of the audience
of Hebrews. Abraham, like them, hoped in a resurrection. This correspondence even has the
feature of the New Testament situation being greater in scope, something which is also common
in typology.11 While Abraham hoped in the possibility of a temporal resurrection for Isaac alone,
the audience of Hebrews hopes in an ultimate and eternal resurrection for all believers.
On the other hand, the concept of Abraham’s hope in a resurrection comes not from the
Genesis text. It is speculation on the part of the author of Hebrews. It is well-founded
speculation, perhaps, but Genesis does not state it. This idea is certainly useful in relating
Abraham’s experience to that of the audience of Hebrews, but the fact that it is speculative in
nature casts some doubt upon the idea of an historical pattern or correspondence founded in the
Old Testament text itself. Furthermore, the broader context of Hebrews 11:18, the 11th chapter,
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repeats again and again this process of relating the experiences of Old Testament figures to the
struggles of the audience. With this in mind, it seems that Abraham is not a type of the audience,
but a member of the cloud of witnesses. These two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but
this wider contextual view accommodates everything Hebrews says about Abraham without the
need to appeal to typology for explanation. The relationship between the experiences of the Old
Testament saints and those of the New Testament believers is not typological but direct. Perhaps
the same sort of thinking that forms the basis for typology in the first place informs the
hermeneutic of Hebrews 11:18, but it does not seem necessary to characterize that hermeneutic
as typological in nature.
Although there is a speculative element in Hebrews’ statements about Abraham’s
mindset, the idea that God could resurrect Isaac is by no means an imposition on the Old
Testament from a canonical perspective. John Levenson points to Daniel 12:1-3 as one of the
clearest and earliest references to resurrection theology in the Old Testament. He argues that this,
as well as later rabbinic teachings on resurrection, find their roots in latent foreshadowings that
occur much earlier, including within Genesis.12 N. T. Wright agrees with the assessment that
later fully-fledged resurrection theology grew organically out of theology expressed as early as
Genesis and is inseparable from it.13 On the other hand, while Wright argues for these deep links
between earlier and later theology, he still maintains that this theology transitioned through
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several stages of thought about life after death, with the idea of resurrection being characteristic
of only the later stages.14
The continuity between that earlier theology and later resurrection theology implies that
Hebrews is not imposing some alien theology on Genesis, particularly from an Old Testament
canonical perspective. The fact remains, however, that Hebrews is not merely speaking to the
canonical reality of resurrection. It seems to state that Abraham himself acknowledged it, yet
Abraham ostensibly inhabited that earlier time during which resurrection theology was not fully
developed. Given what Genesis itself reveals about God’s sovereignty and faithfulness within the
Abrahamic narrative, as well as other latent seeds of resurrection theology in Genesis, it is not so
much of a stretch to say that Abraham could indeed have come to such a conclusion based upon
only his own knowledge of God of his situation. However, the fact that Hebrews not only reads
Genesis in light of resurrection theology present in the canon but posits such a belief on behalf of
Abraham means that canonical reading alone is not sufficient to explain the hermeneutical issues
raised in Hebrews 11:18.
So, the hermeneutic exhibited in Hebrews 11:18 does not seem to be straightforward in
the way shown in Romans 9:7. There are also reasons not to classify it as typological, and
therefore another avenue must be sought. Hebrews 11:18 seems to exhibit a certain degree of
creativity in its larger speculations upon Abraham’s mindset in terms of how it related that
mindset to the experience of the audience of Hebrews. Hebrews provides a speculative narrative
as the basis for this relatability. As has already been argued, Hebrews is concerned with an
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exhortative application of Old Testament Scripture to its audience. Hebrews aims to encourage
them to hold fast to a resurrection hope, and this leads Hebrews to adapt its usage of Old
Testament texts to focus on this hope in creative ways. Calling this presentation of the narrative
speculative is not to say that it is necessarily inaccurate or even unlikely. It is merely to say that
it is based upon conclusions drawn about the original Old Testament narrative which are not
stated within that original narrative and which go beyond its immediate contextual concerns.
This speculation deals specifically with Hebrews’ statement about Abraham’s belief in a possible
resurrection for Isaac, but the core of Abraham’s relatability to the audience of Hebrews still
rests upon what is explicitly stated in the Genesis text: Abraham’s complete trust in God and
willingness to act on that trust. The speculative resurrection hope of Abraham does not alone
comprise this relatability, it merely enhances it. Therefore, the basic hermeneutical movement
being made in Hebrews 11, which relates the actions of Abraham to the argument about God’s
faithfulness, is well founded in the Genesis text, but a further speculative move regarding a
resurrection hope serves to strengthen the relatability of Abraham’s experience for the readers.
The hermeneutic employed in Hebrews 11:18 can be characterized as a sort of semi-speculative
narration. It is not entirely speculative because, by and large, its major point deals with what is
stated in the Genesis text. However, the author of Hebrews is willing to speculate beyond what is
stated to a degree in order to enhance the argument. The author narrates the experience of
Abraham as depicted in Genesis, adding some speculation concerning Isaac’s potential
resurrection.
It is difficult to classify the hermeneutics of the New Testament. It would be quite
difficult indeed to make them fit neatly into modern categories. An attempt has been made to
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describe the hermeneutical methods exhibited in Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 with some
degree of accuracy. Much more could be said, of course, about these hermeneutical methods, but
the focus here has been to describe them at least well enough to point out more clearly their
significant differences. Paul’s hermeneutic in using Genesis 21:12 has been characterized as an
appeal to fact for the purpose of theodicy, and that of Hebrews 11:18 has been characterized as
semi-speculative narration. These are characterizations, not categories, and they should not be
expected to correspond to any system of categorizing hermeneutical method. They are merely an
attempt to describe the hermeneutical methods of these two passages well enough for the task at
hand, which is to establish that there are real hermeneutical differences between these two
passages in the way that they use Genesis 21:12. It remains now to discuss the significance of
these differences for the argument of this study.
What Different Hermeneutics means for Hermeneutical Justification
Hermeneutical justification was discussed in the previous chapter. It argued that
hermeneutical justification is an important concept in reconciling a structuralist approach to
intertextual meaning with the creativity exhibited in the New Testament’s use of the Old. Within
this context, it is important how hermeneutical justification is defined and what its criteria are.
Too strict a criterion will become discordant with the creativity exhibited by New Testament
usage, but if the criterion is too loose the structuralist approach to meaning will be undermined.
The argument was made that speech act theory furnishes an approach that is useful in navigating
these waters, particularly in a way that is capable of evaluating a wide variety of situational
usages, including usages by modern readers. Here, this study will expand upon that argument,
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and will place special focus upon its significance in the context of the fact that Romans 9:7 and
Hebrews 11:18 exhibit real hermeneutical differences in how they use Genesis 21:12.
Speech Acts and Hermeneutical Justification
In the previous chapter, this study argued that speech act theory furnishes an approach to
hermeneutical justification that is able to navigate in a consistent way the tension between
structuralist meaning and creative usage, specifically in the context of a variety of ways of using
Scripture in a variety of situations. A criterion for hermeneutical justification was proposed
which considers the speech acts involved in use and misuse of texts: a text is hermeneutically
justified in its use of an Old Testament text if it does not, when taking situational factors into
account, perform an illocutionary act of making a claim that the Old Testament text means
something that it does not mean. This criterion is built upon the idea that use and misuse are
essentially illocutionary speech acts. Hermeneutical justification, then, can be viewed as the
absence of a speech act of misuse. Whether or not a particular usage of a text constitutes
something hermeneutically unjustified, then, depends on whether or not an illocutionary act of
misuse is performed.
Since Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 have already been evaluated under this criterion,
no more needs to be said here about how it applies to those texts. There is one important point,
however, that needs to be made in order to proceed with the current argument concerning a
situational hermeneutic in the New Testament. Part of the insight of speech act theory involves
the relationship between speech acts and factors external to the speech itself. Actions are by
nature situational in terms of their significance. They have a context which can drastically impact
the very nature of the acts being performed. Speech act theory recognizes that the identity of the
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speaker as well as situational factors play a role in determining what illocutionary acts take
place.15 The very nature of these acts can, in fact, be drastically changed by factors completely
separate from the actual locution. This point serves to further highlight the benefit of
approaching the question of hermeneutical justification via speech act theory. Speech act theory
is well-suited to consideration of the manner in which external factors can alter the performative
impact of an instance of speech, such that something said in one situation can have a different
performative impact under different circumstances. This point has been hinted at before, but it is
necessary to formally state it here: situational factors play a role in defining the nature of
illocutionary acts that take place. This study argues that when this is applied to usage of the Old
Testament, situational factors might even make the difference between an illocutionary act
constituting misuse and one which does not. This means that situational factors can mean the
difference between hermeneutical justification and the failure to attain hermeneutical
justification.
Speech act theory formally describes the relationship between situational factors and
hermeneutical justification. It provides a framework for discussing and evaluating that
relationship as it applies to different instances of the use of Scripture. Perhaps even more
importantly, it provides a bridge between a variety of instances. It is one thing to note how a
particular text’s situational context plays into its use of another text, but speech act theory
supplies an overarching approach to this relationship between situation and hermeneutical
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justification that can aid in discussing disparate instances of the usage of Scripture together. This
becomes particularly important when it comes to questions about replication of the New
Testament’s interpretive methods, since modern usage of Scripture presents its own, distinct
array of situations.
The Significance of Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 being Differently Justified
The differences between Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 have been addressed at every
stage of this study. These two passages are quite different in terms of the hermeneutics they
employ, despite using the same Old Testament text. Romans 9:7 exhibits an appeal to fact for the
purpose of theodicy while Hebrews 11:18 applies a semi-speculative narration. These terms are
intended here to function solely as a way to describe the contrast between the two passages, but it
is necessary now to expand upon the significance of that hermeneutical contrast.
This significance lies in the realm of hermeneutical justification. Specifically, Romans
9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 are not hermeneutically justified in the same way. They both meet the
same criterion, but they do so by way of factors unique to each respective text and involving
factors surrounding the usage of Genesis 21:12. To elucidate this point, the following question
may be asked: how would it be if Romans 9:7 employed the same hermeneutical method as
Hebrews 11:18? What if, in addition to quoting Genesis 21:12, Paul added some degree of
speculation upon the Genesis narrative? Given that the context is a theodicy defending the gospel
against an accusation of breaking God’s word as depicted in the Old Testament promises given
to Abraham, it would seem that the consequences would have been dire for the effectiveness of
Paul’s argument. He would have been including in his theodicy a premise based upon something
the text doesn’t say. More importantly, however, is what this would do to Romans 9:7 in terms of
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hermeneutical justification. Since Paul is appealing to the Old Testament as an authority in the
context of a theodicy, he is attaching the validity of his premise to that authority. By claiming
that the Old Testament supports his argument in the way that he does, he is making a claim about
the meaning of the Old Testament text. This is all well and good, since what Romans 9:7 actually
claims is in fact in alignment with what the Genesis text actually says, but what if Paul had been
speculative instead, as Hebrews 11:18 is? Paul would have been making an untrue claim about
the meaning of the Genesis text. He would have failed the test of hermeneutical justification.
However, this same speculative move passes the test in Hebrews 11:18. The reasons for
this have already been discussed, but they boil down to this: the context of the usage in Hebrews
alters the nature of the illocutionary act such that when it speculates it is not in fact making a
claim about the meaning of the Genesis text. This allows the usage of Genesis 21:12 in Hebrews
to pass the test of hermeneutical justification where similar usage in Romans 9:7 would not. It
has already been established that Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 represent different
hermeneutics. At this point it is important to add to this the observation that what was justified in
one passage is not necessarily justified in the other. As such, the New Testament is not merely
exhibiting, for example, a restricted pool of hermeneutical methods which can be used in any
situation. Rather, there is a complex relationship between context and which hermeneutical
maneuvers are justified and which are not.
Since the hermeneutical method employed in Hebrews 11:18 has been discussed in terms
of how it would operate in the context of Romans 9:7, the word should be said about the reverse.
How would the hermeneutical method of Romans 9:7 function within Hebrews 11:18? Since
Paul’s usage involves appeal to fact drawn from the Old Testament meaning, it does not seem
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that there would be a problem with hermeneutical justification even if a similar move were done
in the context of Hebrews 11:18. Applying that hermeneutic in the context of Hebrews 11:18
would involve leaving out the statements about Abraham’s hope in a resurrection, since those are
speculative, and their inclusion would therefore change the nature of the hermeneutic. Hebrews’
statements about Abraham’s experience would not be as relatable to the Christian audience.
However, hermeneutical justification is simply a matter of not making untrue claims about the
meaning of the Old Testament text. It seems that the hermeneutic employed in Romans 9:7
would not be unjustified in the context of Hebrews 11:18, even if it were not as rhetorically
effective. The point remains, though, that there exists a relationship between context and
hermeneutical justification. What is allowable in one instance might not be allowable in another.
Situational Hermeneutic
Everything that has been discussed so far can now be brought together to argue for a
particular characterization of the hermeneutics exhibited in the New Testament use of the Old.
This study argues that the New Testament employs a situational hermeneutic. It also posits that
speech act theory is a useful way to approach this idea, particularly when it comes to
understanding questions about what may or may not be hermeneutically justified in a particular
situation. It remains, now, to lay out the concept of a situational hermeneutic, beginning with a
discussion of why this concept is needed based upon the observations that have been provided
thus far. An attempt will then be made to clearly define the concept of situation and how that
contributes to a definition of situational hermeneutic.
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The Need for Situation as an Explanatory Device
In order to discuss the concept of a situational hermeneutic as an accurate
characterization of the New Testament’s use of the Old, it is necessary to begin by arguing that
there is indeed a need for the concept of a situational hermeneutic. This argument flows from the
points that have been discussed so far. The aim here will be to show that these points imply that
there is a need for the concept of situation. This will serve as a basis for discussing how that
concept can be clearly defined.
In order to accomplish this task, this study will begin with by stating a point from the
preceding discussion in the form of two premises (1) Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 exhibit
different hermeneutical methods. (2) Both Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 are hermeneutically
justified in their use of Genesis 21:12. There is no need to repeat the argumentation behind these
premises, but it is important to observe that they imply that (3) multiple hermeneutical methods
can be hermeneutically justified. The logic here is fairly straightforward. If two different
passages employ different hermeneutical methods that are both justified, then it stands to reason
that more than one hermeneutical method can be justified. Hermeneutical justification is not,
then, only a matter of using the right method, but rather there is more than one justifiable
method. This is not meant to imply that any method is justifiable, but simply that there is more
than one. Now the following premise can be added: (4) the hermeneutical method exhibited in
Hebrews 11:18 would not be justified if it were employed in Romans 9:7. Again, the reasons for
this have been discussed at length, but (3) in combination with (4) suggests the following
conclusion: (5) hermeneutical methods that are justified in one context are not necessarily
justified in all contexts. Since the method in Hebrews 11:18 would not be justified in the context
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of Romans 9:7, it stands to reason that at least some hermeneutical methods are justified only
conditionally. This implies that there is something beyond the hermeneutical method itself which
affects hermeneutical justification. The fact that some methods are only conditionally justified
implies the existence of a condition.
If a hermeneutical method is not justified in one context but is justified in another, this
means that it is not the method itself which makes it inherently justified or unjustified. It must
therefore be something about the context which makes the difference. There must exist a
condition or set of conditions which affect whether or not some hermeneutical methods are
justified. Speech act theory furnishes a way to understand and evaluate these conditions in terms
of their effect upon whether or not a particular usage is justified. By recognizing the manner in
which various factors can alter the performative impact of a speech act, speech act theory can
adequately describe how factors other than hermeneutical method can make the difference
between use and misuse, particularly in light of the fact that certain usages may be acceptable in
some scenarios but not in others. This study chooses to refer to this these conditions as situation
for reasons which will be discussed, but it is sufficient for now simply to acknowledge that there
is a need for such a concept in order to adequately account for the hermeneutical methods
exhibited by the New Testament.
Definition of Situation
Walter Kaiser argues that while variety can be found in how the New Testament uses the
Old, the arguments presented within the New Testament depend upon congruity with the Old
Testament message for their authenticity. His argument in The Uses of the Old Testament in the

173

New focuses on passages which use the Old Testament apologetically.16 His argument hints at
the relationship between the purpose of Old Testament usage and the need for hermeneutical
rigor. Indeed, it is telling that he writes that, “while Jewish and Christian believers often would
trifle with the Scriptures for devotional and meditative purposes, one would be hard-pressed to
find any apologetic value in appealing to such procedures as midrash, pesher, allgory, or the
like…”17 The implication here is that purpose can have a role in tightening or loosening
hermeneutical requirements. Beale is more explicit in acknowledging that some instances of
New Testament use of the Old are hermeneutically looser than others. Beale excuses these looser
instances on the basis that they often involve “… an ironic or polemical intention.”18 Beale and
Carson discuss this issue a little further in the introduction to their Commentary on the New
Testament use of the Old Testament. They argue that the Old Testament may be used by the New
in multiple ways. Importantly, some of these ways may be more hermeneutically demanding
than others. For example, they ask whether there may be instances where apparent references to
the Old Testament are simply the result of the author’s mind being steeped in scriptural
language, alongside instances that involve claims of Old Testament prophecy fulfillment, or
other instances that seek to teach a moral lesson by way of analogy.19
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Beale, Carson, and Kaiser seem to express the idea that using the Old Testament for
certain purposes allows for looser interpretations than other purposes might, though neither
closely explores this relationship. This study seeks to answer more clearly the following
question: what is it that allows looser interpretation in some instances but not in others? The idea
that purpose or reason for usage of an Old Testament text can have an effect on the need for
hermeneutical rigor is a clue to this relationship, but purpose of use alone is not necessarily
adequate to account for it. This study argues instead for a concept of situation which takes into
account more than just the purpose of scriptural usage. This section will discuss the reasons for
which situation is a desirable term for this concept. Following this, an attempt will be made to
clearly define the concept of situation as it is relevant here. This will lay the foundation for the
introduction of the concept of a situational hermeneutic in the New Testament.
First, it is important to discuss why situation is a desirable term for this concept. The
concept in question involves conditions which make hermeneutical maneuvers justifiable at
times but not at other times. At first blush, it may seem simpler to understand this idea as
context. What makes the difference between hermeneutical justification and the lack thereof, it
seems, boils down to what is going in the text surrounding a usage of the Old Testament, and
context appears to be an adequate way to refer to this. Context, however, is undesirable because
it is too general. Everything surrounding a particular text, such as other text, the author, historical
factors, etc. all fall under the label of context. Not all of these factors, however, necessarily play
a role in determining the difference between use and misuse. A less broad term, if it can be
found, would be desirable. That term may encompass a subset of context, but it would not
necessarily be synonymous with it. Furthermore, context is a loaded term in a way which focuses
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on text. Context, taken generally, applies to things other than texts, but in discussions of
hermeneutics it may prove difficult to escape from its textual connotations.
Situation is offered here as a more desirable term. While context focuses on texts,
situation focuses on action. This is of particular importance since hermeneutical justification has
already been framed in terms of its relationship to speech acts. If use and misuse are actions, it
makes sense to view the surrounding factors which play a pivotal role in creating use and misuse
in terms of their relationship to action. The term situation is chosen because it is slightly different
from context and connotes action as the thing being surrounded. This recognizes that it is not
merely the text which is involved in use or misuse, but that use and misuse are both illocutionary
acts, and that whether or not either has taken place depends on the situation in which the acts
take place.
With all of this in mind, the task of defining situation is fairly straightforward. In the
context of this argument, situation refers to factors surrounding speech acts involved in use of an
Old Testament text which have some effect on the performative impact of those speech acts.
Most importantly, situation involves things which surround the act of using the Old Testament
text and in turn affect whether or not that use constitutes. Thus, situation plays into whether or
not particular hermeneutical methods are justified. It comprises the things which affect the nature
of speech acts related to Old Testament usage. Situation is closely related to context, and indeed
any evidence useful in understanding the situation of particular text is likely to come from
context, but it is best to view situation and context as logically distinct even though they are
closely related.
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Defining a Situational Hermeneutic
Having established the need for a concept of situation and provided a definition for it, it
is now possible to get to the crux of the argument of this chapter. This study seeks to provide a
useful characterization of the New Testament’s hermeneutic, but it has shown that the New
Testament’s hermeneutic is not monolithic. The New Testament employs multiple hermeneutics.
However, this study also seeks to remain true to a structuralist approach to intertextual meaning.
That is to say that this study seeks to show how the multiple hermeneutics of the New Testament,
some looser than others, can accommodate an approach which sees meaning as rooted in
authorial intent. To clarify, the meaning of the Old Testament text is rooted in the intent of the
author of that text, and the meaning of the New Testament text is in turn rooted in the intent of
its own author. This commitment to a structuralist approach to meaning means that while
multiple hermeneutical approaches may be allowable, they are not without restriction. Some
hermeneutics may not be allowed at all, while others may only be conditionally allowed. The
hermeneutical dynamics of Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18, in fact, exhibit this conditionality.
The upshot of this is that what is hermeneutically allowable is dependent upon external
factors. This study has chosen to refer to these factors collectively as situation. As such, it makes
sense to characterize the hermeneutic of the New Testament in its use of the Old as a situational
hermeneutic. This is a hermeneutic which admits to a variety of hermeneutical methods, but
these methods are restrained. They are not restrained simply as a static list of which methods are
allowable and which are not.20 Rather, whether or not they are allowable ultimately depends on
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situation. There is a dynamic but consistent relationship between hermeneutical justification and
situation as situation forms the context of performative speech acts and plays a part in
determining their nature. Therefore, it is not enough simply to say that the New Testament
exhibits multiple hermeneutics. It exhibits a situational hermeneutic, employing different
methods creatively as the situation allows, but within a framework that is dynamic but restricted
by the contours of the situational backdrop.
This situational hermeneutic, then, is a dynamic and creative hermeneutic which respects
the Old Testament’s meaning, structuralistically construed, within the framework of the situation
current to the New Testament text. By approaching this in terms of the effects which situation
has upon the nature of speech acts, it becomes clearer how the manner in which this situational
aspect of the hermeneutics found in the New Testament can be applied consistently. Having
defined the concept of a situational hermeneutic, there is an important issue which needs to be
briefly addressed before proceeding toward a discussion of the relationship between a situational
hermeneutic and the theology of the New Testament authors.
Typology and a Situational Hermeneutic
If an attempt is to be made to characterize the hermeneutics exhibited in the New
Testament, it is necessary to discuss how that characterization relates to typology. After all,
typology is not simply one way in which the New Testament uses the Old. Some scholars have
argued that it is in fact the primary way.21 As such, it is important to discuss the relationship
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between a situational hermeneutic and typology. The concept of a situational hermeneutic is in
no way an attempt to dethrone typology as an understanding of how the authors of the New
Testament use the Old. Situational hermeneutic is an attempt to explain the New Testament’s use
of the Old from a hermeneutical perspective, with a primary focus on the issue of hermeneutical
justification. Typology, on the other hand, describes a specific, though common, way in which
New Testament uses the Old. Typology, in fact, fits within the framework of a situational
hermeneutic. It is among the hermeneutical methods which a situational hermeneutic allows for.
A situational hermeneutic is a framework that seeks to explain how the New Testament can use
the Old in a variety of creative ways while respecting the meaning of the Old Testament text,
structuralistically construed. Typology, on the other hand, is a particular understanding of a
particular way of reading the Old Testament exhibited by the New Testament, and like any other
particular way of using the Old Testament it can find a place within the framework of a
situational hermeneutic.
So, situational hermeneutic and typology are not competing conceptions of how the New
Testament uses the Old. If anything, they are complementary. What begs for further scrutiny at
this point, though, is what guides and limits this situational hermeneutic from a theological
perspective. The New Testament’s use of the Old is highly theological, and in particular
Christological. Therefore, the next step in this study is to explore how this concept of a
situational hermeneutic interacts with theology.
The Role of Theology in a Situational Hermeneutic
The New Testament authors are creative and varied in their usage of the Old Testament.
The concept of a situational hermeneutic that has been proposed here attempts to offer some
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insight into the nature of this hermeneutical variety. However, any discussion of the
hermeneutics exhibited within the New Testament as it uses the Old would be incomplete if it
did not address the role of theology in the New Testament’s use of the Old. Therefore, the
theological dimension of the New Testament’s hermeneutics will be explored here, particularly
as it relates to the concept of a situational hermeneutic and acts as a guide and limiter within that
framework. Commentators upon the New Testament’s use of the Old often recognize theology as
having a central role in how the Old Testament is used.22 Christology in particular colors how the
New Testament authors utilize the Old Testament, even when it does not speak directly about
Christ. The New Testament authors are affected by bibliology as well. It informs their views
upon the nature of Scripture and by extension their usage of it.
Bibliology and a Situational Hermeneutic
The relationship between theology and the New Testament’s use of the Old seems clear,
and that relationship holds when the New Testament’s use of the Old is framed as a situational
hermeneutic. One of the major components of the concept of a situational hermeneutic that has
been proposed here is a commitment to structuralist meaning. That is to say that the meaning of
the Old Testament text is external to the New Testament author and the New Testament text. It
resides within the Old Testament itself, in the form of the intent of the Old Testament author.
This commitment to structuralist meaning is not just a commitment to a particular literary theory,
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it is also a theological commitment. It implies a certain understanding about what the word of
God is and how God communicates it. It is a bibliological position with bibliological
ramifications.
This same commitment is evidenced by the New Testament authors themselves. In his
recent book The Hermeneutics of the Biblical Writers, Abner Chou argues for a hermeneutical
continuity between the Old Testament prophets and the apostles of the New Testament. As part
of his larger argument, he offers an investigation into the self-perception of the New Testament
authors using internal evidence from the New Testament text. He argues that citation formulae,
for example, evidence the dependency on the part of the New Testament text upon the contextual
meaning of the Old.23 The upshot of Chou’s approach here is that it shows that the New
Testament’s apparent commitment to the contextual meaning of the Old goes beyond simply
what is evidenced in the usage itself. Chou presents internal evidence that suggests that the New
Testament authors were self-aware that they were using the Old Testament in a way consistent
with this respect for its authoritative meaning. This suggests that what the New Testament
authors believed about the Old Testament played a part, likely a large part, in determining how
they used it. Their theology, and specifically their bibliology, is inseparable from their
hermeneutic.
Richard B. Hays provides another relevant insight in Conversion of the Imagination. He
argues for a “hermeneutic of trust” rather than a “hermeneutic of skepticism” which is focused
upon trust in the God who is the author of Scripture. This hermeneutic of trust, in some ways,
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enables somewhat imaginative interpretation because it is trust-centered rather than focusing on
hermeneutical method.24 Perhaps Hays would see the concept of a situational hermeneutic and its
attempt to describe the functioning of hermeneutical justification within the context of the
creative usages found in the New Testament as the product of a hermeneutic of skepticism.
Regardless, his insight makes an important point: whatever factors limit the hermeneutics of the
New Testament are concerned with views about enScriptured revelation before they are
concerned about commitment to a particular hermeneutical method. In some ways this echoes the
concept of a situational hermeneutic. A situational hermeneutic does not question whether a
hermeneutical method is the right or best method, but whether it constitutes misuse within a
situation, whether it violates what is known or believed about the Old Testament text.
The simple fact that the New Testament authors appeal to the theological authority of the
Old Testament shows that they consider it to have an authoritative meaning outside of
themselves. When Paul turns to Romans 9:7 to argue about covenant exclusivity, he is appealing
to a revealed fact, and the source of that revelation is the Old Testament text. His argument does
not work if he is reading into the text something that is not there. Ultimately, a structuralist
approach to meaning seems to be reflected in the bibliology of the New Testament writers. This
in turns helps to form the foundation of the situational hermeneutic of the New Testament. The
situational hermeneutic depends upon that particular bibliological idea. Without a commitment to
structuralist meaning, a situational hermeneutic as it has been construed here would not exist.
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Even if it could be situational in the sense that situation might affect how an author chooses to
read the text, it could not be situational in the sense that situation would play a role determining
hermeneutical justification. Under a post-structuralist approach to meaning, the concept of
hermeneutical justification loses relevance. As such, insofar as the concept of a situational
hermeneutic is founded on a structuralist approach to meaning, it is founded upon a particular
bibliological idea about the nature of God’s word.
Bibliology is not the only area of theology that interacts with the concept of a situational
hermeneutic, however. Discussions of the ways in which the New Testament reads the Old
theologically often focus on Christology, and for good reason. Old Testament passages are
frequently used in ways that highlight their significance with regard to Christ, even if they are
not directly Christological within their Old Testament contexts. Further, the New Testament uses
the Old not only to speak about Christ generally but about salvation-history as fulfilled in him.
As such, this study will now turn to an examination of the Christological and salvation-historical
dimension of the New Testament use of the Old and how that interacts with the concept of a
situational hermeneutic.
Salvation-Historical Christology and a Situational Hermeneutic
While the bibliology of the New Testament authors is an important component of their
use of the Old Testament, their Christology within the context of salvation-history is perhaps
more important.25 This aspect of the theology of the New Testament authors is, at least, far more
directly evident in their writings. It is not unrelated to bibliology. It could be argued that one of
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the underpinnings of the bibliology of the New Testament writers is their belief that all of
Scripture is Christological in a salvation-historical way. However, the relationship between this
aspect of the theology of the New Testament writers and the concept of a situational hermeneutic
differs from that of their bibliology. As such, the two deserve separate treatment.
N. T. Wright argues that Paul formed Christian theology in response to the practical
needs of the community of faith which he served. This community lived within the new era of
salvation history initiated by Jesus, and the need to preach and teach to that community
necessitated Paul’s application of the Old Testament Scriptures to this new theological reality.
Moreover, the continuity between the Old Testament Scriptures and this new reality was
assumed. Paul’s task was not to appropriate these texts but to preach the new covenant in light of
them.26
Beale likewise emphasizes the continuity between the Old Testament and the new
salvation-historical era initiated by Christ. Beale argues that New Testament interpretations of
the Old Testament differ from Jewish interpretations not because the New Testament authors
twist Scripture, but because they operate under a different set of presuppositions which inform
their hermeneutics. He lists five presuppositions which relate to the New Testament’s
Christological reading of the Old. The New Testament’s use of the Old relates to Christ, but it
does so in a particularly salvation-historical way as it seeks to apply the Old Testament
Scriptures to the stage of salvation-history in which the New Testament authors find
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themselves.27 As such, the New Testament era serves as a broader context in which to interpret
the Old.
Beale shies away from affirming a sensus plenior because he feels it is a loaded term, but
he sees room for Old Testament texts to have meanings and implications perhaps not entirely
known to their original authors. There is an important distinction here, though. Beale argues that
New Testament interpretations do not contravene Old Testament meaning, but rather expand
upon it in light of salvation-historical developments. Importantly, they do so along lines already
set forth within the Old Testament itself.28 Christology, especially as it relates to salvationhistory, forms an integral part of the theological backdrop of New Testament hermeneutics.
But how does this relate to the concept of a situational hermeneutic as it has been
presented here? Beale seems to affirm that, in some sense, there are meanings in the Old
Testament which the author is not aware of, but he qualifies that comment thusly: “I believe,
however, that it can be demonstrated that this expansion does not contravene the integrity of the
earlier texts but rather develops them in a way which is consistent with the Old Testament
author’s understanding of the way in which God interacts with his people.”29 In other words,
while there is some sense in which an Old Testament text can have meaning of which its original
author was unaware, that meaning is nonetheless not completely external to the Old Testament
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author’s intent. It is somehow incipient in the Old Testament author, taking into account the
wider context of the God-human relational dynamic.
Both Romans 9:7 and Hebrews 11:18 are good examples of this. In Romans 9:7, Paul is
concerned with a question that is in a sense a question of salvation history. It concerns the reality
of Christ’s rejection by many Jews in Paul’s salvation-historical era, and the potential problems
this creates in light of earlier promises.30 Even if the author of Genesis was not focused on the
potential for covenant exclusivity among the chosen nation at a future stage long after the era of
the patriarchs, the manner in which he presents the covenant promise nevertheless includes
details that can be applied to that exclusivity. They are relevant to a later salvation-historical era.
Likewise, Hebrews’ reading of Abraham’s life sees the original narrative involving Abraham’s
hope in light of the resurrection hope enjoyed by the audience of Hebrews.31 Importantly, these
two hopes are not entirely distinct. The resurrection hope contemporary to Hebrews is viewed as
a later development of the hope enjoyed by Abraham and not an entirely new and separate hope.
In both cases, this connection serves to preserve the integrity Old Testament meaning in spite of
its application in a new and different salvation-historical era.
Situational hermeneutic is concerned with hermeneutical justification from a speech act
perspective. That is, misuse is an illocutionary act which is determined in part by situational
factors. What is proper use in one situation might be misuse in another. The degree to which
New Testament usages of the Old Testament in light of further-developed salvation-history
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constitute new or developed meanings attached to the Old Testament texts themselves might be
debatable. However, Within the context of a situational hermeneutic, might these salvationhistorical concerns form a part of the interpretive situation?
Situational hermeneutic deals with the question of whether a particular usage of Scripture
claims that that Scripture means something it does not mean. Does usage of Old Testament
Scripture in light of further salvation-historical development constitute misuse under this rubric?
In order to answer this question, an important distinction should be pointed out. These new
meanings to which Beale alludes do not arise from the Old Testament text alone nor from
salvation-history alone. Rather, they arise from the combination of the two. It is Old Testament
text in light of salvation-history that gives rise to these interpretations.
Does that indicate, as Beale argues, that the Old Testament text itself means these new
meanings? If it does, then New Testament usage is simply claiming that the text means what it
means, which does not constitute misuse under the rubric of a situational hermeneutic. On the
other hand, what if Beale is wrong on that point? What if these meanings are not contained
within the Old Testament text alone, but instead arise from the Old Testament text only in
combination with salvation-history? In that case, then it would seem that the New Testament
authors are still not making false claims about the meaning of the Old Testament text. Rather,
they can be seen as making claims about the meaning of the Old Testament text in light of
salvation history. That is, the meaning they are claiming exists lies in the combination of the text
with salvation history and not solely in the text itself. Such claims, though related to claims about
the meaning of the text, are logically distinct. It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss in
detail whether Beale is right or wrong with regard to sensus plenior, but it appears that the
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construal of hermeneutical justification under the rubric of a situational hermeneutic can function
either way. Either the New Testament authors are simply saying something true about the text, or
what they are saying is not directly and completely about the text on its own, but a comment
upon both text and salvation-history in combination with one another.
For example, Romans 9:7 applies the logic of the Abrahamic promise to the reality of
new covenant exclusivity in Paul’s day. Paul makes no illocutionary claim that the Genesis text
speaks to the new covenant. However, what the Genesis text does speak to, its own internal
meaning, has certain implications within the context of that later salvation-historical reality.
Hebrews 11:18 is an even better example in this regard. In chapter four, it was concluded that
Hebrews’ statement about Abraham’s belief in a resurrection for Isaac does not constitute a
claim about the meaning of the Genesis text, but rather a further comment upon Abraham
himself as an historical person. In light of the resurrection hope that is a salvation-historical
reality for the author and audience of Hebrews, which is of a single historical thread with
Abraham’s hope, it is not disingenuous to conclude, as Hebrews does, that Abraham believed
God was able to raise Isaac from the dead. The fact that this conclusion is not expressed in the
Genesis text taken on its own does not mean that Hebrews is making a false claim about the
meaning of the Genesis text. The idea expressed in Hebrews arises from the combination of the
Genesis text and a New Testament theology of salvation-history, and this does not constitute an
illocutionary false claim about the meaning of the Genesis text.
Can Modern Readers Use a Situational Hermeneutic?
Having discussed the concept of a situational hermeneutic and how it interacts with the
theological way in which the New Testament authors read the Old Testament, it is not possible to
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turn to an important question which seems to arise in any discussion of the hermeneutic of the
New Testament authors. Can and should their hermeneutical methods be utilized by modern
readers? In the context of this study, the question can be framed as such: should modern readers
use a situational hermeneutic like that used by the New Testament authors?
Longenecker and Beale weigh in with opposing answers to this question. Longenecker
argues that the hermeneutical methods of the New Testament writers should not be considered
normative practice for Christians today. While they made sense within their historical context,
they do not necessarily make sense in all historical contexts. As such, modern Christians, while
beholden to apostolic doctrine, are not required to use the same hermeneutics as the New
Testament writers.32 This question, though, hinges somewhat upon how the hermeneutics of the
New Testament are understood. Some degree of perceived invalidity on the part of those
hermeneutical methods seems to be required in order to question whether they can be
reproduced. If the hermeneutics of the New Testament are rather free in their reading of the Old,
taking things out of context or generally misusing the text, then the danger is that anyone
imitating their methods would do the same. Longenecker, for example, sees the hermeneutics of
the New Testament primarily in light of their similarity to intertestamental Jewish practices that
are often questionable by modern standards. While the Jewish background of the New Testament
should not be ignored, when it comes to hermeneutics care must be taken not to overstate it
either.
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Beale’s argument hinges upon the idea that the New Testament’s use of the Old is not, in
fact, non-contextual. He sees the New Testament writers as respectful of the Old Testament
context, though they often use utilize that contextual meaning in ways that are complex. To him,
this means that the hermeneutical methods of the New Testament writers can be reproduced
today, and in fact they should be lest modern readers risk separating themselves from the
apostles.33
It seems that the question of whether or not the hermeneutical methods of the New
Testament writers should be reproduced is closely related to the question of whether or not those
methods can be considered valid.34 Part of the goal of this study in arguing for a situational
hermeneutic has been to argue that the New Testament writers can be seen as respecting the Old
Testament’s meaning under a structuralist framework while also accounting for their apparent
creativity. Insofar as the concept of a situational hermeneutic succeeds in this endeavor, it also
succeeds in showing that New Testament hermeneutics are valid. A situational hermeneutic is
intended to be inherently a valid one since it comprises hermeneutical methods that can be
considered valid situationally. It does not attempt to prove the validity of New Testament usage
so much as it seeks to offer an explanation of how it can be valid when multiple hermeneutical
methods are evident. If a situational hermeneutic is valid and the question of reproducibility
largely hinges on validity, then it stands to reason that a situational hermeneutic can be
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reproduced. Just as the concept of a situational hermeneutic is a useful way to describe the
multiplicity of New Testament interpretation, perhaps in the same way it can describe alreadyextant modern usages that are valid within different situational contexts. Thus, if a situational
hermeneutic is valid (and this study has argued that it is), then it can and should be utilized
today. It arguably already is. Modern readers just need to take into account situational factors
which may affect the validity of a particular usage with a particular situational context.
Just like the New Testament authors, modern readers of Scripture may interpret and use
Scripture in a variety of situational contexts. Modern readers exegete Scripture, use it to build
theology, use it homiletically, apply it, and read it devotionally. The example of T. S. Eliot’s
“The Hippopotamus” discussed in the previous chapter is an example of Scripture being used as
part of a modern creative work, and yet that particular work takes on aspects of homily and
application in its message addressed to the church. Furthermore, all of these usages of Scripture
are performed in their own particular cultural, historical, and community contexts. Even the
genre of the Scripture being used may play a role. Each of these usages of Scripture forms its
own situational milieu.
Importantly, the approach furnished by speech act theory can be applied to modern
situations just as it can be applied to New Testament situations. Part of the advantage of this
approach is that while it can accommodate the variety of situations represented in the New
Testament as they relate to the New Testament’s usage of Scripture, they can apply to situations
experienced by modern interpreters in the same way. As long as the criterion for hermeneutical
justification is satisfied, modern readers can use Scripture in situationally-appropriate ways. By
recognizing use and misuse as illocutionary acts, this approach allows modern readers to
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evaluate their own usage of Scripture according to the same standard that can applied to the New
Testament. This goes beyond the question of whether or not modern readers are permitted to
replicate New Testament methods of interpretation. It provides insight into the subsequent
question of how they can go about doing so. Part of the answer to that subsequent question, it
would seem, would be to evaluate one’s own illocutionary acts in light of one’s situational
context.
New Testament authors and modern readers alike both operate within complex situational
contexts and use Scripture in a variety of ways within those contexts. All of these contexts form
a situational backdrop which has the potential to affect what does and does not constitute valid
usage. The author of Hebrews exhibits this by applying Abraham’s experience expressed in the
Genesis narrative to that of the audience.35 The concept of a situational hermeneutic means that
when taking situational factors into account, this is not necessarily a misappropriation of the text,
nor does it indicate a lack of respect for the Old Testament’s meaning understood from a
structuralistic perspective. By exploring situational factors, especially by using the tools
provided by speech act theory, perhaps modern readers can better navigate what is and what is
not acceptable in light of varying situational contexts.
Conclusion
This study has attempted to make a small inroad into the large task of characterizing the
New Testament’s use of the Old. It has sought to maintain the validity of that usage in the face of
the evident creativity of the ways in which the New Testament uses the Old. It has recognized
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that there is not a single, overarching hermeneutical method which describes the New
Testament’s use of the Old, referring to two New Testament passages that both use the same Old
Testament passage differently in order to elucidate this point. This study has discussed these
passages in detail and sought to find a criterion of validity which can function within a variety of
situational context and which might be used to argue in favor of the New Testament’s
hermeneutical integrity in light of this hermeneutical multiplicity. To that end, speech act theory
has been employed, recognizing that misuse of Old Testament texts is an illocutionary act and
that therefore a criterion for hermeneutical justification can be built around that approach. As
such, speech acts were discussed within the context of the passages that served as the focus of
this study.
This all led to the formation of a concept of a situational hermeneutic, which recognizes
that the performative impact of speech acts is affected by situation, even to the degree that
situational factors can make the difference between use and misuse of a text. As such, it is not
enough to ask whether or not a hermeneutical method evidenced within the New Testament is
valid, but it also needs to be asked whether or not that method is valid within the current
situation. Some methods which might be invalid in some situations may well be valid in those
situations in which they do appear in the New Testament. The evident creativity in the New
Testament’s use of the Old may well be accounted for as valid under this rubric. Moreover,
speech act theory serves as a way to navigate this concept of situation from a theoretical as well
as a practical perspective.
This concept of a situational hermeneutic was then discussed as it relates to the
theological underpinnings of the New Testament’s use of the Old. All in all, this study has
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sought to show that the New Testament’s use of the Old is not monolithic. While that particular
point is not hotly debated, it has also sought to show how hermeneutical validity can be
maintained given that interpretive variety. The New Testament authors utilize a situational
hermeneutic, and that hermeneutic is valid. It can be reproduced by modern readers and probably
already is in some form. Creativity can be employed in how the Bible is read, interpreted, and
applied. Doing so does not necessarily imply misuse of the Scripture. Readers simply need to
take into account situational factors which might make the difference between use and misuse,
and the approach discussed here based upon speech act theory provides a way for them to do so.
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